From patchwork Fri Oct 6 20:47:00 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 13412006 X-Patchwork-Delegate: bpf@iogearbox.net Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 93BBD38FB5 for ; Fri, 6 Oct 2023 20:47:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="MkzEEFHU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 20A13C433D9; Fri, 6 Oct 2023 20:47:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1696625243; bh=F615IKuA7bDZOZiywezIBUwni47usqqUl3FhcOL75r4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=MkzEEFHURUlhaf/Rs8JSHdDfbBI8A0FrdRbWcJ3VY3hVDGsRp5hZGazKfEdx7+BRN upgSGxx0r59J54ZIi80xeidaW285E538KNXAaTh+YIGBAlLhgRqE6rLVPRP8iA3o4c LepH9+vwFjA35hmI5aaZcY3LGbq4W8havVvOQY9Jdlv94xKRxgj6V4oxyyPUbx1IeK L10ptWrZjb6+TJS+YEv5TJK6no/8ShW1Q0R6q0xQ6uankxaNqrrsFVilRuM6oOk+2I REwvW6APsSwEkBhfYOlXqVedPLbpZp4hsMnW/TelYJe5cLqUVOmQ1UKtK8ff5AYSru JhyOymH4AEbnA== From: KP Singh To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, renauld@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v6 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 22:47:00 +0200 Message-ID: <20231006204701.549230-5-kpsingh@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.42.0.609.gbb76f46606-goog In-Reply-To: <20231006204701.549230-1-kpsingh@kernel.org> References: <20231006204701.549230-1-kpsingh@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Patchwork-Delegate: bpf@iogearbox.net BPF LSM hooks have side-effects (even when a default value is returned), as some hooks end up behaving differently due to the very presence of the hook. The static keys guarding the BPF LSM hooks are disabled by default and enabled only when a BPF program is attached implementing the hook logic. This avoids the issue of the side-effects and also the minor overhead associated with the empty callback. security_file_ioctl: 0xffffffff818f0e30 <+0>: endbr64 0xffffffff818f0e34 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 0xffffffff818f0e39 <+9>: push %rbp 0xffffffff818f0e3a <+10>: push %r14 0xffffffff818f0e3c <+12>: push %rbx 0xffffffff818f0e3d <+13>: mov %rdx,%rbx 0xffffffff818f0e40 <+16>: mov %esi,%ebp 0xffffffff818f0e42 <+18>: mov %rdi,%r14 0xffffffff818f0e45 <+21>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e57 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Static key enabled for SELinux 0xffffffff818f0e47 <+23>: xchg %ax,%ax ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Static key disabled for BPF. This gets patched when a BPF LSM program is attached 0xffffffff818f0e49 <+25>: xor %eax,%eax 0xffffffff818f0e4b <+27>: xchg %ax,%ax 0xffffffff818f0e4d <+29>: pop %rbx 0xffffffff818f0e4e <+30>: pop %r14 0xffffffff818f0e50 <+32>: pop %rbp 0xffffffff818f0e51 <+33>: cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk> 0xffffffff818f0e57 <+39>: endbr64 0xffffffff818f0e5b <+43>: mov %r14,%rdi 0xffffffff818f0e5e <+46>: mov %ebp,%esi 0xffffffff818f0e60 <+48>: mov %rbx,%rdx 0xffffffff818f0e63 <+51>: call 0xffffffff819033c0 0xffffffff818f0e68 <+56>: test %eax,%eax 0xffffffff818f0e6a <+58>: jne 0xffffffff818f0e4d 0xffffffff818f0e6c <+60>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e47 0xffffffff818f0e6e <+62>: endbr64 0xffffffff818f0e72 <+66>: mov %r14,%rdi 0xffffffff818f0e75 <+69>: mov %ebp,%esi 0xffffffff818f0e77 <+71>: mov %rbx,%rdx 0xffffffff818f0e7a <+74>: call 0xffffffff8141e3b0 0xffffffff818f0e7f <+79>: test %eax,%eax 0xffffffff818f0e81 <+81>: jne 0xffffffff818f0e4d 0xffffffff818f0e83 <+83>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e49 0xffffffff818f0e85 <+85>: endbr64 0xffffffff818f0e89 <+89>: mov %r14,%rdi 0xffffffff818f0e8c <+92>: mov %ebp,%esi 0xffffffff818f0e8e <+94>: mov %rbx,%rdx 0xffffffff818f0e91 <+97>: pop %rbx 0xffffffff818f0e92 <+98>: pop %r14 0xffffffff818f0e94 <+100>: pop %rbp 0xffffffff818f0e95 <+101>: ret Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Jiri Olsa --- include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 ++++++++++++- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/bpf/hooks.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/security.