[bpf-next,v6,1/2] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()

Commit Message

Yonghong Song Dec. 14, 2023, 8:38 p.m. UTC

When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
I once hit a kasan error like below:

  [ 1887.184724] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
  [ 1887.185599] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106806910 by task kworker/u12:2/2830
  [ 1887.186498]
  [ 1887.186712] CPU: 3 PID: 2830 Comm: kworker/u12:2 Tainted: G           OEL     6.7.0-rc3-00699-g90679706d486-dirty #494
  [ 1887.188034] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 1887.189618] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
  [ 1887.190341] Call Trace:
  [ 1887.190666]  <TASK>
  [ 1887.190949]  dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
  [ 1887.191423]  ? nf_tcp_handle_invalid+0x1b0/0x1b0
  [ 1887.192019]  ? panic+0x3c0/0x3c0
  [ 1887.192449]  print_report+0x14f/0x720
  [ 1887.192930]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
  [ 1887.193459]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xac/0x120
  [ 1887.194004]  ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
  [ 1887.194572]  kasan_report+0xc3/0x100
  [ 1887.195085]  ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
  [ 1887.195668]  bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
  [ 1887.196183]  ? __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0xb0/0xb0
  [ 1887.196736]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
  [ 1887.197270]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
  [ 1887.197802]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
  [ 1887.198319]  bpf_obj_free_fields+0x1d4/0x260
  [ 1887.198883]  array_map_free+0x1a3/0x260
  [ 1887.199380]  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x7b/0xe0
  [ 1887.199943]  process_scheduled_works+0x3a2/0x6c0
  [ 1887.200549]  worker_thread+0x633/0x890
  [ 1887.201047]  ? __kthread_parkme+0xd7/0xf0
  [ 1887.201574]  ? kthread+0x102/0x1d0
  [ 1887.202020]  kthread+0x1ab/0x1d0
  [ 1887.202447]  ? pr_cont_work+0x270/0x270
  [ 1887.202954]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
  [ 1887.203444]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
  [ 1887.203914]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
  [ 1887.204397]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
  [ 1887.204913]  </TASK>
  [ 1887.204913]  </TASK>
  [ 1887.205209]
  [ 1887.205416] Allocated by task 2197:
  [ 1887.205881]  kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
  [ 1887.206366]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x6e/0x80
  [ 1887.206856]  __kmalloc+0xac/0x1a0
  [ 1887.207293]  btf_parse_fields+0xa15/0x1480
  [ 1887.207836]  btf_parse_struct_metas+0x566/0x670
  [ 1887.208387]  btf_new_fd+0x294/0x4d0
  [ 1887.208851]  __sys_bpf+0x4ba/0x600
  [ 1887.209292]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50
  [ 1887.209762]  do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xf0
  [ 1887.210222]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
  [ 1887.210868]
  [ 1887.211074] Freed by task 36:
  [ 1887.211460]  kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
  [ 1887.211951]  kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0x40
  [ 1887.212485]  ____kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x180
  [ 1887.213027]  __kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x210
  [ 1887.213514]  btf_free+0x5b/0x130
  [ 1887.213918]  rcu_core+0x638/0xcc0
  [ 1887.214347]  __do_softirq+0x114/0x37e

The error happens at bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0:

  00000000000034c0 <bpf_rb_root_free>:
  ; {
    34c0: f3 0f 1e fa                   endbr64
    34c4: e8 00 00 00 00                callq   0x34c9 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x9>
    34c9: 55                            pushq   %rbp
    34ca: 48 89 e5                      movq    %rsp, %rbp
  ...
  ;       if (rec && rec->refcount_off >= 0 &&
    36aa: 4d 85 ed                      testq   %r13, %r13
    36ad: 74 a9                         je      0x3658 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x198>
    36af: 49 8d 7d 10                   leaq    0x10(%r13), %rdi
    36b3: e8 00 00 00 00                callq   0x36b8 <bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8>
                                        <==== kasan function
    36b8: 45 8b 7d 10                   movl    0x10(%r13), %r15d
                                        <==== use-after-free load
    36bc: 45 85 ff                      testl   %r15d, %r15d
    36bf: 78 8c                         js      0x364d <bpf_rb_root_free+0x18d>

So the problem is at rec->refcount_off in the above.

