From patchwork Mon Oct 28 05:50:00 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13853032 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA2FF18CBF9; Mon, 28 Oct 2024 05:50:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730094630; cv=none; b=prFOJtVvNe+Bns9D4Sd0+xxZ5Z47lcFIayzcAVw8L91r6yn24zhi6P3/rqyAlvGX3GR40+S+ITgZPy/v2fWJTP0R6nQ/nB2UXwfT7ziZxef71riLr7rWqGGKZYGWbdpM0mh9MIxcqamD7GRE4n1FPQyFGnB8lW/yX9VfOp2kWvc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730094630; c=relaxed/simple; bh=XCl1yMmjSZe/N+58hVzZinUX+FhB2RuhENSeqHEfICA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ru1oP15EwOtYBUPFYhYdUqmY7nyL94pXpefTu0Sk9UtZrztcP18VIxtAMfZM+BmrCSIrJ//aNSSxVbw/dyWmXAckCUjxaygmtSZfmbzfsxlUVyGHwYJtnalK+nKthpQo27no4aa1ABlLHb8SQATFq93opPvE1Plij2dbyZbcujA= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ClqiLAlM; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ClqiLAlM" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 35271C4CEC3; Mon, 28 Oct 2024 05:50:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1730094630; bh=XCl1yMmjSZe/N+58hVzZinUX+FhB2RuhENSeqHEfICA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ClqiLAlMkiN/DrZw9ugwPsZjE2a13LnBH68M15USUJdgIri7wqh6mvs/pgttHRWSi fh6X75u8MZzEDqsgwQNfWGkXs9XSBIB9HGl6vtEP4jTgRoTSUSB9eR7fTlUSXyw9fx a6JdOd9vNNUaYKnS/x1YWqoXmYpBnQebIuWPGivtyarv+vWoBczqRw0k+Dwt/mBKlD 99fhbfzxyz38qwsSEPftm6L/4vzKNxNLcaUR/zd1pELSVueMBlXiMpF61Xx+YYr/eI IoGU2yk7t2EQhKjOhjVXRVqhMMYgFKtgvuVAyXXc7sU+Ge9573Xh1WlsI06YJv1upn JQrbqkF5YGf7Q== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Peter Huewe , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Mimi Zohar , Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Dmitry Kasatkin , Eric Snowberg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM), stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null() Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 07:50:00 +0200 Message-ID: <20241028055007.1708971-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.0 In-Reply-To: <20241028055007.1708971-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20241028055007.1708971-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v8: - Fix stray character in a log message. v7: - No changes. v6: - Address Stefan's remark: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/def4ec2d-584b-405f-9d5e-99267013c3c0@linux.ibm.com/ v5: - Fix the TPM error code leak from tpm2_load_context(). v4: - No changes. v3: - Update log messages. Previously the log message incorrectly stated on load failure that integrity check had been failed, even tho the check is done *after* the load operation. v2: - Refined the commit message. - Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if tmp_null_key is used as the parameter. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index a0306126e86c..950a3e48293b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -915,33 +915,37 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) { - int rc; unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, - null_key); - if (rc != -EINVAL) - return rc; + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + goto err; + } - /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); - /* check the null name against what we know */ - tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); - if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) - /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ - return rc; - /* - * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so - * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM - * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be - * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so - * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. - */ - dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + /* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */ + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) + goto err; + + /* Return null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (!memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name))) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + + /* Deduce from the name change TPM interference: */ + dev_err(&chip->dev, "null key integrity check failed\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; - return rc; +err: + return rc ? -ENODEV : 0; } /**