From patchwork Thu Sep 30 01:05:09 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan X-Patchwork-Id: 12527065 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14ABBC4332F for ; Thu, 30 Sep 2021 01:05:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0160D615A4 for ; Thu, 30 Sep 2021 01:05:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1347609AbhI3BHT (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 Sep 2021 21:07:19 -0400 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:24480 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1347505AbhI3BHQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 Sep 2021 21:07:16 -0400 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10122"; a="212330112" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.85,334,1624345200"; d="scan'208";a="212330112" Received: from orsmga001.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.18]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 29 Sep 2021 18:05:34 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.85,334,1624345200"; d="scan'208";a="521027373" Received: from yzhu3-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO skuppusw-desk1.amr.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.37.25]) by orsmga001-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 29 Sep 2021 18:05:33 -0700 From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan To: Greg Kroah-Hartman , Borislav Petkov Cc: x86@kernel.org, Bjorn Helgaas , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Andreas Noever , "Michael S . Tsirkin" , Michael Jamet , Yehezkel Bernat , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , Mika Westerberg , Jonathan Corbet , Jason Wang , Dan Williams , Andi Kleen , Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Subject: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 18:05:09 -0700 Message-Id: <20210930010511.3387967-5-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210930010511.3387967-1-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> References: <20210930010511.3387967-1-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org Confidential guest platforms like TDX have a requirement to allow only trusted devices. By default the confidential-guest core will arrange for all devices to default to unauthorized (via dev_default_authorization) in device_initialize(). Since virtio driver is already hardened against the attack from the un-trusted host, override the confidential computing default unauthorized state Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan --- drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c index 588e02fb91d3..377b0ccdc503 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include /* Unique numbering for virtio devices. */ @@ -390,6 +392,13 @@ int register_virtio_device(struct virtio_device *dev) dev->config_enabled = false; dev->config_change_pending = false; + /* + * For Confidential guest (like TDX), virtio devices are + * trusted. So set authorized status as true. + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_DEVICE_FILTER)) + dev->dev.authorized = true; + /* We always start by resetting the device, in case a previous * driver messed it up. This also tests that code path a little. */ dev->config->reset(dev);