From patchwork Tue Nov 7 03:56:16 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "D. Wythe" X-Patchwork-Id: 13447864 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6788C63D8 for ; Tue, 7 Nov 2023 03:56:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=none Received: from out30-98.freemail.mail.aliyun.com (out30-98.freemail.mail.aliyun.com [115.124.30.98]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B6F32D47; Mon, 6 Nov 2023 19:56:25 -0800 (PST) X-Alimail-AntiSpam: AC=PASS;BC=-1|-1;BR=01201311R111e4;CH=green;DM=||false|;DS=||;FP=0|-1|-1|-1|0|-1|-1|-1;HT=ay29a033018045192;MF=alibuda@linux.alibaba.com;NM=1;PH=DS;RN=9;SR=0;TI=SMTPD_---0Vvsn0nB_1699329376; Received: from j66a10360.sqa.eu95.tbsite.net(mailfrom:alibuda@linux.alibaba.com fp:SMTPD_---0Vvsn0nB_1699329376) by smtp.aliyun-inc.com; Tue, 07 Nov 2023 11:56:20 +0800 From: "D. Wythe" To: kgraul@linux.ibm.com, wenjia@linux.ibm.com, jaka@linux.ibm.com, wintera@linux.ibm.com Cc: kuba@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net] net/smc: avoid data corruption caused by decline Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 11:56:16 +0800 Message-Id: <1699329376-17596-1-git-send-email-alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org From: "D. Wythe" We found a data corruption issue during testing of SMC-R on Redis applications. The benchmark has a low probability of reporting a strange error as shown below. "Error: Protocol error, got "\xe2" as reply type byte" Finally, we found that the retrieved error data was as follows: 0xE2 0xD4 0xC3 0xD9 0x04 0x00 0x2C 0x20 0xA6 0x56 0x00 0x16 0x3E 0x0C 0xCB 0x04 0x02 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xE2 It is quite obvious that this is a SMC DECLINE message, which means that the applications received SMC protocol message. We found that this was caused by the following situations: client server proposal -------------> accept <------------- confirm -------------> wait confirm failed llc confirm x------ (after 2s)timeout wait rsp wait decline (after 1s) timeout (after 2s) timeout decline --------------> decline <-------------- As a result, a decline message was sent in the implementation, and this message was read from TCP by the already-fallback connection. This patch double the client timeout as 2x of the server value, With this simple change, the Decline messages should never cross or collide (during Confirm link timeout). This issue requires an immediate solution, since the protocol updates involve a more long-term solution. Signed-off-by: D. Wythe --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index abd2667..5b91f55 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static int smcr_clnt_conf_first_link(struct smc_sock *smc) int rc; /* receive CONFIRM LINK request from server over RoCE fabric */ - qentry = smc_llc_wait(link->lgr, NULL, SMC_LLC_WAIT_TIME, + qentry = smc_llc_wait(link->lgr, NULL, 2 * SMC_LLC_WAIT_TIME, SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK); if (!qentry) { struct smc_clc_msg_decline dclc;