@@ -999,10 +999,12 @@ static enum rx_handler_result handle_not_macsec(struct sk_buff *skb)
struct metadata_dst *md_dst;
struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd;
struct macsec_dev *macsec;
+ bool is_macsec_md_dst;
rcu_read_lock();
rxd = macsec_data_rcu(skb->dev);
md_dst = skb_metadata_dst(skb);
+ is_macsec_md_dst = md_dst && md_dst->type == METADATA_MACSEC;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(macsec, &rxd->secys, secys) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
@@ -1013,14 +1015,42 @@ static enum rx_handler_result handle_not_macsec(struct sk_buff *skb)
* the SecTAG, so we have to deduce which port to deliver to.
*/
if (macsec_is_offloaded(macsec) && netif_running(ndev)) {
- struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc = NULL;
+ const struct macsec_ops *ops;
- if (md_dst && md_dst->type == METADATA_MACSEC)
- rx_sc = find_rx_sc(&macsec->secy, md_dst->u.macsec_info.sci);
+ ops = macsec_get_ops(macsec, NULL);
- if (md_dst && md_dst->type == METADATA_MACSEC && !rx_sc)
+ if (ops->rx_uses_md_dst && !is_macsec_md_dst)
continue;
+ if (is_macsec_md_dst) {
+ struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc;
+
+ /* All drivers that implement MACsec offload
+ * support using skb metadata destinations must
+ * indicate that they do so.
+ */
+ DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!ops->rx_uses_md_dst);
+ rx_sc = find_rx_sc(&macsec->secy,
+ md_dst->u.macsec_info.sci);
+ if (!rx_sc)
+ continue;
+ /* device indicated macsec offload occurred */
+ skb->dev = ndev;
+ skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
+ eth_skb_pkt_type(skb, ndev);
+ ret = RX_HANDLER_ANOTHER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* This datapath is insecure because it is unable to
+ * enforce isolation of broadcast/multicast traffic and
+ * unicast traffic with promiscuous mode on the macsec
+ * netdev. Since the core stack has no mechanism to
+ * check that the hardware did indeed receive MACsec
+ * traffic, it is possible that the response handling
+ * done by the MACsec port was to a plaintext packet.
+ * This violates the MACsec protocol standard.
+ */
if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(hdr->h_dest,
ndev->dev_addr)) {
/* exact match, divert skb to this port */
@@ -1036,14 +1066,10 @@ static enum rx_handler_result handle_not_macsec(struct sk_buff *skb)
break;
nskb->dev = ndev;
- if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(hdr->h_dest,
- ndev->broadcast))
- nskb->pkt_type = PACKET_BROADCAST;
- else
- nskb->pkt_type = PACKET_MULTICAST;
+ eth_skb_pkt_type(nskb, ndev);
__netif_rx(nskb);
- } else if (rx_sc || ndev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
+ } else if (ndev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
skb->dev = ndev;
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
ret = RX_HANDLER_ANOTHER;
Can now correctly identify where the packets should be delivered by using md_dst or its absence on devices that provide it. This detection is not possible without device drivers that update md_dst. A fallback pattern should be used for supporting such device drivers. This fallback mode causes multicast messages to be cloned to both the non-macsec and macsec ports, independent of whether the multicast message received was encrypted over MACsec or not. Other non-macsec traffic may also fail to be handled correctly for devices in promiscuous mode. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZULRxX9eIbFiVi7v@hog/ Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 860ead89b851 ("net/macsec: Add MACsec skb_metadata_dst Rx Data path support") Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com> --- drivers/net/macsec.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)