@@ -409,12 +409,6 @@ static void cn_proc_mcast_ctl(struct cn_msg *msg,
!task_is_in_init_pid_ns(current))
return;
- /* Can only change if privileged. */
- if (!__netlink_ns_capable(nsp, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
- err = EPERM;
- goto out;
- }
-
if (msg->len == sizeof(*pinput)) {
pinput = (struct proc_input *)msg->data;
mc_op = pinput->mcast_op;
@@ -461,7 +455,6 @@ static void cn_proc_mcast_ctl(struct cn_msg *msg,
break;
}
-out:
cn_proc_ack(err, msg->seq, msg->ack);
}
@@ -938,6 +938,16 @@ bool netlink_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_net_capable);
+static inline bool netlink_multicast_allowed(const struct socket *sock,
+ unsigned long groups)
+{
+ if (sock->sk->sk_protocol == NETLINK_CONNECTOR) {
+ if (test_bit(CN_IDX_PROC - 1, &groups))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline int netlink_allowed(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
{
return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) ||
@@ -1024,7 +1034,8 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
/* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */
if (groups) {
if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!netlink_multicast_allowed(sock, groups))
+ return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
return err;
There were a couple of reasons for not allowing non-root users access initially - one is there was some point no proper receive buffer management in place for netlink multicast. But that should be long fixed. See link below for more context. Second is that some of the messages may contain data that is root only. But this should be handled with a finer granularity, which is being done at the protocol layer. The only problematic protocols are nf_queue and the firewall netlink. Hence, this restriction for non-root access was relaxed for NETLINK_ROUTE initially: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20020612013101.A22399@wotan.suse.de/ This restriction has also been removed for following protocols: NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT, NETLINK_AUDIT, NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, NETLINK_GENERIC, NETLINK_SELINUX. Since process connector messages are not sensitive (process fork, exit notifications etc.), and anyone can read /proc data, we can allow non-root access here. However, since process event notification is not the only consumer of NETLINK_CONNECTOR, we can make this change even more fine grained than the protocol level, by checking for multicast group within the protocol. Added a new function netlink_multicast_allowed(), which checks if the protocol is NETLINK_CONNECTOR, and if multicast group is CN_IDX_PROC (process event notification) - if so, then allow non-root acceess. For other multicast groups of NETLINK_CONNECTOR, do not allow non-root access. Reason we need this change is we cannot run our DB application as root. Signed-off-by: Anjali Kulkarni <anjali.k.kulkarni@oracle.com> --- drivers/connector/cn_proc.c | 7 ------- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)