From patchwork Thu Sep 22 15:17:07 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Christian Brauner X-Patchwork-Id: 12985383 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D447C6FA95 for ; Thu, 22 Sep 2022 15:18:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231837AbiIVPSv (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Sep 2022 11:18:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41268 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231878AbiIVPSj (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Sep 2022 11:18:39 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA69EEFA49; Thu, 22 Sep 2022 08:18:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7BA97B83839; Thu, 22 Sep 2022 15:18:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D5E1FC433D6; Thu, 22 Sep 2022 15:18:06 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1663859888; bh=MWeoZ0/V2lTZ/MXNnA/IeO/jY7FHURW/VBDh8GSymc8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FLGl7N8lJMoDKQZ/3BQacSRkHAatnJPvU4RC6wM4+oiYtij5bs0xjXvyGJC1N0ZVj 475r143tX6Lj6JvI+v+gL8J7sMaazeYiVWyhFGtAOXxplrgj8N4cUe7MmBppzqpcKZ cTTTiRSIRX32DtGgHFOMwvPZsM0HCST0+K8g2SMyjDWJnllAflWMiQKJSGVE8PUCoa cK1iUMIE2Tk1oPylDP+1964k4Q3zZ2A4PSsqej2OdRjneVHscZMYGZbJao2cmW2VLo crKe1wh1ogbV/yk3/PGsbHhVlO/kRhrvhOhwX7vsH7lFfZNsCUOIPes8f2nVbkDDFw vbrgygeIhoR6g== From: Christian Brauner To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christian Brauner , Seth Forshee , Christoph Hellwig , Al Viro , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 09/29] security: add set acl hook Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2022 17:17:07 +0200 Message-Id: <20220922151728.1557914-10-brauner@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220922151728.1557914-1-brauner@kernel.org> References: <20220922151728.1557914-1-brauner@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=5184; i=brauner@kernel.org; h=from:subject; bh=MWeoZ0/V2lTZ/MXNnA/IeO/jY7FHURW/VBDh8GSymc8=; b=owGbwMvMwCU28Zj0gdSKO4sYT6slMSTr1FTc89qXrBKZuuIV1+IMj3W9Eb0SSbGNa7MTXATfmOcZ XdrZUcrCIMbFICumyOLQbhIut5ynYrNRpgbMHFYmkCEMXJwCMJG58Qz/7BU82QWfPvrUGZkVl3m0XT Y4+MtHH+ddL88yrZ4iP3XhH0aGL9NfnCva3eOml931KXT/40+LFMN8Q15N/vE0S/ralX+LeAA= X-Developer-Key: i=brauner@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=4880B8C9BD0E5106FC070F4F7B3C391EFEA93624 Precedence: bulk List-ID: The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ security/security.c | 9 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 806448173033..9f7bce6927b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 84a0d7e02176..28246c5d190c 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -435,6 +435,10 @@ * Check permission before removing the extended attribute * identified by @name for @dentry. * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @inode_set_acl: + * Check permission before setting the posix acls + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getsecurity: * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1bc362cb413f..db9b97786075 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -359,6 +359,9 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path); int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); +int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl); void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); @@ -869,6 +872,14 @@ static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); } +static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 14d30fec8a00..56d48e7254d6 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1370,6 +1370,15 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size); } +int security_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, kacl); +} + void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) {