From patchwork Mon Nov 25 10:39:58 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Christian_G=C3=B6ttsche?= X-Patchwork-Id: 13884792 Received: from server02.seltendoof.de (server02.seltendoof.de [168.119.48.163]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DABDD193064; Mon, 25 Nov 2024 10:40:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=168.119.48.163 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1732531235; cv=none; b=b6Dlejcz4+ob6Bd7VijiV4UqjR3JWR81dvN+oTlQ4o4mWtA8Ik5hRYAmX+keFmutjLGUZHytYtwtMkf/zOkerkc0ce1jF6ohmUJ5FQSvuzfyOGg3uONBJCb4NZYi4K/baQpQ8ZCUIaBWCQgqbsAC/hV9rzVcsrXVq0p1Ygi9TP4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1732531235; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VhnL2wmSb+pfgIHkp6bvcyX/tRAnbRI3P76lLhLZZrc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=JiNoiifgIoHbhXMbwzVc84NbL/ueGpyiXMo0OIroByecsPjdnrm5vd5jcxXe8dyjPvMvVEZ2VbOC88jDu9NgKO1OwmJFlSffhViatZdzg0GPXA0XeGKjP4NPyiUeBL36UoyHLfxV1JTBc2DU3bBJ9pd+li0DJOi6wUkFqa6RfM4= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=reject dis=none) header.from=seltendoof.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=seltendoof.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=seltendoof.de header.i=@seltendoof.de header.b=renzaNjY; arc=none smtp.client-ip=168.119.48.163 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=reject dis=none) header.from=seltendoof.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=seltendoof.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=seltendoof.de header.i=@seltendoof.de header.b="renzaNjY" From: =?utf-8?q?Christian_G=C3=B6ttsche?= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=seltendoof.de; s=2023072701; t=1732531230; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=BnJPwZBINKy4LES6pr7BNEYT4c7M8sYvf1DiqcmfvZQ=; b=renzaNjYJ9YJyG9gUtmjWqJwQ0VY7TQPB8AIE5W2eHdeqh2KtO/X4RlDCy1my/SVpQmQbZ wjNEjBd+3Nx5SYzGSi/4OwNEhlCfesxm4VNww0jT0OEYCfKsxUBHnyqFZjs4qmm0yXdPXf JQVxhmVSoR7oSv45zcTLYW4BjQnZhX+TQ9oYJfvSmhOwIXh5wbGCNS9yLVPQ//3K2TAHgl Eb4e91BrZZEw09F7m/z/76uD9fpDEgjnOst+2rcsjNChNW2KdjtqLgROIapy8OMfgZI/BW MreOsqodNcQhtkdGSCQM3CtyEM177zZSZrrnzTyeG6viMRNF26psOPQLgVZyPg== To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Christian_G=C3=B6ttsche?= , Boris Brezillon , Steven Price , Liviu Dudau , Maarten Lankhorst , Maxime Ripard , Thomas Zimmermann , David Airlie , Simona Vetter , Richard Weinberger , Zhihao Cheng , Serge Hallyn , Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, cocci@inria.fr Subject: [PATCH 06/11] ubifs: reorder capability check last Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2024 11:39:58 +0100 Message-ID: <20241125104011.36552-5-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de> In-Reply-To: <20241125104011.36552-1-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de> References: <20241125104011.36552-1-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de> Reply-To: cgzones@googlemail.com Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Christian Göttsche capable() calls refer to enabled LSMs whether to permit or deny the request. This is relevant in connection with SELinux, where a capability check results in a policy decision and by default a denial message on insufficient permission is issued. It can lead to three undesired cases: 1. A denial message is generated, even in case the operation was an unprivileged one and thus the syscall succeeded, creating noise. 2. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to ignore those denial messages, hiding future syscalls, where the task performs an actual privileged operation, leading to hidden limited functionality of that task. 3. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to permit the task the requested capability, while it does not need it, violating the principle of least privilege. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche Acked-by: Richard Weinberger --- drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_drv.c | 2 +- fs/ubifs/budget.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_drv.c index ac7e53f6e3f0..2de0c3627fbf 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_drv.c @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static int group_priority_permit(struct drm_file *file, return 0; /* Higher priorities require CAP_SYS_NICE or DRM_MASTER */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || drm_is_current_master(file)) + if (drm_is_current_master(file) || capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) return 0; return -EACCES; diff --git a/fs/ubifs/budget.c b/fs/ubifs/budget.c index d76eb7b39f56..6137aeadec3f 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/budget.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/budget.c @@ -256,8 +256,9 @@ long long ubifs_calc_available(const struct ubifs_info *c, int min_idx_lebs) */ static int can_use_rp(struct ubifs_info *c) { - if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), c->rp_uid) || capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) || - (!gid_eq(c->rp_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID) && in_group_p(c->rp_gid))) + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), c->rp_uid) || + (!gid_eq(c->rp_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID) && in_group_p(c->rp_gid)) || + capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return 1; return 0; }