I did some source code analysis and find the reason.
                                  CPU A                        CPU B
  bpf_map_put:
    ...
    btf_put with rcu callback
    ...
    bpf_map_free_deferred
      with system_unbound_wq
    ...                          ...                           ...
    ...                          btf_free_rcu:                 ...
    ...                          ...                           bpf_map_free_deferred:
    ...                          ...
    ...         --------->       btf_struct_metas_free()
    ...         | race condition ...
    ...         --------->                                     map->ops->map_free()
    ...
    ...                          btf->struct_meta_tab = NULL

In the above, map_free() corresponds to array_map_free() and eventually
calling bpf_rb_root_free() which calls:
  ...
  __bpf_obj_drop_impl(obj, field->graph_root.value_rec, false);
  ...

Here, 'value_rec' is assigned in btf_check_and_fixup_fields() with following code:

  meta = btf_find_struct_meta(btf, btf_id);
  if (!meta)
    return -EFAULT;
  rec->fields[i].graph_root.value_rec = meta->record;

So basically, 'value_rec' is a pointer to the record in struct_metas_tab.
And it is possible that that particular record has been freed by
btf_struct_metas_free() and hence we have a kasan error here.

Actually it is very hard to reproduce the failure with current bpf/bpf-next
code, I only got the above error once. To increase reproducibility, I added
a delay in bpf_map_free_deferred() to delay map->ops->map_free(), which
significantly increased reproducibility.

  diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
  index 5e43ddd1b83f..aae5b5213e93 100644
  --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
  +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
  @@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
        struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
        struct btf_record *rec = map->record;

  +     mdelay(100);
        security_bpf_map_free(map);
        bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
        /* implementation dependent freeing */

Hao also provided test cases ([1]) for easily reproducing the above issue.

There are two ways to fix the issue, the v1 of the patch ([2]) moving
btf_put() after map_free callback, and the v5 of the patch ([3]) using
a kptr style fix which tries to get a btf reference during
map_check_btf(). Each approach has its pro and cons. The first approach
delays freeing btf while the second approach needs to acquire reference
depending on context which makes logic not very elegant and may
complicate things with future new data structures. Alexei
suggested in [4] going back to v1 which is what this patch
tries to do.

Rerun './test_progs -j' with the above mdelay() hack for a couple
of times and didn't observe the error for the above rb_root test cases.
Running Hou's test ([1]) is also successful.

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[e-mail]/
  [2] v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[e-mail]/
  [3] v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[e-mail]/
  [4] v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[e-mail]/

Cc: Hou Tao <[e-mail]>
Fixes: 958cf2e273f0 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[e-mail]>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

[e-mail] Dec. 15, 2023, 1:20 a.m. UTC | #1

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <[e-mail]>:

