| Message ID | 20231120173318.1132868-20-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
| Headers | show |
| Series | security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand |
On Mon, 2023-11-20 at 18:33 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > > Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from > various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a > new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like > 'integrity'). > > Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(), > which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the > respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Conditionally register > ima_post_path_mknod() if CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is enabled, otherwise the > path_post_mknod hook won't be available. > > Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA (renamed to > ima_kernel_module_request()), and conditionally register it as > implementation of the kernel_module_request LSM hook (if > CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled). > > Define the 'ima' LSM, and initialize it with init_ima_lsm(). Consequently, > assign the LSM_ID_IMA ID to IMA in include/uapi/linux/lsm.h. > > Still rely on the existing 'integrity' subsystem to be enabled and to > manage integrity metadata. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> > --- > fs/file_table.c | 2 - > fs/namei.c | 6 -- > fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 -- > fs/open.c | 1 - > include/linux/ima.h | 94 --------------------- > include/linux/integrity.h | 13 --- > include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + > security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 22 ----- > security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++----- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + > security/keys/key.c | 9 +-- > security/security.c | 63 +++------------ > 14 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 225 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c > index c72dc75f2bd3..0401ac98281c 100644 > --- a/fs/file_table.c > +++ b/fs/file_table.c > @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ > #include <linux/percpu_counter.h> > #include <linux/percpu.h> > #include <linux/task_work.h> > -#include <linux/ima.h> > #include <linux/swap.h> > #include <linux/kmemleak.h> > > @@ -386,7 +385,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) > locks_remove_file(file); > > security_file_release(file); > - ima_file_free(file); > if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) { > if (file->f_op->fasync) > file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0); > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index adb3ab27951a..37cc0988308f 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ > #include <linux/fsnotify.h> > #include <linux/personality.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > -#include <linux/ima.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/mount.h> > #include <linux/audit.h> > @@ -3622,8 +3621,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd, > error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file); > if (!error) > error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode); > - if (!error) > - error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode); > if (!error && do_truncate) > error = handle_truncate(idmap, file); > if (unlikely(error > 0)) { > @@ -3687,7 +3684,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); > } > security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); > - ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); > return 0; > } > > @@ -4036,8 +4032,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode, > case 0: case S_IFREG: > error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode, > dentry, mode, true); > - if (!error) > - ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry); > break; > case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK: > error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode, > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c > index b0c3f07a8bba..e491392a1243 100644 > --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c > +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c > @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ > #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> > #include <linux/xattr.h> > #include <linux/jhash.h> > -#include <linux/ima.h> > #include <linux/pagemap.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > @@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, > goto out; > } > > - host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags); > - if (host_err) { > - fput(file); > - goto out; > - } > - > if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE) > file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH; > else > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c > index 02dc608d40d8..c8bb9bd5259f 100644 > --- a/fs/open.c > +++ b/fs/open.c > @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ > #include <linux/audit.h> > #include <linux/falloc.h> > #include <linux/fs_struct.h> > -#include <linux/ima.h> > #include <linux/dnotify.h> > #include <linux/compat.h> > #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index 31ef6c3c3207..23ae24b60ecf 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm; > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA > extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void); > -extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); > -extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); > -extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct inode *inode); > -extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); > -extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); > -extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > - unsigned long prot); > -extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); > -extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > - enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); > -extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > - bool contents); > -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > - enum kernel_read_file_id id); > -extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry); > extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); > extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size); > extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); > @@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void) > return HASH_ALGO__LAST; > } > > -static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct inode *inode) > -{ > -} > - > -static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, > - unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > - enum kernel_load_data_id id, > - char *description) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > - bool contents) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > - enum kernel_read_file_id id) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry) > -{ > - return; > -} > - > static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) > { > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > @@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) > {} > #endif > > -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > -extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, > - struct key *key, > - const void *payload, size_t plen, > - unsigned long flags, bool create); > -#else > -static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, > - struct key *key, > - const void *payload, > - size_t plen, > - unsigned long flags, > - bool create) {} > -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ > - > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE > extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); > extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h > index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644 > --- a/include/linux/integrity.h > +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h > @@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) > } > #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */ > > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > - > -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > - > -#else > - > -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ > - > #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */ > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h > index f0386880a78e..ee7d034255a9 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h > @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { > #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN 108 > #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 > #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 > +#define LSM_ID_IMA 111 > > /* > * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes > diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > index 895f4b9ce8c6..4d11c622fabd 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > @@ -133,25 +133,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, > return ret; > } > > -/** > - * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests > - * @kmod_name: kernel module name > - * > - * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA > - * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to > - * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try > - * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. > - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, > - * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). > - * > - * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification > - * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies > - * also signed with digsig. > - */ > -int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > -{ > - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) > - return -EINVAL; > - > - return 0; > -} > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c > index d4419a2a1e24..6cbf2aa5540e 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c > @@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) > 0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once); > return 0; > } > + > DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = { > .name = "integrity", > .init = integrity_iintcache_init, > .