| Message ID | 771a50ef3c8263ed77a2bcb84f5e75b95ead0495.1494527628.git.rgb@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 664d6a5..c0adee6 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (pESET && !(pEALL && EROOT && RROOT && SROOT) ) { + if (pESET && !(pEALL && (EROOT || RROOT) && SROOT) ) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret;
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user id. Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the unnecessary record. Ref: 3fc689e96c0c (Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS) See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> --- security/commoncap.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)