From patchwork Mon Jan 10 13:49:57 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Michal_Such=C3=A1nek?= X-Patchwork-Id: 12708827 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5702AC4332F for ; Mon, 10 Jan 2022 13:50:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235094AbiAJNua (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Jan 2022 08:50:30 -0500 Received: from smtp-out2.suse.de ([195.135.220.29]:33384 "EHLO smtp-out2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233800AbiAJNuJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Jan 2022 08:50:09 -0500 Received: from relay2.suse.de (relay2.suse.de [149.44.160.134]) by smtp-out2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id B811C1F39D; Mon, 10 Jan 2022 13:50:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1641822607; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=WMeJYRdjSb6eOUZmaN5YfP8/wtUzUEKymy7rkLY/s6E=; b=IKjACkBib8SHFJgl0wUEyaB3NTGdYXyaAi3u18kpTJ/OSU6eDSze97YNwDXffOwjSVz/hm o22cYeHgXQvez62gW3UiEYdC+3z04rNVyU0CnYH+d9WamwJEd3gEdHnrHRoQ1q1dIaT6xW EfVgXqXY3J/O/CTdP/D4cUHMtvNL/1k= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1641822607; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=WMeJYRdjSb6eOUZmaN5YfP8/wtUzUEKymy7rkLY/s6E=; b=NBwVUb5sh2z8gsZ5bYO2pPw0m+iE4D6QsM4xXCtU1Gt+AFLAWBo4peD0g0/umyj7ijQ24t +3U/7rczwvJD+WCg== Received: from kitsune.suse.cz (kitsune.suse.cz [10.100.12.127]) by relay2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70932A3B84; Mon, 10 Jan 2022 13:50:07 +0000 (UTC) From: Michal Suchanek To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michal Suchanek , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Philipp Rudo , Mimi Zohar , Nayna , Rob Herring , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Heiko Carstens , Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Christian Borntraeger , Luis Chamberlain , Paul Mackerras , Hari Bathini , Alexander Gordeev , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Frank van der Linden , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Daniel Axtens , buendgen@de.ibm.com, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Christian Borntraeger , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Dmitry Kasatkin , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Sven Schnelle , Baoquan He , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 14:49:57 +0100 Message-Id: <65d9913441b16e27b672cfabbab24fa5c12bee14.1641822505.git.msuchanek@suse.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log messages about the signature. Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek --- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 4 +++- kernel/module.c | 3 ++- kernel/module_signing.c | 11 ++++++----- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) { return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - "kexec_file"); + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) return 0; return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - "kexec_file"); + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = { [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig", + [VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE] = "kexec appended sig", [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig", }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for); diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for { VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR }; @@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, #endif int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len, - struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what); + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for purpose); #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) */ if (flags == 0) { err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module"); + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE); if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true; return 0; diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -19,17 +19,18 @@ * @data: The data to be verified * @len: Size of @data. * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification - * @what: Informational string for log messages + * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put */ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len, - struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what) + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for purpose) { const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; struct module_signature *ms; unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len; int ret; - pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen); + pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen); if (markerlen > modlen) return -ENODATA; @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len, ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms); - ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what); + ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]); if (ret) return ret; @@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len, return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, trusted_keys, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + purpose, NULL, NULL); }