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, > }; > > - > /* > * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file > * > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); > static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {} > #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */ > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, > + const void *payload, size_t plen, > + unsigned long flags, bool create); > +#endif > + > /* > * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the > * platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian. > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 02021ee467d3..af213bece9b8 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > * > * Flag files that changed, based on i_version > */ > -void ima_file_free(struct file *file) > +static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) > { > struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; > @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, > * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file > * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) > +static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) > { > u32 secid; > int ret; > @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > * > * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. > */ > -int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > - unsigned long prot) > +static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > + unsigned long prot) > { > struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; > struct file *file; > @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file > * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > +static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > int ret; > u32 secid; > @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file > * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) > +static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) > { > u32 secid; > > @@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) > mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | > MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); > } > -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); > > static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, > size_t buf_size) > @@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash); > * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created > * tmpfiles are in policy. > */ > -void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct inode *inode) > +static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > + struct inode *inode) > + > { > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; > int must_appraise; > @@ -717,8 +717,8 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the > * file data can be written later. > */ > -void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > - struct dentry *dentry) > +static void __maybe_unused > +ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) > { > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; > struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; > @@ -753,8 +753,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, > * > * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, > - bool contents) > +static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, > + bool contents) > { > enum ima_hooks func; > u32 secid; > @@ -803,8 +803,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file > * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > - enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > +static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > + enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > { > enum ima_hooks func; > u32 secid; > @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > * > * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > +static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > { > bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce; > > @@ -891,9 +891,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file > * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. > */ > -int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > - enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, > - char *description) > +static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > + enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, > + char *description) > { > if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) { > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && > @@ -1122,4 +1122,72 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) > return error; > } > > +/** > + * ima_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests > + * @kmod_name: kernel module name > + * > + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA > + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to > + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try > + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. > + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, > + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). > + * > + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification > + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies > + * also signed with digsig. > + */ > +static int __maybe_unused ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > +{ > + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file), > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod), > +#endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update), > +#endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request), > +#endif > +}; > + > +static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { > + .name = "ima", > + .id = LSM_ID_IMA, > +}; > + > +/* > + * Since with the LSM_ORDER_LAST there is no guarantee about the ordering > + * within the .lsm_info.init section, ensure that IMA hooks are before EVM > + * ones, by letting the 'integrity' LSM call init_ima_lsm() to initialize the > + * 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs in this sequence. > + */ Sorry, leftover from the previous version (also for EVM). > +int __init init_ima_lsm(void) Will make this as static (reported by kernel robot). Roberto > +{ > + security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid); > + return 0; > +} > + > +DEFINE_LSM(ima) = { > + .name = "ima", > + .init = init_ima_lsm, > + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, > +}; > + > late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h > index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > #include <crypto/hash.h> > #include <linux/key.h> > #include <linux/audit.h> > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > > /* iint action cache flags */ > #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 > diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c > index f75fe66c2f03..80fc2f203a0c 100644 > --- a/security/keys/key.c > +++ b/security/keys/key.c > @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ > #include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/workqueue.h> > #include <linux/random.h> > -#include <linux/ima.h> > #include <linux/err.h> > #include "internal.h" > > @@ -937,8 +936,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, > > security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, > true); > - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, > - flags, true); > > key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); > > @@ -970,13 +967,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, > > key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); > > - if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { > + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) > security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, > flags, false); > - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, > - payload, plen, > - flags, false); > - } > > goto error_free_prep; > } > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 423d53092604..e18953ee4a97 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ > - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0)) > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) > > /* > * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the > @@ -1182,12 +1183,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file * > */ > int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_bprm_check(bprm); > + return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); > } > > /** > @@ -2883,13 +2879,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) > int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, > unsigned long flags) > { > - unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); > + return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot), > + flags); > } > > /** > @@ -2918,12 +2909,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) > int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, > unsigned long prot) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); > + return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); > } > > /** > @@ -3232,12 +3218,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) > */ > int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); > + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); > } > > /** > @@ -3253,12 +3234,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, > bool contents) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); > + return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); > > @@ -3278,12 +3254,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); > int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id id) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); > + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); > > @@ -3298,12 +3269,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); > */ > int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_load_data(id, contents); > + return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); > > @@ -3325,13 +3291,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_load_data_id id, > char *description) > { > - int ret; > - > - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, > - description); > - if (ret) > - return ret; > - return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); > + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, > + description); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); >
