| Message ID | 20210610164031.3412479-2-maximmi@nvidia.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Commit | 5fc177ab759418c9537433e63301096e733fb915 |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| netdev/cover_letter | success | Link |
| netdev/fixes_present | success | Link |
| netdev/patch_count | success | Link |
| netdev/tree_selection | success | Clearly marked for net |
| netdev/subject_prefix | success | Link |
| netdev/cc_maintainers | warning | 2 maintainers not CCed: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org coreteam@netfilter.org |
| netdev/source_inline | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
| netdev/verify_signedoff | success | Link |
| netdev/module_param | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
| netdev/build_32bit | success | Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0 |
| netdev/kdoc | success | Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0 |
| netdev/verify_fixes | success | Link |
| netdev/checkpatch | success | total: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 checks, 17 lines checked |
| netdev/build_allmodconfig_warn | success | Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0 |
| netdev/header_inline | success | Link |
Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com> wrote: > The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read > one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets > into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is > neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds > the length of 1. > > This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack > out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c index b100c04a0e43..3d6d49420db8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ synproxy_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int doff, int length = (th->doff * 4) - sizeof(*th); u8 buf[40], *ptr; + if (unlikely(length < 0)) + return false; + ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, doff + sizeof(*th), length, buf); if (ptr == NULL) return false; @@ -47,6 +50,8 @@ synproxy_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int doff, length--; continue; default: + if (length < 2) + return true; opsize = *ptr++; if (opsize < 2) return true;
The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). v2 changes: Added an early return when length < 0 to avoid calling skb_header_pointer with negative length. Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com> Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)