From patchwork Tue Jun 22 12:37:50 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ahmad Fatoum X-Patchwork-Id: 12337231 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E9AEC49EA2 for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 12:39:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5415260FE7 for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 12:39:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231701AbhFVMlj (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Jun 2021 08:41:39 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48240 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231294AbhFVMlG (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Jun 2021 08:41:06 -0400 Received: from metis.ext.pengutronix.de (metis.ext.pengutronix.de [IPv6:2001:67c:670:201:290:27ff:fe1d:cc33]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 59A05C061767 for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 05:38:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dude.hi.pengutronix.de ([2001:67c:670:100:1d::7]) by metis.ext.pengutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.3:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lvffW-0001dn-6X; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:38:18 +0200 Received: from afa by dude.hi.pengutronix.de with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lvffS-0002QD-NB; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:38:14 +0200 From: Ahmad Fatoum To: James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells Cc: kernel@pengutronix.de, Ahmad Fatoum , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , =?utf-8?q?Horia_Geant=C4=83?= , Aymen Sghaier , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Udit Agarwal , Eric Biggers , Jan Luebbe , David Gstir , Richard Weinberger , Franck LENORMAND , Sumit Garg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:37:50 +0200 Message-Id: <77c472a8b373f4a9de646c91214db546bbbe1e81.1624364386.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2001:67c:670:100:1d::7 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: afa@pengutronix.de X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on metis.ext.pengutronix.de); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-PTX-Original-Recipient: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware that does the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. While a previous change offers users the choice to use the kernel RNG instead for both, new trust sources may want to unconditionally use the kernel RNG for generating key material, like it's done elsewhere in the kernel. This is especially prudent for hardware that has proven-in-production HWRNG drivers implemented, as otherwise code would have to be duplicated only to arrive at a possibly worse result. Make this possible by turning struct trusted_key_ops::get_random into an optional member. If a driver leaves it NULL, kernel RNG will be used instead. Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum --- To: James Bottomley To: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Horia Geantă" Cc: Aymen Sghaier Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Udit Agarwal Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Jan Luebbe Cc: David Gstir Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Franck LENORMAND Cc: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops { /* Unseal a key. */ int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); - /* Get a randomized key. */ + /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */ int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); /* Exit key interface. */ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 2eeb7117e86b..8d829e6866ca 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) continue; get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random; - if (trusted_kernel_rng) + if (trusted_kernel_rng || !get_random) get_random = kernel_get_random; static_call_update(trusted_key_init,