From patchwork Wed Jan 26 20:35:14 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Vivek Goyal X-Patchwork-Id: 12725741 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD882C2BA4C for ; Wed, 26 Jan 2022 20:35:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230368AbiAZUfV (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:35:21 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]:21165 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230261AbiAZUfV (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:35:21 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1643229321; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type; bh=KJxFPQJdPSBExsQiGgprcViRgqS6/9NAuVAPZcOxqbY=; b=QO3lg4fwx0I3LlLrc8TgXAMmHgtTBi4jawrT0uCmwXJDbMC3qLYZyOr/BRjYuDgzhz9CkG 8WewvswnYfYgm5Th7CXMLZJkaZeewKKK1ty0AlHCD8IiROPU3ytAHBpiU302j501vvqZXF xTQYpquQC/uXPt2gpHZjKn+hVdgAXoM= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-115-Bf1IrsabNTCIFeKHf2yq0A-1; Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:35:17 -0500 X-MC-Unique: Bf1IrsabNTCIFeKHf2yq0A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1208E1091DA0; Wed, 26 Jan 2022 20:35:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from horse.redhat.com (unknown [10.22.16.191]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E2BF61095; Wed, 26 Jan 2022 20:35:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: by horse.redhat.com (Postfix, from userid 10451) id 208E2223DA6; Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:35:14 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:35:14 -0500 From: Vivek Goyal To: linux kernel mailing list , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paul Moore , Casey Schaufler , Jeff Layton , Christian Brauner , Stephen Muth , "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: [PATCH] security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 Precedence: bulk List-ID: A ceph user has reported that ceph is crashing with kernel NULL pointer dereference. Following is the backtrace. /proc/version: Linux version 5.16.2-arch1-1 (linux@archlinux) (gcc (GCC) 11.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.36.1) #1 SMP PREEMPT Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:18:29 +0000 distro / arch: Arch Linux / x86_64 SELinux is not enabled ceph cluster version: 16.2.7 (dd0603118f56ab514f133c8d2e3adfc983942503) relevant dmesg output: [ 30.947129] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947206] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 30.947258] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 30.947310] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 30.947342] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 30.947388] CPU: 5 PID: 778 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.16.2-arch1-1 #1 86fbf2c313cc37a553d65deb81d98e9dcc2a3659 [ 30.947486] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B365M DS3H/B365M DS3H, BIOS F5 08/13/2019 [ 30.947569] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 [ 30.947616] Code: b6 07 38 d0 74 16 48 83 c7 01 84 c0 74 05 48 39 f7 75 ec 31 c0 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 48 89 f8 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 0 f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 12 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 31 ff [ 30.947782] RSP: 0018:ffffa4ed80ffbbb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 30.947836] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947904] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947971] RBP: ffff94b0d15c0ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948040] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948106] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948174] FS: 00007fc7520f0740(0000) GS:ffff94b7ced40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 30.948252] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 30.948308] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104a40001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 30.948376] Call Trace: [ 30.948404] [ 30.948431] ceph_security_init_secctx+0x7b/0x240 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948582] ceph_atomic_open+0x51e/0x8a0 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948708] ? get_cached_acl+0x4d/0xa0 [ 30.948759] path_openat+0x60d/0x1030 [ 30.948809] do_filp_open+0xa5/0x150 [ 30.948859] do_sys_openat2+0xc4/0x190 [ 30.948904] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 30.948948] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 30.948989] ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x180 [ 30.949034] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 30.949091] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7521e25bb [ 30.950849] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 0 0 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 Core of the problem is that ceph checks for return code from security_dentry_init_security() and if return code is 0, it assumes everything is fine and continues to call strlen(name), which crashes. Typically SELinux LSM returns 0 and sets name to "security.selinux" and it is not a problem. Or if selinux is not compiled in or disabled, it returns -EOPNOTSUP and ceph deals with it. But somehow in this configuration, 0 is being returned and "name" is not being initialized and that's creating the problem. Our suspicion is that BPF LSM is registering a hook for dentry_init_security() and returns hook default of 0. LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry,...) I have not been able to reproduce it just by doing CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y. Stephen has tested the patch though and confirms it solves the problem for him. dentry_init_security() is written in such a way that it expects only one LSM to register the hook. Atleast that's the expectation with current code. If another LSM returns a hook and returns default, it will simply return 0 as of now and that will break ceph. Hence, suggestion is that change semantics of this hook a bit. If there are no LSMs or no LSM is taking ownership and initializing security context, then return -EOPNOTSUP. Also allow at max one LSM to initialize security context. This hook can't deal with multiple LSMs trying to init security context. This patch implements this new behavior. Reported-by: Stephen Muth Tested-by: Stephen Muth Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Cc: Jeff Layton Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Paul Moore Cc: # 5.16.0 Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Index: redhat-linux/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h =================================================================== --- redhat-linux.orig/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h 2022-01-24 14:56:14.338030140 -0500 +++ redhat-linux/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h 2022-01-25 18:48:46.917496696 -0500 @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_clone_mnt_opts, cons unsigned long *set_kern_flags) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, move_mount, const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry, +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_create_files_as, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, Index: redhat-linux/security/security.c =================================================================== --- redhat-linux.orig/security/security.c 2022-01-25 18:46:59.166496696 -0500 +++ redhat-linux/security/security.c 2022-01-26 14:31:43.454568468 -0500 @@ -1048,8 +1048,19 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode, - name, xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + /* + * Only one module will provide a security context. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) { + rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, + xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) + return rc; + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);