From patchwork Tue Apr 12 21:21:24 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 12811289 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8343C433EF for ; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 23:24:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229934AbiDLX0r (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:26:47 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44308 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230044AbiDLX0W (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:26:22 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1870EE9967; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 15:40:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CL7kSC009058; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:41 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=MsEQHlRc5s0kB5gw3dEIoCSQBugOphAjhjTsJWExk10=; b=aO/9mjbFf3ZFGcZMn5Kwy0Lm80/zDaeyZUtYf0Pinh1dbuGOAgsSWtekQUg5ziI8h9TY ajc5/qjPkCg/Spnt6/8NDUxvj35lVBQr7JCT0dxy80Pnne8z8Y9GHm8YVvagIoYOtu+G WwIREwQwO8at3D9s1Z67YMTghHTgN5NNE4jkWlYKu9jNschkUTQvaZzKIZn8wZWq94OP mv78LV2i7pv+T4JRzARcLlowB1WvLi7G9QomgCCMx/jD9ztt7LfHrugwgJBvEVTjBLyS Q301ggRG4FpT67olidEnQoaR9ctyOiCLyyu5NOzgQQyDlmYV6AEDnUcQ4bQRzEdd1RQ0 9Q== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3fde22c7m1-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:40 +0000 Received: from m0098393.ppops.net (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 23CL5tvt001731; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:40 GMT Received: from ppma03dal.us.ibm.com (b.bd.3ea9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.62.189.11]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3fde22c7kk-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:40 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma03dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma03dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CLC1fp007798; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.19]) by ppma03dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3fb1sa1t6e-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 +0000 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.233]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 23CLLbng14287330 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:37 GMT Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DB4E13605E; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:37 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99E3D136053; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:35 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:35 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Gerd Hoffmann , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Matthew Garrett , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:24 +0000 Message-Id: <20220412212127.154182-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: DiCSi1JcTGmGkiljjdGDXQd_QerrljCx X-Proofpoint-GUID: mNB_XaO3fkUvQpKH2Dgz9pmdfcNctiyQ X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-04-12_06,2022-04-12_02,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 impostorscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 clxscore=1015 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2204120097 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example: [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018 The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 147c30a81f15..1591d67e0bcd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + &efi.coco_secret, +#endif }; u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */ diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig index 2c3dac5ecb36..6fa251b3709f 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig @@ -284,3 +284,19 @@ config EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/ssdt-overlays.rst for more information. + +config EFI_COCO_SECRET + bool "EFI Confidential Computing Secret Area Support" + depends on EFI + help + Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow the + Guest Owner to securely inject secrets during guest VM launch. + The secrets are placed in a designated EFI reserved memory area. + + In order to use the secrets in the kernel, the location of the secret + area (as published in the EFI config table) must be kept. + + If you say Y here, the address of the EFI secret area will be kept + for usage inside the kernel. This will allow the + virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn + allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets. diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 7de3f5b6e8d0..378d044b2463 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + .coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, +#endif }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); @@ -528,6 +531,9 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS {LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID, &efi.mokvar_table, "MOKvar" }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + {LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "CocoSecret" }, #endif {}, }; diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index ccd4d3f91c98..771d4cd06b56 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2) #define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68) #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) /* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) @@ -596,6 +597,7 @@ extern struct efi { unsigned long tpm_log; /* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log; /* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table; /* MOK variable config table */ + unsigned long coco_secret; /* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time; efi_set_time_t *set_time; @@ -1335,4 +1337,12 @@ extern void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt); static inline void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt) { } #endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { + u64 base_pa; + u64 size; +}; + +/* Header of a populated EFI secret area */ +#define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b) + #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */