From patchwork Mon Aug 29 17:04:01 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" X-Patchwork-Id: 12958253 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0898C6FA82 for ; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 17:06:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231366AbiH2RGZ (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Aug 2022 13:06:25 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42256 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231315AbiH2RF0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Aug 2022 13:05:26 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6D9DA9D64F; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:04:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml745-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4MGcCG2XVCz67Ybb; Tue, 30 Aug 2022 01:00:58 +0800 (CST) Received: from lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) by fraeml745-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.226) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.31; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 19:04:37 +0200 Received: from mscphis00759.huawei.com (10.123.66.134) by lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 18:04:36 +0100 From: Konstantin Meskhidze To: CC: , , , , , , , Subject: [PATCH v7 18/18] landlock: Document Landlock's network support Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2022 01:04:01 +0800 Message-ID: <20220829170401.834298-19-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220829170401.834298-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> References: <20220829170401.834298-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.123.66.134] X-ClientProxiedBy: mscpeml100002.china.huawei.com (7.188.26.75) To lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: Describe network access rules for TCP sockets. Add network access example in the tutorial. Point out AF_UNSPEC socket family behaviour. Point out UDP sockets issues. Add kernel configuration support for network. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze --- Changes since v6: * Adds network support documentaion. --- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 84 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst index 2509c2fbf98f..4b099d1b5a9d 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control :Date: August 2022 The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global -filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable -LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers -in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox -is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or +filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock +is a stackable LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new +security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This +kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. @@ -30,18 +30,20 @@ Landlock rules A Landlock rule describes an action on an object. An object is currently a file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined with `access -rights`_. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which can then restrict -the thread enforcing it, and its future children. +rights`_. Since ABI version 3 a port "object" appears with related network actions +for TCP4/TCP6 sockets families. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which +can then restrict the thread enforcing it, and its future children. Defining and enforcing a security policy ---------------------------------------- We first need to define the ruleset that will contain our rules. For this example, the ruleset will contain rules that only allow read actions, but write -actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these kind of +actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these kind of actions. This is required for backward and forward compatibility (i.e. the kernel and user space may not know each other's supported restrictions), hence -the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. +the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. Also ruleset +will have network rules for specific ports, so it should handle network actions. .. code-block:: c @@ -62,6 +64,9 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + .handled_access_net = + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, }; Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be @@ -70,9 +75,9 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should -remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` or `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access -rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third version of -the ABI. +remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` or `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` or +network access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and +third version of the ABI. .. code-block:: c @@ -87,9 +92,13 @@ the ABI. /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; __attribute__((fallthrough)); + /* Removes network support for ABI < 2 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net = 0; case 2: /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; + /* Removes network support for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net = 0; } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules. @@ -129,6 +138,24 @@ descriptor. } err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, &path_beneath, 0); + +It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained +for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock +ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested +`allowed_access` rights are already available in ABI 1. + +For network part we can add number of rules containing a port number and actions +that a process is allowed to do for certian ports. + +.. code-block:: c + + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = { + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP, + .port = 8080, + }; + + err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE, + &net_service, 0); close(path_beneath.parent_fd); if (err) { perror("Failed to update ruleset"); @@ -136,13 +163,9 @@ descriptor. return 1; } -It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained -for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock -ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested -`allowed_access` rights are already available in ABI 1. - We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while -denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to +denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The ruleset also contains +a rule allowing to bind current proccess to the port 8080. The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID binary). @@ -280,6 +303,13 @@ It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags `O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC`. +AF_UNSPEC socket family +----------------------- + +Sockets of AF_UNSPEC family types are treated as AF_INET(TCP4) socket for bind() +hook. But connect() hook is not allowed by Landlock for AF_UNSPEC sockets. This +logic prevents from disconnecting already connected sockets. + Compatibility ============= @@ -339,7 +369,7 @@ Access rights ------------- .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h - :identifiers: fs_access + :identifiers: fs_access net_access Creating a new ruleset ---------------------- @@ -358,6 +388,7 @@ Extending a ruleset .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h :identifiers: landlock_rule_type landlock_path_beneath_attr + landlock_net_service_attr Enforcing a ruleset ------------------- @@ -406,6 +437,13 @@ Memory usage Kernel memory allocated to create rulesets is accounted and can be restricted by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. +UDP sockets restricting +----------------------- + +Current network part supports to restrict just TCP sockets type. UPD sockets sandboxing +adds additional issues due to unconnected nature of the protocol. UDP sockets support +might come in future Landlock versions. + Previous limitations ==================== @@ -435,6 +473,13 @@ always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access right. +Network support (ABI < 3) +------------------------- + +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to restrict TCP +sockets bind() and connect() syscalls for specific ports allowing processes +to establish secure connections. + .. _kernel_support: Kernel support @@ -453,6 +498,9 @@ still enable it by adding ``lsm=landlock,[...]`` to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst thanks to the bootloader configuration. +To support Landlock's network part, the kernel must be configured with `CONFIG_NET=y` +and `CONFIG_INET=y` options. For TCP6 family sockets `CONFIG_IPV6=y` must be switched on. + Questions and answers =====================