Message ID | 20220420140633.753772-11-stefanb@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns | expand |
On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:06:17AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > Instead of calling ima_lsm_update_rules() for every namespace upon > invocation of the ima_lsm_policy_change() notification function, > only set a flag in a namespace and defer the call to > ima_lsm_update_rules() to before the policy is accessed the next time, > which is either in ima_policy_start(), when displaying the policy via > the policy file in securityfs, or when calling ima_match_policy(). > > The performance numbers before this change for a test enabling > and disabling an SELinux module was as follows with a given number > of IMA namespaces that each a have a policy containing 2 rules > with SELinux labels: > > 2: ~9s > 192: ~11s > 1920: ~80s > > With this change: > > 2: ~6.5s > 192: ~7s > 1920: ~8.3s > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index c68b5117d034..5bf7f080c2be 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ struct ima_h_table { > }; > > struct ima_namespace { > + unsigned long ima_ns_flags; > +/* Bit numbers for above flags; use BIT() to get flag */ > +#define IMA_NS_LSM_UPDATE_RULES 0 > + > /* policy rules */ > struct list_head ima_default_rules; /* Kconfig, builtin & arch rules */ > struct list_head ima_policy_rules; /* arch & custom rules */ > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 23c559c8fae9..59e4ae5a6361 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -228,6 +228,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { > {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, > }; > > +static void ima_lsm_update_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns); > + > +static inline void ima_lazy_lsm_update_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns) > +{ > + if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_NS_LSM_UPDATE_RULES, &ns->ima_ns_flags)) > + ima_lsm_update_rules(ns); > +} > + > static int ima_policy __initdata; > > static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) > @@ -478,7 +486,8 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, > return NOTIFY_DONE; > > ns = container_of(nb, struct ima_namespace, ima_lsm_policy_notifier); > - ima_lsm_update_rules(ns); > + > + set_bit(IMA_NS_LSM_UPDATE_RULES, &ns->ima_ns_flags); > > return NOTIFY_OK; > } > @@ -705,6 +714,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, > if (template_desc && !*template_desc) > *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); > > + ima_lazy_lsm_update_rules(ns); > + > rcu_read_lock(); > ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); > list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { > @@ -1907,6 +1918,8 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) > struct ima_rule_entry *entry; > struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp; > > + ima_lazy_lsm_update_rules(ns); > + > rcu_read_lock(); > ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); > list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { > -- > 2.34.1
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c68b5117d034..5bf7f080c2be 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ struct ima_h_table { }; struct ima_namespace { + unsigned long ima_ns_flags; +/* Bit numbers for above flags; use BIT() to get flag */ +#define IMA_NS_LSM_UPDATE_RULES 0 + /* policy rules */ struct list_head ima_default_rules; /* Kconfig, builtin & arch rules */ struct list_head ima_policy_rules; /* arch & custom rules */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 23c559c8fae9..59e4ae5a6361 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -228,6 +228,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; +static void ima_lsm_update_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns); + +static inline void ima_lazy_lsm_update_rules(struct ima_namespace *ns) +{ + if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_NS_LSM_UPDATE_RULES, &ns->ima_ns_flags)) + ima_lsm_update_rules(ns); +} + static int ima_policy __initdata; static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) @@ -478,7 +486,8 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, return NOTIFY_DONE; ns = container_of(nb, struct ima_namespace, ima_lsm_policy_notifier); - ima_lsm_update_rules(ns); + + set_bit(IMA_NS_LSM_UPDATE_RULES, &ns->ima_ns_flags); return NOTIFY_OK; } @@ -705,6 +714,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, if (template_desc && !*template_desc) *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); + ima_lazy_lsm_update_rules(ns); + rcu_read_lock(); ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) { @@ -1907,6 +1918,8 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) struct ima_rule_entry *entry; struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp; + ima_lazy_lsm_update_rules(ns); + rcu_read_lock(); ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ns->ima_rules); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
Instead of calling ima_lsm_update_rules() for every namespace upon invocation of the ima_lsm_policy_change() notification function, only set a flag in a namespace and defer the call to ima_lsm_update_rules() to before the policy is accessed the next time, which is either in ima_policy_start(), when displaying the policy via the policy file in securityfs, or when calling ima_match_policy(). The performance numbers before this change for a test enabling and disabling an SELinux module was as follows with a given number of IMA namespaces that each a have a policy containing 2 rules with SELinux labels: 2: ~9s 192: ~11s 1920: ~80s With this change: 2: ~6.5s 192: ~7s 1920: ~8.3s Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)