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h index 1de7ece5d36d..5bbc31ac948c 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog, bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id); bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog); +void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value); static inline struct bpf_storage_blob *bpf_inode( const struct inode *inode) @@ -78,6 +79,10 @@ static inline void bpf_lsm_find_cgroup_shim(const struct bpf_prog *prog, { } +static inline void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value) +{ +} + #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index c77a1859214d..57ffe4eb6d30 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -97,11 +97,14 @@ struct lsm_static_calls_table { * @scalls: The beginning of the array of static calls assigned to this hook. * @hook: The callback for the hook. * @lsm: The name of the lsm that owns this hook. + * @default_state: The state of the LSM hook when initialized. If set to false, + * the static key guarding the hook will be set to disabled. */ struct security_hook_list { struct lsm_static_call *scalls; union security_list_options hook; const char *lsm; + bool default_state; } __randomize_layout; /* @@ -151,7 +154,15 @@ static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs, #define LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, CALLBACK) \ { \ .scalls = static_calls_table.NAME, \ - .hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK } \ + .hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK }, \ + .default_state = true \ + } + +#define LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, CALLBACK) \ + { \ + .scalls = static_calls_table.NAME, \ + .hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK }, \ + .default_state = false \ } extern char *lsm_names; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c index e97aeda3a86b..44788e2eaa1b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* dummy _ops. The verifier will operate on target program's ops. */ const struct bpf_verifier_ops bpf_extension_verifier_ops = { @@ -510,6 +511,21 @@ static enum bpf_tramp_prog_type bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(struct bpf_prog *prog) } } +static void bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, + enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind) +{ + struct bpf_tramp_link *link; + bool found = false; + + hlist_for_each_entry(link, &tr->progs_hlist[kind], tramp_hlist) { + if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(tr->func.addr, found); +} + static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_trampoline *tr) { enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind; @@ -549,6 +565,10 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_tr hlist_add_head(&link->tramp_hlist, &tr->progs_hlist[kind]); tr->progs_cnt[kind]++; + + if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) + bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind); + err = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */); if (err) { hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist); @@ -582,6 +602,10 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_ } hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist); tr->progs_cnt[kind]--; + + if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) + bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind); + return bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */); } diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c index cfaf1d0e6a5f..47e1a4777ec9 100644 --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ - LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME), + LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME), #include #undef LSM_HOOK LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free), @@ -32,3 +32,26 @@ DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { .init = bpf_lsm_init, .blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes }; + +void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value) +{ + struct lsm_static_call *scalls; + struct security_hook_list *h; + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks); i++) { + h = &bpf_lsm_hooks[i]; + if (h->hook.lsm_callback != addr) + continue; + + for (j = 0; j < MAX_LSM_COUNT; j++) { + scalls = &h->scalls[j]; + if (scalls->hl != &bpf_lsm_hooks[i]) + continue; + if (value) + static_branch_enable(scalls->active); + else + static_branch_disable(scalls->active); + } + } +} diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ce4c0a9107ea..f45e875b6d93 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ static void __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl) __static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline, hl->hook.lsm_callback); scall->hl = hl; - static_branch_enable(scall->active); + if (hl->default_state) + static_branch_enable(scall->active); return; } scall++;