From patchwork Mon Aug 7 09:48:31 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Petr Oros X-Patchwork-Id: 13343233 X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55301D2E4 for ; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 09:48:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA23FF9 for ; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 02:48:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1691401725; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=+6FLaF/tuMkmWKXbbq159vzqpGYVrDE6F2OX13lKGxo=; b=CplS3XVrjZ+qbVkIy80pefFjVRRDRc5N5ghG1IBKXWHBsJXAYKsW9k/OsgB3EK9fWY8cwk ktQseIsz87uLJ0FLkwaIGE2XX87lk7z4fzRsX+XLXgqShebGX9V8ADMW8Q14Wgf/dKiRcL A/dm32uFlmfGsWcsYsEl25JME1YRDDU= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast-mx02.redhat.com [66.187.233.88]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-480-1ItAMbWeOo2IYJ1EjEEd2Q-1; Mon, 07 Aug 2023 05:48:39 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 1ItAMbWeOo2IYJ1EjEEd2Q-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1FA43823D61; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 09:48:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from swamp.redhat.com (unknown [10.45.226.148]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0988E1121314; Mon, 7 Aug 2023 09:48:36 +0000 (UTC) From: Petr Oros To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: jesse.brandeburg@intel.com, anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, Jacob.e.keller@intel.com, przemyslawx.patynowski@intel.com, kamil.maziarz@intel.com, dawidx.wesierski@intel.com, mateusz.palczewski@intel.com, slawomirx.laba@intel.com, norbertx.zulinski@intel.com, intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net 2/2] ice: Fix NULL pointer deref during VF reset Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 11:48:31 +0200 Message-ID: <20230807094831.696626-3-poros@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20230807094831.696626-1-poros@redhat.com> References: <20230807094831.696626-1-poros@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.3 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net X-Patchwork-Delegate: kuba@kernel.org During stress test with attaching and detaching VF from KVM and simultaneously changing VFs spoofcheck and trust there was a NULL pointer dereference in ice_reset_vf that VF's VSI is null. More than one instance of ice_reset_vf() can be running at a given time. When we rebuild the VSI in ice_reset_vf, another reset can be triaged from ice_service_task. In this case we can access the currently uninitialized VSI and couse panic. The window for this racing condition has been around for a long time but it's much worse after commit 227bf4500aaa ("ice: move VSI delete outside deconfig") because the reset runs faster. ice_reset_vf() using vf->cfg_lock and when we move this lock before accessing to the VF VSI, we can fix BUG for all cases. Panic occurs sometimes in ice_vsi_is_rx_queue_active() and sometimes in ice_vsi_stop_all_rx_rings() With our reproducer, we can hint BUG: ~8h before commit 227bf4500aaa ("ice: move VSI delete outside deconfig"). ~20m after commit 227bf4500aaa ("ice: move VSI delete outside deconfig"). After this fix we are not able to reproduce it after ~48h There was commit cf90b74341ee ("ice: Fix call trace with null VSI during VF reset") which also tried to fix this issue, but it was only partially resolved and the bug still exists. [ 6420.658415] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 6420.665382] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 6420.670521] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 6420.675659] PGD 0 [ 6420.677679] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 6420.682038] CPU: 53 PID: 326472 Comm: kworker/53:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-317.el9.x86_64 #1 [ 6420.691250] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/04V528, BIOS 1.6.5 04/15/2022 [ 6420.698729] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ 6420.703462] RIP: 0010:ice_vsi_is_rx_queue_active+0x2d/0x60 [ice] [ 6420.705860] ice 0000:ca:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 6420.709494] Code: 00 00 66 83 bf 76 04 00 00 00 48 8b 77 10 74 3e 31 c0 eb 0f 0f b7 97 76 04 00 00 48 83 c0 01 39 c2 7e 2b 48 8b 97 68 04 00 00 <0f> b7 0c 42 48 8b 96 20 13 00 00 48 8d 94 8a 00 00 12 00 8b 12 83 [ 6420.714426] ice 0000:ca:00.0 ens7f0: Setting MAC 22:22:22:22:22:00 on VF 0. VF driver will be reinitialized [ 6420.733120] RSP: 0018:ff778d2ff383fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6420.733123] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff2acf1916294000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 6420.733125] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff2acf1f2c6401a0 RDI: ff2acf1a27301828 [ 6420.762346] RBP: ff2acf1a27301828 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000001000 [ 6420.769476] R10: ff2acf1916286000 R11: 00000000019eba3f R12: ff2acf19066460d0 [ 6420.776611] R13: ff2acf1f2c6401a0 R14: ff2acf1f2c6401a0 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 6420.783742] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2acf28ffa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6420.791829] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6420.797575] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000016ad410003 CR4: 0000000000773ee0 [ 6420.804708] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 6420.811034] vfio-pci 0000:ca:01.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 6420.811840] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 6420.811841] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6420.811842] Call Trace: [ 6420.811843] [ 6420.811844] ice_reset_vf+0x9a/0x450 [ice] [ 6420.811876] ice_process_vflr_event+0x8f/0xc0 [ice] [ 6420.841343] ice_service_task+0x23b/0x600 [ice] [ 6420.845884] ? __schedule+0x212/0x550 [ 6420.849550] process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 [ 6420.853563] ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 [ 6420.857577] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 [ 6420.861242] ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 [ 6420.865253] kthread+0xdd/0x100 [ 6420.868400] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 6420.873194] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 6420.876774] [ 6420.878967] Modules linked in: vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iavf vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nft_counter nf_tables bridge stp llc sctp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nfp tls nfnetlink bluetooth mlx4_en mlx4_core rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common i10nm_edac nfit libnvdimm ipmi_ssif x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp irdma kvm_intel i40e kvm iTCO_wdt dcdbas ib_uverbs irqbypass iTCO_vendor_support mgag200 mei_me ib_core dell_smbios isst_if_mmio isst_if_mbox_pci rapl i2c_algo_bit drm_shmem_helper intel_cstate drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect isst_if_common sysimgblt intel_uncore fb_sys_fops dell_wmi_descriptor wmi_bmof intel_vsec mei i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi ipmi_si i2c_smbus ipmi_devintf intel_pch_thermal acpi_power_meter pcspkr Fixes: efe41860008e ("ice: Fix memory corruption in VF driver") Fixes: f23df5220d2b ("ice: Fix spurious interrupt during removal of trusted VF") Signed-off-by: Petr Oros Reviewed-by: Simon Horman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c index 294e91c3453ccd..ea3310be8354cf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c @@ -612,11 +612,17 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags) return 0; } + if (flags & ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK) + mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); + else + lockdep_assert_held(&vf->cfg_lock); + if (ice_is_vf_disabled(vf)) { vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); if (!vsi) { dev_dbg(dev, "VF is already removed\n"); - return -EINVAL; + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; } ice_vsi_stop_lan_tx_rings(vsi, ICE_NO_RESET, vf->vf_id); @@ -625,14 +631,9 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags) dev_dbg(dev, "VF is already disabled, there is no need for resetting it, telling VM, all is fine %d\n", vf->vf_id); - return 0; + goto out_unlock; } - if (flags & ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK) - mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock); - else - lockdep_assert_held(&vf->cfg_lock); - /* Set VF disable bit state here, before triggering reset */ set_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states); ice_trigger_vf_reset(vf, flags & ICE_VF_RESET_VFLR, false);