From patchwork Wed May 17 05:22:37 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Fastabend X-Patchwork-Id: 13244215 X-Patchwork-Delegate: bpf@iogearbox.net Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 77019D2FF; Wed, 17 May 2023 05:23:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-pj1-x1033.google.com (mail-pj1-x1033.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1033]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D238F40E8; Tue, 16 May 2023 22:23:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x1033.google.com with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-24e16918323so341408a91.2; Tue, 16 May 2023 22:23:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20221208; t=1684300980; x=1686892980; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=0kZKE0BIR8kU5LZVmgLjnz2d1PSXb3yg4NzK45uW/48=; b=cRkWytBtiGaSGkZGb1lGO5EpFHKoDUYUuK5Oz8ieUPrXG/cEfhWcNmUTjiR2wv5/2Y dCe0wsOCy0EDiyByz4pTpVmTdrNIgpG0rwuvi44ao4b8pMgcr3k3tWtkpc9d3Bs1TpHm xtDTnadk1AUFUZKWGlZvlLQBksSKqj9jaTr5vZRASQf6kEVsxpd6WOBk6d18rU+GoIQG 4Gomt8LUqcFrjfzOLHIhnoCrgM7NPD1lwa0oD49ek/Afxd492687Vhy+ddRs5c7QSmFa vGuphk3ZSON0WjGWKDVVTigQhcxI3xpsT1c/lf8mfRBTjxoD0oIKBl5f7hDXZ7bo16oe 1lug== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1684300980; x=1686892980; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=0kZKE0BIR8kU5LZVmgLjnz2d1PSXb3yg4NzK45uW/48=; b=JyUZLh9O0yz1eu93+kwDCOWzdOQa/IhFIfEgb7B9+t5RyTbdklHjLu6sl+O7N4sN/A QTpJy3cPQG3v7TwwEuAEttOr8jd/lCaDEoSDkUHulhEso9PiYRAJEd0glmWxgRGkZmHG a9MU+MBM0eXE/pruu8rj9FsZKYFX/Z7hDIxBIY8C7jFOGctkbv0/+XBhkb0p4G3yB/e4 nhe+gDDgsyeJIoCVXYYysg4NxUHXbo/uesWV20LjE50WssLJDTkKO4Ml3dvMgZBWQe2k QFFPFzmJ3iC6mIZctSlXI3fJ+UFWbtEoxc58a2ZGqyq08owuBhkr4NfT0cLIddoAMmWa vUXQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDxk0sMtOENQcDfFpaOvaaj+ACcvaLLVJkQhlcU04muXDnPgyKZ2 cM13ZqvvrUIrSe36tzWoSzI= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACHHUZ6EF5kZ8TNSzipzeod/uXtreVo2wV1TRMEKut1mV+wuT1WLnTlpz7yRN0Tjh97K0epVBjbDXQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:e545:b0:24e:2e86:5465 with SMTP id ei5-20020a17090ae54500b0024e2e865465mr39481099pjb.31.1684300980468; Tue, 16 May 2023 22:23:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from john.lan ([98.97.37.198]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n11-20020a17090a2fcb00b0023cfdbb6496sm581779pjm.1.2023.05.16.22.22.58 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 16 May 2023 22:23:00 -0700 (PDT) From: John Fastabend To: jakub@cloudflare.com, daniel@iogearbox.net Cc: john.fastabend@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, ast@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org, will@isovalent.com Subject: [PATCH bpf v8 06/13] bpf: sockmap, TCP data stall on recv before accept Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 22:22:37 -0700 Message-Id: <20230517052244.294755-7-john.fastabend@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.0 In-Reply-To: <20230517052244.294755-1-john.fastabend@gmail.com> References: <20230517052244.294755-1-john.fastabend@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net X-Patchwork-Delegate: bpf@iogearbox.net A common mechanism to put a TCP socket into the sockmap is to hook the BPF_SOCK_OPS_{ACTIVE_PASSIVE}_ESTABLISHED_CB event with a BPF program that can map the socket info to the correct BPF verdict parser. When the user adds the socket to the map the psock is created and the new ops are assigned to ensure the verdict program will 'see' the sk_buffs as they arrive. Part of this process hooks the sk_data_ready op with a BPF specific handler to wake up the BPF verdict program when data is ready to read. The logic is simple enough (posted here for easy reading) static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk) { struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->ops || !sock->ops->read_skb)) return; sock->ops->read_skb(sk, sk_psock_verdict_recv); } The oversight here is sk->sk_socket is not assigned until the application accepts() the new socket. However, its entirely ok for the peer application to do a connect() followed immediately by sends. The socket on the receiver is sitting on the backlog queue of the listening socket until its accepted and the data is queued up. If the peer never accepts the socket or is slow it will eventually hit data limits and rate limit the session. But, important for BPF sockmap hooks when this data is received TCP stack does the sk_data_ready() call but the read_skb() for this data is never called because sk_socket is missing. The data sits on the sk_receive_queue. Then once the socket is accepted if we never receive more data from the peer there will be no further sk_data_ready calls and all the data is still on the sk_receive_queue(). Then user calls recvmsg after accept() and for TCP sockets in sockmap we use the tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() handler. The handler checks for data in the sk_msg ingress queue expecting that the BPF program has already run from the sk_data_ready hook and enqueued the data as needed. So we are stuck. To fix do an unlikely check in recvmsg handler for data on the sk_receive_queue and if it exists wake up data_ready. We have the sock locked in both read_skb and recvmsg so should avoid having multiple runners. Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()") Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Signed-off-by: John Fastabend --- net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index 804bd0c247d0..404857ab14cc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -212,6 +212,26 @@ static int tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(struct sock *sk, return tcp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, flags, addr_len); lock_sock(sk); + + /* We may have received data on the sk_receive_queue pre-accept and + * then we can not use read_skb in this context because we haven't + * assigned a sk_socket yet so have no link to the ops. The work-around + * is to check the sk_receive_queue and in these cases read skbs off + * queue again. The read_skb hook is not running at this point because + * of lock_sock so we avoid having multiple runners in read_skb. + */ + if (unlikely(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))) { + tcp_data_ready(sk); + /* This handles the ENOMEM errors if we both receive data + * pre accept and are already under memory pressure. At least + * let user know to retry. + */ + if (unlikely(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))) { + copied = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + } + msg_bytes_ready: copied = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, flags); /* The typical case for EFAULT is the socket was gracefully