From patchwork Wed Apr 5 21:52:14 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 9665789 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45169602B5 for ; Wed, 5 Apr 2017 21:52:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34D3520008 for ; Wed, 5 Apr 2017 21:52:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 2835D205FB; Wed, 5 Apr 2017 21:52:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58FED20008 for ; Wed, 5 Apr 2017 21:52:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933477AbdDEVwX (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Apr 2017 17:52:23 -0400 Received: from nm24-vm5.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([98.138.91.246]:50405 "EHLO nm24-vm5.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755800AbdDEVwV (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Apr 2017 17:52:21 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1491429140; bh=vXnNzLoJPMvYgkyoMGc/ZgWg26RIyJkmlqVmSg1/jO4=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From:Subject; b=c/mhKkUhF/WgKCRne0SvXusCY5lrDvQwsPRwXzV0Amqi85XTd7Rt28A1D3jiM3bHdEFbS9giO5MFTydW6s+vBq2GO/v7JrGrFRJLOwK3DHKfGu2uCi8WMwPPf+5hdGDYiUmsu/adwoUk3+KUrBnMTqhi0F76qAZByi3b/W+1Hehm5vKSF/bq3yF+MPyEwWFRufOThswqCm9GJiVpiv2UakRRUyhVN7JMALnkB96XDV3uvkwEpe2szxWiHg7ie8dUuKBuz1R+Ia105Ty1oxk1JBO5gNXmxHIdxpAgBE1SjgfxdHHZYPfUFYd7Q43fNoBBivQvUPzWzKXZMFJmBCcwIg== Received: from [98.138.226.179] by nm24.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 05 Apr 2017 21:52:20 -0000 Received: from [98.138.104.114] by tm14.bullet.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 05 Apr 2017 21:52:20 -0000 Received: from [127.0.0.1] by smtp223.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 05 Apr 2017 21:52:20 -0000 X-Yahoo-Newman-Id: 121951.8890.bm@smtp223.mail.ne1.yahoo.com X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 X-YMail-OSG: JmJHyqgVM1ncXmA3WbUJVJhzhLj8VxFHxfMgwJqvj0eZALy tpdism2RX2KN.PT1Hj8SgVg1zHRgtYFBanps9ZoPw5ValebAb2RJC6gY_fp7 vC_gQY905y4Rv8XJHF0cRo2cDWMXsmoZm.BWcuM2If37E5VtdOGkPrXtdX3x Hz5g29gFUbB8Xm9bZKm2E5BFakHVvOoH19M2lYMxxS3CExxikmBNOG3f36Z1 OmPMxHFaM.G2DVQTIwWZskJcsk5EprNRxorEDe7CMq9urxZPrZWVm8lwg1Pm mFO811U0G7FkiTTy3WrZIhQHbD4St7oTxAd_sdtZehfstr6XeeAzKG5exOyE LkMaeUzdzoPe3GhajnqXDnKojzby5LyUgsq3YlDDQphM39XF6ZVcXPc3UmkA ap3hy1PGFO_A8hMLwZp6TDv.mxCeKNK8ZVeF7XEL5ZHj9P6Hugf7t5bQJ5t7 euG.BM4cqznExPY_zr68YWWmgW2i.LhTaWq1SZpSq9d1wK7X6NfrV.aoFbT5 26zTzWKl4RSO1yJtC5To2yM8bDB9kP9PSaTRCnyGiK8HT2PfOD56i8IE- X-Yahoo-SMTP: OIJXglSswBDfgLtXluJ6wiAYv6_cnw-- Subject: [PATCH RFC 01/11] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs To: LSM , James Morris References: <509e0281-9f8a-83c2-f9d6-5532903cda46@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: John Johansen , Tetsuo Handa , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Kees Cook , Casey Schaufler From: Casey Schaufler Message-ID: Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2017 14:52:14 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <509e0281-9f8a-83c2-f9d6-5532903cda46@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Subject: [PATCH RFC 01/11] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. This patch does not include subdirectories for SELinux or AppArmor. I do have a patch that provides those, and will happily make it available should anyone see value in it. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 19 +++++++++---- fs/proc/base.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ fs/proc/internal.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 15 ++++++---- security/security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++--- 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt index c2683f2..57eafbc 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt @@ -16,11 +16,10 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the LSM to provide specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available in the core functionality of Linux itself. -Without a specific LSM built into the kernel, the default LSM will be the -Linux capabilities system. Most LSMs choose to extend the capabilities -system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks. -For more details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux -man-pages project. +The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. For more details +on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux man-pages project. +This may be followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one +"major" module. A list of the active security modules can be found by reading /sys/kernel/security/lsm. This is a comma separated list, and @@ -29,6 +28,14 @@ order in which checks are made. The capability module will always be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured. +Process attributes associated with "major" security modules should +be accessed and maintained using the special files in /proc/.../attr. +A security module may maintain a module specific subdirectory there, +named after the module. /proc/.../attr/smack is provided by the Smack +security module and contains all its special files. The files directly +in /proc/.../attr remain as legacy interfaces for modules that provide +subdirectories. + Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215, a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to @@ -38,4 +45,4 @@ that end users and distros can make a more informed decision about which LSMs suit their requirements. For extensive documentation on the available LSM hook interfaces, please -see include/linux/security.h. +see include/linux/lsm_hooks.h. diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index c87b6b9..2decd2f 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -139,9 +139,13 @@ struct pid_entry { #define REG(NAME, MODE, fops) \ NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), NULL, &fops, {}) #define ONE(NAME, MODE, show) \ - NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \ { .proc_show = show } ) +#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE) \ + NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)), \ + NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations, \ + { .lsm = LSM }) /* * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the . @@ -2455,7 +2459,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, if (!task) return -ESRCH; - length = security_getprocattr(task, + length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, &p); put_task_struct(task); @@ -2501,7 +2505,8 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (length < 0) goto out_free; - length = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, + length = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm, + file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page, count); mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: @@ -2518,13 +2523,53 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ +static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate(struct file *filp, \ + struct dir_context *ctx) \ +{ \ + return proc_pident_readdir(filp, ctx, \ + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ +} \ +\ +static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \ + .read = generic_read_dir, \ + .iterate = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_iterate, \ + .llseek = default_llseek, \ +}; \ +\ +static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \ + struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \ +{ \ + return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \ + LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \ + ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \ +} \ +\ +static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \ + .lookup = proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \ + .getattr = pid_getattr, \ + .setattr = proc_setattr, \ +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK +static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { + ATTR("smack", "current", 0666), +}; +LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); +#endif + static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { - REG("current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("prev", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), - REG("sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations), + ATTR(NULL, "current", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "prev", 0444), + ATTR(NULL, "exec", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK + DIR("smack", 0555, + proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops), +#endif }; static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h index c5ae09b..8b7d101 100644 --- a/fs/proc/internal.h +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ union proc_op { int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); + const char *lsm; }; struct proc_inode { diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index af675b5..8ee9dbd 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -365,8 +365,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd); int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter); void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); -int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, + char **value); +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, + size_t size); int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); @@ -1111,15 +1113,18 @@ static inline int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, return 0; } -static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode) { } -static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) +static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, + char *name, char **value) { return -EINVAL; } -static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size) +static inline int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, char *name, + void *value, size_t size) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 549bddc..e28bb98 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1216,14 +1216,36 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, + char **value) { - return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); + if (rc != -ENOENT) + return rc; + } + return -EINVAL; } -int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, + size_t size) { - return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); + if (rc != -ENOENT) + return rc; + } + return -EINVAL; } int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)