On Thu, 14 Dec 2023 12:38:15 -0800 you wrote:
> When running `./test_progs -j` in my local vm with latest kernel,
> I once hit a kasan error like below:
> 
>   [ 1887.184724] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>   [ 1887.185599] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106806910 by task kworker/u12:2/2830
>   [ 1887.186498]
>   [ 1887.186712] CPU: 3 PID: 2830 Comm: kworker/u12:2 Tainted: G           OEL     6.7.0-rc3-00699-g90679706d486-dirty #494
>   [ 1887.188034] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>   [ 1887.189618] Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
>   [ 1887.190341] Call Trace:
>   [ 1887.190666]  <TASK>
>   [ 1887.190949]  dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xe0
>   [ 1887.191423]  ? nf_tcp_handle_invalid+0x1b0/0x1b0
>   [ 1887.192019]  ? panic+0x3c0/0x3c0
>   [ 1887.192449]  print_report+0x14f/0x720
>   [ 1887.192930]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
>   [ 1887.193459]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xac/0x120
>   [ 1887.194004]  ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>   [ 1887.194572]  kasan_report+0xc3/0x100
>   [ 1887.195085]  ? bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>   [ 1887.195668]  bpf_rb_root_free+0x1f8/0x2b0
>   [ 1887.196183]  ? __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0xb0/0xb0
>   [ 1887.196736]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
>   [ 1887.197270]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
>   [ 1887.197802]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x40
>   [ 1887.198319]  bpf_obj_free_fields+0x1d4/0x260
>   [ 1887.198883]  array_map_free+0x1a3/0x260
>   [ 1887.199380]  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x7b/0xe0
>   [ 1887.199943]  process_scheduled_works+0x3a2/0x6c0
>   [ 1887.200549]  worker_thread+0x633/0x890
>   [ 1887.201047]  ? __kthread_parkme+0xd7/0xf0
>   [ 1887.201574]  ? kthread+0x102/0x1d0
>   [ 1887.202020]  kthread+0x1ab/0x1d0
>   [ 1887.202447]  ? pr_cont_work+0x270/0x270
>   [ 1887.202954]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
>   [ 1887.203444]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
>   [ 1887.203914]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x50/0x50
>   [ 1887.204397]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
>   [ 1887.204913]  </TASK>
>   [ 1887.204913]  </TASK>
>   [ 1887.205209]
>   [ 1887.205416] Allocated by task 2197:
>   [ 1887.205881]  kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
>   [ 1887.206366]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x6e/0x80
>   [ 1887.206856]  __kmalloc+0xac/0x1a0
>   [ 1887.207293]  btf_parse_fields+0xa15/0x1480
>   [ 1887.207836]  btf_parse_struct_metas+0x566/0x670
>   [ 1887.208387]  btf_new_fd+0x294/0x4d0
>   [ 1887.208851]  __sys_bpf+0x4ba/0x600
>   [ 1887.209292]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50
>   [ 1887.209762]  do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xf0
>   [ 1887.210222]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
>   [ 1887.210868]
>   [ 1887.211074] Freed by task 36:
>   [ 1887.211460]  kasan_set_track+0x3f/0x60
>   [ 1887.211951]  kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0x40
>   [ 1887.212485]  ____kasan_slab_free+0x101/0x180
>   [ 1887.213027]  __kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x210
>   [ 1887.213514]  btf_free+0x5b/0x130
>   [ 1887.213918]  rcu_core+0x638/0xcc0
>   [ 1887.214347]  __do_softirq+0x114/0x37e
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [bpf-next,v6,1/2] bpf: Fix a race condition between btf_put() and map_free()
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/59e5791f59dd
  - [bpf-next,v6,2/2] selftests/bpf: Remove flaky test_btf_id test
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/56925f389e15

You are awesome, thank you!

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 3fcf7741146a..8faa1a20edf8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@  static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
 	struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
+	struct btf *btf = map->btf;
 
 	security_bpf_map_free(map);
 	bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
@@ -707,6 +708,10 @@  static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
 	 * template bpf_map struct used during verification.
 	 */
 	btf_record_free(rec);
+	/* Delay freeing of btf for maps, as map_free callback may need
+	 * struct_meta info which will be freed with btf_put().
+	 */
+	btf_put(btf);
 }
 
 static void bpf_map_put_uref(struct bpf_map *map)
@@ -747,7 +752,6 @@  void bpf_map_put(struct bpf_map *map)
 	if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&map->refcnt)) {
 		/* bpf_map_free_id() must be called first */
 		bpf_map_free_id(map);
-		btf_put(map->btf);
 
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic64_read(&map->sleepable_refcnt));
 		if (READ_ONCE(map->free_after_mult_rcu_gp))