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index c72dc75f2bd3..0401ac98281c 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include <linux/percpu_counter.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/task_work.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/kmemleak.h> @@ -386,7 +385,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) locks_remove_file(file); security_file_release(file); - ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) { if (file->f_op->fasync) file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index adb3ab27951a..37cc0988308f 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -3622,8 +3621,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd, error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file); if (!error) error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode); - if (!error) - error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode); if (!error && do_truncate) error = handle_truncate(idmap, file); if (unlikely(error > 0)) { @@ -3687,7 +3684,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); } security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); - ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); return 0; } @@ -4036,8 +4032,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode, case 0: case S_IFREG: error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, true); - if (!error) - ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry); break; case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK: error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode, diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index b0c3f07a8bba..e491392a1243 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/jhash.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, goto out; } - host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags); - if (host_err) { - fput(file); - goto out; - } - if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE) file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH; else diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 02dc608d40d8..c8bb9bd5259f 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/dnotify.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 31ef6c3c3207..23ae24b60ecf 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void); -extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); -extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct inode *inode); -extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); -extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); -extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot); -extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); -extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); -extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents); -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id id); -extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); @@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void) return HASH_ALGO__LAST; } -static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct inode *inode) -{ -} - -static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_load_data_id id, - char *description) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id id) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return; -} - static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) {} #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS -extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, - struct key *key, - const void *payload, size_t plen, - unsigned long flags, bool create); -#else -static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, - struct key *key, - const void *payload, - size_t plen, - unsigned long flags, - bool create) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */ -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); - -#else - -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ - #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index f0386880a78e..ee7d034255a9 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN 108 #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 +#define LSM_ID_IMA 111 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 895f4b9ce8c6..4d11c622fabd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -133,25 +133,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, return ret; } -/** - * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests - * @kmod_name: kernel module name - * - * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA - * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to - * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try - * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, - * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). - * - * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification - * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies - * also signed with digsig. - */ -int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) - return -EINVAL; - - return 0; -} diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index d4419a2a1e24..6cbf2aa5540e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once); return 0; } + DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = { .name = "integrity", .init = integrity_iintcache_init, .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, }; - /* * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, + const void *payload, size_t plen, + unsigned long flags, bool create); +#endif + /* * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the * platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 02021ee467d3..af213bece9b8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Flag files that changed, based on i_version */ -void ima_file_free(struct file *file) +static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { u32 secid; int ret; @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, * * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. */ -int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot) +static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) { struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; struct file *file; @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) +static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; @@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) @@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash); * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created * tmpfiles are in policy. */ -void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct inode *inode) +static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode) + { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; @@ -717,8 +717,8 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the * file data can be written later. */ -void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry) +static void __maybe_unused +ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; @@ -753,8 +753,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */ -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, - bool contents) +static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, + bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -803,8 +803,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) +static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, + enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */ -int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) +static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce; @@ -891,9 +891,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, - char *description) +static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, + enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, + char *description) { if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && @@ -1122,4 +1122,72 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) return error; } +/** + * ima_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * @kmod_name: kernel module name + * + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). + * + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies + * also signed with digsig. + */ +static int __maybe_unused ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file), +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request), +#endif +}; + +static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { + .name = "ima", + .id = LSM_ID_IMA, +}; + +/* + * Since with the LSM_ORDER_LAST there is no guarantee about the ordering + * within the .lsm_info.init section, ensure that IMA hooks are before EVM + * ones, by letting the 'integrity' LSM call init_ima_lsm() to initialize the + * 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs in this sequence. + */ +int __init init_ima_lsm(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ima) = { + .name = "ima", + .init = init_ima_lsm, + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, +}; + late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index f75fe66c2f03..80fc2f203a0c 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -937,8 +936,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, true); - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, - flags, true); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); @@ -970,13 +967,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); - if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, false); - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, - payload, plen, - flags, false); - } goto error_free_prep; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 423d53092604..e18953ee4a97 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the @@ -1182,12 +1183,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file * */ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_bprm_check(bprm); + return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); } /** @@ -2883,13 +2879,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); + return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot), + flags); } /** @@ -2918,12 +2909,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); + return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); } /** @@ -3232,12 +3218,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) */ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); } /** @@ -3253,12 +3234,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); + return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); @@ -3278,12 +3254,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); @@ -3298,12 +3269,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); */ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_load_data(id, contents); + return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); @@ -3325,13 +3291,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, - description); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, + description); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);