| Message ID | 20240726090858.71541-1-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Handled Elsewhere |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v3] proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes | expand |
On Fri, 26 Jul 2024 at 11:11, Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com> wrote: > > This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing > the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because > it can be abused. > > The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because > it can break GDB and some other use cases. > > Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing > distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however > that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler > approach with semantics also easier to understand for users. > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe5tEQ@mail.gmail.com/ [1] > Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> > Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> > Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> > Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com> > --- > Changes in v3: > * Simplified code to use shorthand ifs and a > lookup_constant() table. > > Changes in v2: > * Added bootparam on top of Linus' patch. > * Slightly reworded commit msg. > --- > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 ++++ > fs/proc/base.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++- > security/Kconfig | 32 +++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > index c1134ad5f06d..793301f360ec 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > @@ -4791,6 +4791,16 @@ > printk.time= Show timing data prefixed to each printk message line > Format: <bool> (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable) > > + proc_mem.force_override= [KNL] > + Format: {always | ptrace | never} > + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory > + permissions. This allows people to limit that. Better to use passive tense here rather than referring to 'users' and 'people'. 'Traditionally, /proc/pid/mem allows memory permissions to be overridden without restrictions. This option may be set to restrict that' > + Can be one of: > + - 'always' traditional behavior always allows mem overrides. punctuation please > + - 'ptrace' only allow for active ptracers. > + - 'never' never allow mem permission overrides. Please be consistent: 'mem overrides' or 'mem permission overrides' in both instances. > + If not specified, default is always. 'always' > + > processor.max_cstate= [HW,ACPI] > Limit processor to maximum C-state > max_cstate=9 overrides any DMI blacklist limit. > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index 72a1acd03675..0ca3fc3d9e0e 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ > #include <linux/elf.h> > #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> > #include <linux/user_namespace.h> > +#include <linux/fs_parser.h> > #include <linux/fs_struct.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> > @@ -117,6 +118,35 @@ > static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init; > static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init; > > +enum proc_mem_force { > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE, > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER > +}; > + > +static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init = > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS : > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE : > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER; > + > +struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] = { This can be static const __initconst > + { "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS }, > + { "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE }, > + { } > +}; > + > +static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf) > +{ > + if (!buf) > + return -EINVAL; > + Can this ever happen? > + proc_mem_force_override = lookup_constant(proc_mem_force_table, > + buf, PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER); > + > + return 0; > +} > +early_param("proc_mem.force_override", early_proc_mem_force_override); > + > struct pid_entry { > const char *name; > unsigned int len; > @@ -835,6 +865,26 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) > return ret; > } > > +static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) > +{ > + switch (proc_mem_force_override) { > + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER: > + return false; > + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE: { > + bool ptrace_active = false; > + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); > + > + if (task) { > + ptrace_active = task->ptrace && task->mm == mm && task->parent == current; > + put_task_struct(task); > + } > + return ptrace_active; > + } This indentation looks dodgy. If you move the local var declarations out of this block, and use assignments instead, you don't need to { } at all. > + default: > + return true; > + } > +} > + > static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, > size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write) > { > @@ -855,7 +905,9 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, > if (!mmget_not_zero(mm)) > goto free; > > - flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0); > + flags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; > + if (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm)) > + flags |= FOLL_FORCE; > > while (count > 0) { > size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index 412e76f1575d..a93c1a9b7c28 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -19,6 +19,38 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT > > If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. > > +choice > + prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override" > + default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE > + help > + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory > + permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace > + capability. > + > + This allows people to limit that - either never override, or > + require actual active ptrace attachment. > + > + Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now) > + > +config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE > + bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior" > + help > + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping > + permissions if you have ptrace access rights. > + > +config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE > + bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override" > + help > + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping > + permissions for active ptracers like gdb. > + > +config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE > + bool "Never" > + help > + Never override memory mapping permissions > + > +endchoice > + > config SECURITY > bool "Enable different security models" > depends on SYSFS > -- > 2.44.2 > >
