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Thu, 15 Sep 2022 19:32:36 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, brauner@kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, jpenumak@redhat.com, Stefan Berger , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Denis Semakin Subject: [PATCH v14 11/26] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable() Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2022 15:32:06 -0400 Message-Id: <20220915193221.1728029-12-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 In-Reply-To: <20220915193221.1728029-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220915193221.1728029-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: r7kruqUoMrzyczrf1pNl6CM-l5Zx6fZh X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: lRXdhi_gdUUjUAWXVsBSgZjs-_hCFNMm X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.895,Hydra:6.0.528,FMLib:17.11.122.1 definitions=2022-09-15_10,2022-09-14_04,2022-06-22_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 bulkscore=0 phishscore=0 suspectscore=0 clxscore=1011 priorityscore=1501 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2209130000 definitions=main-2209150119 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for the combined ns_capable() checks on CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a user namespace. Return true on the check if either capability or both are available. Use mac_admin_ns_capable() in place of capable(SYS_ADMIN). This will allow an IMA namespace to read the policy with only CAP_MAC_ADMIN, which has less privileges than CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Since CAP_MAC_ADMIN is an additional capability added to an existing gate avoid auditing in case it is not set. Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Denis Semakin Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger --- v13: - implemented file_sb_user_ns(const struct file *); const is needed so it can be called with seq_file's 'const struct file *file' v11: - use ns_capable_noaudit for CAP_MAC_ADMIN to avoid auditing in this case --- include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 65efb74c3585..dc3e1230b365 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); } +static inline bool mac_admin_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) || + ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 9eced4cc286e..ec24368b669e 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2727,6 +2727,11 @@ static inline struct user_namespace *file_mnt_user_ns(struct file *file) return mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt); } +static inline struct user_namespace *file_sb_user_ns(const struct file *file) +{ + return i_user_ns(file_inode(file)); +} + /** * is_idmapped_mnt - check whether a mount is mapped * @mnt: the mount to check diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 5bf7f080c2be..28a9842c566f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -491,4 +491,10 @@ static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, #define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ +static inline +struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) +{ + return file_sb_user_ns(filp); +} + #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 89d3113ceda1..c41aa61b7393 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { */ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp); +#endif struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { @@ -385,7 +388,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) #else if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) return -EACCES; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!mac_admin_ns_capable(user_ns)) return -EPERM; return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); #endif