From patchwork Tue Dec 17 22:43:13 2013 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kees Cook X-Patchwork-Id: 3366531 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-linux-sh@patchwork.kernel.org Delivered-To: patchwork-parsemail@patchwork2.web.kernel.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.19.201]) by patchwork2.web.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4AC3C0D4A for ; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:47:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C43AA20251 for ; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:47:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83D4B20211 for ; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 22:47:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752000Ab3LQWrj (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Dec 2013 17:47:39 -0500 Received: from smtp.outflux.net ([198.145.64.163]:57531 "EHLO smtp.outflux.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751008Ab3LQWq5 (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Dec 2013 17:46:57 -0500 Received: from www.outflux.net (serenity-end.outflux.net [10.2.0.2]) by vinyl.outflux.net (8.14.4/8.14.4/Debian-2ubuntu2.1) with ESMTP id rBHMhKd9013688; Tue, 17 Dec 2013 14:43:20 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michal Marek , Russell King , Ralf Baechle , Paul Mundt , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , James Hogan , Stephen Rothwell , Shawn Guo , x86@kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org Subject: [PATCH v3 1/2] create HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR for centralized use Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 14:43:13 -0800 Message-Id: <1387320194-24185-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.9.5 In-Reply-To: <1387320194-24185-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1387320194-24185-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-MIMEDefang-Filter: outflux$Revision: 1.316 $ X-HELO: www.outflux.net X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.71 on 10.2.0.1 Sender: linux-sh-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on mail.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- Makefile | 14 +++++++++++--- arch/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/Kconfig | 13 +------------ arch/arm/Makefile | 4 ---- arch/mips/Kconfig | 14 +------------- arch/mips/Makefile | 4 ---- arch/sh/Kconfig | 15 +-------------- arch/sh/Makefile | 4 ---- arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +---------------- arch/x86/Makefile | 8 +++----- 10 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 858a147fd836..27ed3ff7cf4c 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -595,10 +595,18 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_WARN),0) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN}) endif -# Force gcc to behave correct even for buggy distributions -ifndef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR -KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) +# Handle stack protector mode. +ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fstack-protector) + ifeq ($(stackp-flag),) + $(error Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR: \ + -fstack-protector not supported by compiler)) + endif +else + # Force off for distro compilers that enable stack protector by default. + stackp-flag := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) endif +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag) # This warning generated too much noise in a regular build. # Use make W=1 to enable this warning (see scripts/Makefile.build) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index f1cf895c040f..24e026d83072 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -336,6 +336,28 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details. +config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + bool + help + An arch should select this symbol if: + - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option + - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard) + +config CC_STACKPROTECTOR + bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection" + depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + help + This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This + feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on + the stack just before the return address, and validates + the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer + overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also + overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then + neutralized via a kernel panic. + + This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution + gcc with the feature backported. + config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING bool help diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index c1f1a7eee953..9c909fc29272 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ config ARM select HAVE_BPF_JIT select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT + select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG select HAVE_DMA_ATTRS @@ -1856,18 +1857,6 @@ config SECCOMP and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls defined by each seccomp mode. -config CC_STACKPROTECTOR - bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" - help - This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This - feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on - the stack just before the return address, and validates - the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer - overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also - overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then - neutralized via a kernel panic. - This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above. - config SWIOTLB def_bool y diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile index c99b1086d83d..55b4255ad6ed 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/Makefile @@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y) KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog endif -ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y) -KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fstack-protector -endif - ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y) KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian AS += -EB diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig index 650de3976e7a..c93d92beb3d6 100644 --- a/arch/mips/Kconfig +++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config MIPS select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA if MODULES && 64BIT select CLONE_BACKWARDS select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW + select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR menu "Machine selection" @@ -2322,19 +2323,6 @@ config SECCOMP If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. -config CC_STACKPROTECTOR - bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" - help - This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This - feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on - the stack just before the return address, and validates - the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer - overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also - overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then - neutralized via a kernel panic. - - This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above. - config USE_OF bool select OF diff --git a/arch/mips/Makefile b/arch/mips/Makefile index de300b993607..efe50787cd89 100644 --- a/arch/mips/Makefile +++ b/arch/mips/Makefile @@ -232,10 +232,6 @@ bootvars-y = VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS=$(load-y) \ LDFLAGS += -m $(ld-emul) -ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector -endif - ifdef CONFIG_MIPS CHECKFLAGS += $(shell $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -dM -E -x c /dev/null | \ egrep -vw '__GNUC_(|MINOR_|PATCHLEVEL_)_' | \ diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig index 9b0979f4df7a..ce298317a73e 100644 --- a/arch/sh/Kconfig +++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ config SUPERH32 select PERF_EVENTS select ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE if MMU select SPARSE_IRQ + select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR config SUPERH64 def_bool ARCH = "sh64" @@ -695,20 +696,6 @@ config SECCOMP If unsure, say N. -config CC_STACKPROTECTOR - bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on SUPERH32 - help - This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This - feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on - the stack just before the return address, and validates - the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer - overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also - overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then - neutralized via a kernel panic. - - This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above. - config SMP bool "Symmetric multi-processing support" depends on SYS_SUPPORTS_SMP diff --git a/arch/sh/Makefile b/arch/sh/Makefile index aed701c7b11b..d4d16e4be07c 100644 --- a/arch/sh/Makefile +++ b/arch/sh/Makefile @@ -199,10 +199,6 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_DWARF_UNWINDER),y) KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fasynchronous-unwind-tables endif -ifeq ($(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR),y) - KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fstack-protector -endif - libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH32) := arch/sh/lib/ $(libs-y) libs-$(CONFIG_SUPERH64) := arch/sh/lib64/ $(libs-y) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index e903c71f7e69..4a814e6c526b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ config X86 select RTC_LIB select HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW select HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK if X86_64 + select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR config INSTRUCTION_DECODER def_bool y @@ -1616,22 +1617,6 @@ config SECCOMP If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. -config CC_STACKPROTECTOR - bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection" - ---help--- - This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This - feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on - the stack just before the return address, and validates - the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer - overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also - overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then - neutralized via a kernel panic. - - This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution - gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically - detected and for those versions, this configuration option is - ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup) - source kernel/Kconfig.hz config KEXEC diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 57d021507120..66d126ab9942 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -89,13 +89,11 @@ else KBUILD_CFLAGS += -maccumulate-outgoing-args endif +# Make sure compiler does not have buggy stackprotector support. ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR cc_has_sp := $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_$(BITS)-has-stack-protector.sh - ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y) - stackp-y := -fstack-protector - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-y) - else - $(warning stack protector enabled but no compiler support) + ifneq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(cc_has_sp) $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(biarch)),y) + $(error stack protector enabled but compiler support is broken) endif endif