On Friday, July 26, 2024 13:18 EEST, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> wrote: > On Fri, 26 Jul 2024 at 11:11, Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com> wrote: > > > > This adds a Kconfig option and boot param to allow removing > > the FOLL_FORCE flag from /proc/pid/mem write calls because > > it can be abused. > > > > The traditional forcing behavior is kept as default because > > it can break GDB and some other use cases. > > > > Previously we tried a more sophisticated approach allowing > > distributions to fine-tune /proc/pid/mem behavior, however > > that got NAK-ed by Linus [1], who prefers this simpler > > approach with semantics also easier to understand for users. > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiGWLChxYmUA5HrT5aopZrB7_2VTa0NLZcxORgkUe5tEQ@mail.gmail.com/ [1] > > Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> > > Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> > > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > > Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> > > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> > > Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> > > Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com> > > --- > > Changes in v3: > > * Simplified code to use shorthand ifs and a > > lookup_constant() table. > > > > Changes in v2: > > * Added bootparam on top of Linus' patch. > > * Slightly reworded commit msg. > > --- > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 ++++ > > fs/proc/base.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++- > > security/Kconfig | 32 +++++++++++ > > 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > index c1134ad5f06d..793301f360ec 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > @@ -4791,6 +4791,16 @@ > > printk.time= Show timing data prefixed to each printk message line > > Format: <bool> (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable) > > > > + proc_mem.force_override= [KNL] > > + Format: {always | ptrace | never} > > + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory > > + permissions. This allows people to limit that. > > Better to use passive tense here rather than referring to 'users' and 'people'. > > 'Traditionally, /proc/pid/mem allows memory permissions to be > overridden without restrictions. > This option may be set to restrict that' > > > + Can be one of: > > + - 'always' traditional behavior always allows mem overrides. > > punctuation please > > > + - 'ptrace' only allow for active ptracers. > > + - 'never' never allow mem permission overrides. > > Please be consistent: 'mem overrides' or 'mem permission overrides' in > both instances. > > > + If not specified, default is always. > > 'always' > > > + > > processor.max_cstate= [HW,ACPI] > > Limit processor to maximum C-state > > max_cstate=9 overrides any DMI blacklist limit. > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > > index 72a1acd03675..0ca3fc3d9e0e 100644 > > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > > @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ > > #include <linux/elf.h> > > #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> > > #include <linux/user_namespace.h> > > +#include <linux/fs_parser.h> > > #include <linux/fs_struct.h> > > #include <linux/slab.h> > > #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> > > @@ -117,6 +118,35 @@ > > static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init; > > static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init; > > > > +enum proc_mem_force { > > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, > > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE, > > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER > > +}; > > + > > +static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init = > > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS : > > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE : > > + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER; > > + > > +struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] = { > > This can be static const __initconst > > > + { "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS }, > > + { "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE }, > > + { } > > +}; > > + > > +static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf) > > +{ > > + if (!buf) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > Can this ever happen? Not sure, many calls simply ignore this case while others like this [1] printk example do test it. I'm inclined to think it can't happen however it's still to good to error check. Thanks for all the suggestions, I'll leave this a bit for others to get a chance to review, then send another iteration. [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.10.1/source/kernel/printk/printk.c#L1051
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index c1134ad5f06d..793301f360ec 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4791,6 +4791,16 @@ printk.time= Show timing data prefixed to each printk message line Format: <bool> (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable) + proc_mem.force_override= [KNL] + Format: {always | ptrace | never} + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory + permissions. This allows people to limit that. + Can be one of: + - 'always' traditional behavior always allows mem overrides. + - 'ptrace' only allow for active ptracers. + - 'never' never allow mem permission overrides. + If not specified, default is always. + processor.max_cstate= [HW,ACPI] Limit processor to maximum C-state max_cstate=9 overrides any DMI blacklist limit. diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 72a1acd03675..0ca3fc3d9e0e 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ #include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> +#include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> @@ -117,6 +118,35 @@ static u8 nlink_tid __ro_after_init; static u8 nlink_tgid __ro_after_init; +enum proc_mem_force { + PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE, + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER +}; + +static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init = + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS : + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE : + PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER; + +struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] = { + { "always", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS }, + { "ptrace", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE }, + { } +}; + +static int __init early_proc_mem_force_override(char *buf) +{ + if (!buf) + return -EINVAL; + + proc_mem_force_override = lookup_constant(proc_mem_force_table, + buf, PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER); + + return 0; +} +early_param("proc_mem.force_override", early_proc_mem_force_override); + struct pid_entry { const char *name; unsigned int len; @@ -835,6 +865,26 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return ret; } +static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + switch (proc_mem_force_override) { + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER: + return false; + case PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE: { + bool ptrace_active = false; + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + + if (task) { + ptrace_active = task->ptrace && task->mm == mm && task->parent == current; + put_task_struct(task); + } + return ptrace_active; + } + default: + return true; + } +} + static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write) { @@ -855,7 +905,9 @@ static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf, if (!mmget_not_zero(mm)) goto free; - flags = FOLL_FORCE | (write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0); + flags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0; + if (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm)) + flags |= FOLL_FORCE; while (count > 0) { size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE); diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 412e76f1575d..a93c1a9b7c28 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -19,6 +19,38 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +choice + prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override" + default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE + help + Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory + permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace + capability. + + This allows people to limit that - either never override, or + require actual active ptrace attachment. + + Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now) + +config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE + bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior" + help + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping + permissions if you have ptrace access rights. + +config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE + bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override" + help + This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping + permissions for active ptracers like gdb. + +config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE + bool "Never" + help + Never override memory mapping permissions + +endchoice + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS