From patchwork Sat Sep 21 12:08:04 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13808913 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B4221714A1; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920516; cv=none; b=ZYHOC20DvRVrAMBCWeILNFQBa6cp+kDyOMNGhc+h1GwTgna3gevI0K5V7iW7b/VHkQaW9oJEybyfCSGZb34bOAgyc6C8PsF+yK6rDIm/UCpTOvjrNdXldXE38TQVykFxSQU8Jd+I6I1wskIqFg7qaNlfwK22EbxPtzyDt6pKRuk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726920516; c=relaxed/simple; bh=HIPvWcl3RtDIm1G+/dGSP1jVFTLhDzMHvZTRakhM4AU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=V1hVFl/zf0Vv1Ei3SkitWtjjkhJeWxqqluWWQ0o1szOdYV1fZSnCtcfHT8GzOmvg/zVImbG2UeciYaRMV6lOUEOa6Am/t2VyRMJFgZKT/UnHriagtZ0+sNZpV0H4hsIGC3n5jHBm22tAqi5eSul2t2a6/Dof9gHIcIS4xg4IK18= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=WWwh1A4W; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="WWwh1A4W" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C568FC4CEC2; Sat, 21 Sep 2024 12:08:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1726920516; bh=HIPvWcl3RtDIm1G+/dGSP1jVFTLhDzMHvZTRakhM4AU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=WWwh1A4WMZw6BoZgijUIqfmmR4DSYZmp3N8BDLbvyKpgunfj7nIj3oinSIRsexUJH f7k8xgSBNGI0ldkx1TpCzBJaUIg/bvu/DNQbJLP0XBeKUSNPcbMjQ2LTVys9cA5jXe bvzKLskyxaC0L2q8PCk7URCqzoJtra00OFLvEznh0tjRJrLN5Zho8A1fBDcQfkp0h8 h4AczCOLfHTT26VFzDeookYEaJ5QQ5Eb1X0DpbCHpVG7uVBJLT5muiB0ThZ+RdQviL xQ8yVfHwtYqOAlwZaeEN+lt14ssDazMaCIKZBiyTe5nyKw8sZckVoOcsfHSJ15QolL sezWnN+i+eMog== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mapengyu@gmail.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session() Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2024 15:08:04 +0300 Message-ID: <20240921120811.1264985-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240921120811.1264985-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: James Bottomley --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Change to bug. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 1aef5b1f9c90..a8d3d5d52178 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1371,10 +1382,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */