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Hallyn" , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Konstantin Meskhidze , =?utf-8?q?G=C3=BCnt?= =?utf-8?q?her_Noack?= Subject: [PATCH v5 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 22:30:04 +0200 Message-Id: <20220817203006.21769-3-gnoack3000@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 In-Reply-To: <20220817203006.21769-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com> References: <20220817203006.21769-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: These tests exercise the following truncation operations: * truncate() (truncate by path) * ftruncate() (truncate by file descriptor) * open with the O_TRUNC flag * special case: creat(), which is open with O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC. in the following scenarios: * Files with read, write and truncate rights. * Files with read and truncate rights. * Files with the truncate right. * Files without the truncate right. In particular, the following scenarios are enforced with the test: * ftruncate() requires the truncate right, even when the thread already has the right to write to the file. * open() with O_TRUNC requires the truncate right, if it truncates a file. open() already checks security_path_truncate() in this case, and it required no additional check in the Landlock LSM's file_open hook. * creat() requires the truncate right when called with an existing filename. * creat() does *not* require the truncate right when it's creating a new file. Signed-off-by: Günther Noack --- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 250 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 250 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c index cb77eaa01c91..010d4c59139e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1"; static const char file2_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2"; static const char dir_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1"; +static const char file1_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1"; /* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ static const char dir_s3d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2"; static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3"; @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3"; * │   ├── f1 * │   └── f2 * └── s3d1 + *    ├── f1 * └── s3d2 * └── s3d3 */ @@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) create_file(_metadata, file1_s2d3); create_file(_metadata, file2_s2d3); + create_file(_metadata, file1_s3d1); create_directory(_metadata, dir_s3d2); set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", dir_s3d2, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700")); @@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d2)); EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s3d1)); EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s3d3)); set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); umount(dir_s3d2); @@ -3023,6 +3027,252 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_fds[1])); } +/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns its errno or 0. */ +static int test_truncate(const char *const path) +{ + if (truncate(path, 10) < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +/* Invokes ftruncate(2) and returns its errno or 0. */ +static int test_ftruncate(int fd) +{ + if (ftruncate(fd, 10) < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0. + * Closes the opened file descriptor on success. + */ +static int test_creat(const char *const path, mode_t mode) +{ + int fd = creat(path, mode); + + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + + /* + * Mixing error codes from close(2) and creat(2) should not lead to any + * (access type) confusion for this test. + */ + if (close(fd) < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted, + * as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed. + */ +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled) +{ + const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1; + const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1; + const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2; + int file_r_fd, file_w_fd, file_none_fd; + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_r, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = file_w, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + /* Implicitly: No rights for file_none. */ + {}, + }; + + const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; + int ruleset_fd; + + /* + * Open some writable file descriptors before enabling Landlock, so that + * we can test ftruncate() without making open() a prerequisite. + */ + file_r_fd = open(file_r, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_r_fd); + file_w_fd = open(file_w, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_w_fd); + file_none_fd = open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_none_fd); + + /* Enable Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* + * Checks read right: truncate, ftruncate and open with O_TRUNC work, + * unless the file is attempted to be opened for writing. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_r)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_r_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_r, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_r, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(file_r, 0600)); + + /* + * Checks write right: truncate, ftruncate and open with O_TRUNC work, + * unless the file is attempted to be opened for reading. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_w)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_w_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_w, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_w, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_creat(file_w, 0600)); + + /* + * Checks "no rights" case: truncate and ftruncate work but all open + * attempts fail, including creat. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_none)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_none_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(file_none, 0600)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_r_fd)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_w_fd)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_none_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate) +{ + const char *const file_rwt = file1_s1d1; + const char *const file_rw = file2_s1d1; + const char *const file_rt = file1_s1d2; + const char *const file_t = file2_s1d2; + const char *const file_none = file1_s1d3; + const char *const dir_t = dir_s2d1; + const char *const file_in_dir_t = file1_s2d1; + const char *const dir_w = dir_s3d1; + const char *const file_in_dir_w = file1_s3d1; + int file_rwt_fd, file_rw_fd, file_rt_fd, file_t_fd, file_none_fd; + int file_in_dir_t_fd, file_in_dir_w_fd; + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_rwt, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + { + .path = file_rw, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = file_rt, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + { + .path = file_t, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + /* Implicitly: No access rights for file_none. */ + { + .path = dir_t, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + { + .path = dir_w, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {}, + }; + const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; + int ruleset_fd; + + /* + * Open some writable file descriptors before enabling Landlock, so that + * we can test ftruncate() without making open() a prerequisite. + */ + file_rwt_fd = open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_rwt_fd); + file_rw_fd = open(file_rw, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_rw_fd); + file_rt_fd = open(file_rt, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_rt_fd); + file_t_fd = open(file_t, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_t_fd); + file_none_fd = open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_none_fd); + file_in_dir_t_fd = open(file_in_dir_t, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_in_dir_t_fd); + file_in_dir_w_fd = open(file_in_dir_w, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, file_in_dir_w_fd); + + /* Enable Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_rwt_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + + /* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */ + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_truncate(file_rw)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_ftruncate(file_rw_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rw, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rw, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + + /* + * Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works. + * + * Note: Files can get truncated using open() even with O_RDONLY. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rt)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_rt_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_rt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + + /* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_t)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_t_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_t, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + + /* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */ + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_truncate(file_none)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_ftruncate(file_none_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_none, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + + /* + * Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained + * files. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_in_dir_t)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_in_dir_t_fd)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file_in_dir_t, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); + + /* + * Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right when + * overwriting an existing file, but does not require it when the file + * is new. + */ + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_creat(file_in_dir_w, 0600)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file_in_dir_w)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, test_creat(file_in_dir_w, 0600)); +} + /* clang-format off */ FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {}; /* clang-format on */