| Message ID | 20250402-kasan_slab-use-after-free_read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport-v1-1-da6f5f00f286@igalia.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | sctp: check transport existence before processing a send primitive | expand |
On Wed, Apr 02, 2025 at 12:25:36PM +0200, Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro wrote: > sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by > doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination > address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in > all the message chunks to be sent. > > There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal > of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an > address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have > been set up and before the message is sent. This causes the access to > the transport data in sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association > outqueue is flushed, to do a use-after-free read. > > This patch addresses this scenario by checking if the transport still > exists right after the chunks to be sent are set up to use it and before > proceeding to sending them. If the transport was freed since it was > found, the send is aborted. The reason to add the check here is that > once the transport is assigned to the chunks, deleting that transport > is safe, since it will also set chunk->transport to NULL in the affected > chunks. This scenario is correctly handled already, see Fixes below. > > The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1] > and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]). > > Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport.txt [1] > Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__repro.c [2] > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: df132eff4638 ("sctp: clear the transport of some out_chunk_list chunks in sctp_assoc_rm_peer") > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn@igalia.com> > --- > net/sctp/socket.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c > index 36ee34f483d703ffcfe5ca9e6cc554fba24c75ef..9c5ff44fa73cae6a6a04790800cc33dfa08a8da9 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/socket.c > +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c > @@ -1787,17 +1787,24 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags(struct sctp_association *asoc, > return 1; > } > > +static union sctp_addr *sctp_sendmsg_get_daddr(struct sock *sk, > + const struct msghdr *msg, > + struct sctp_cmsgs *cmsgs); > + > static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, > struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len, > struct sctp_transport *transport, > struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo) > { > + struct sctp_transport *aux_transport = NULL; > struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; > + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep; > struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk); > struct net *net = sock_net(sk); > struct sctp_datamsg *datamsg; > bool wait_connect = false; > struct sctp_chunk *chunk; > + union sctp_addr *daddr; > long timeo; > int err; > > @@ -1869,6 +1876,15 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, > sctp_set_owner_w(chunk); > chunk->transport = transport; > } > + /* Fail if transport was deleted after lookup in sctp_sendmsg() */ > + daddr = sctp_sendmsg_get_daddr(sk, msg, NULL); > + if (daddr) { > + sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, daddr, &aux_transport); > + if (!aux_transport || aux_transport != transport) { > + sctp_datamsg_free(datamsg); > + goto err; Hi Ricardo, This is not a full review, and I would suggest waiting for one from others. But this will result in the local variable err being used uninitialised. Flagged by Smatch. > + } > + } > > err = sctp_primitive_SEND(net, asoc, datamsg); > if (err) {
Hi Simon, On Wed, 2025-04-02 at 14:21 +0100, Simon Horman wrote: > Hi Ricardo, > > This is not a full review, and I would suggest waiting for one from > others. > But this will result in the local variable err being used > uninitialised. > > Flagged by Smatch. Nice catch! Thanks, I'll queue a fix for this for v2. Cheers, Ricardo
By the way, I'm thinking of setting err to -EAGAIN here so that userspace can retry the send and sctp_sendmsg() will try again to find a suitable association or create a new one if necessary, but if someone more knowledgeable about the SCTP implementation has a better suggestion about what kind of error to return in this scenario, I'd appreciate it. Regards, Ricardo
On Wed, Apr 2, 2025 at 6:26 AM Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn@igalia.com> wrote: > > sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by > doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination > address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in > all the message chunks to be sent. > > There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal > of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an > address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have > been set up and before the message is sent. This causes the access to > the transport data in sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association > outqueue is flushed, to do a use-after-free read. > The data send path: sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc() -> sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() And the transport removal path: sctp_sf_do_asconf() -> sctp_process_asconf() -> sctp_assoc_rm_peer() are both protected by the same socket lock. Additionally, when a path is removed, sctp_assoc_rm_peer() updates the transport of all existing chunks in the send queues (peer->transmitted and asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list) to NULL. It will be great if you can reproduce the issue locally and help check how the potential race occurs. > This patch addresses this scenario by checking if the transport still > exists right after the chunks to be sent are set up to use it and before > proceeding to sending them. If the transport was freed since it was > found, the send is aborted. The reason to add the check here is that > once the transport is assigned to the chunks, deleting that transport > is safe, since it will also set chunk->transport to NULL in the affected > chunks. This scenario is correctly handled already, see Fixes below. > > The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1] > and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]). > > Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport.txt [1] > Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__repro.c [2] > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: df132eff4638 ("sctp: clear the transport of some out_chunk_list chunks in sctp_assoc_rm_peer") > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn@igalia.com> > --- > net/sctp/socket.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c > index 36ee34f483d703ffcfe5ca9e6cc554fba24c75ef..9c5ff44fa73cae6a6a04790800cc33dfa08a8da9 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/socket.c > +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c > @@ -1787,17 +1787,24 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags(struct sctp_association *asoc, > return 1; > } > > +static union sctp_addr *sctp_sendmsg_get_daddr(struct sock *sk, > + const struct msghdr *msg, > + struct sctp_cmsgs *cmsgs); > + > static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, > struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len, > struct sctp_transport *transport, > struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo) > { > + struct sctp_transport *aux_transport = NULL; > struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; > + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep; > struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk); > struct net *net = sock_net(sk); > struct sctp_datamsg *datamsg; > bool wait_connect = false; > struct sctp_chunk *chunk; > + union sctp_addr *daddr; > long timeo; > int err; > > @@ -1869,6 +1876,15 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, > sctp_set_owner_w(chunk); > chunk->transport = transport; > } > + /* Fail if transport was deleted after lookup in sctp_sendmsg() */ > + daddr = sctp_sendmsg_get_daddr(sk, msg, NULL); > + if (daddr) { > + sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, daddr, &aux_transport); > + if (!aux_transport || aux_transport != transport) { > + sctp_datamsg_free(datamsg); > + goto err; > + } > + } > We should avoid an extra hashtable lookup on this hot TX path, as it would negatively impact performance. Thanks. > err = sctp_primitive_SEND(net, asoc, datamsg); > if (err) { > > --- > base-commit: 38fec10eb60d687e30c8c6b5420d86e8149f7557 > change-id: 20250402-kasan_slab-use-after-free_read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport-46c9c30bcb7d >
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 36ee34f483d703ffcfe5ca9e6cc554fba24c75ef..9c5ff44fa73cae6a6a04790800cc33dfa08a8da9 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -1787,17 +1787,24 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags(struct sctp_association *asoc, return 1; } +static union sctp_addr *sctp_sendmsg_get_daddr(struct sock *sk, + const struct msghdr *msg, + struct sctp_cmsgs *cmsgs); + static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len, struct sctp_transport *transport, struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo) { + struct sctp_transport *aux_transport = NULL; struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep; struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk); struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct sctp_datamsg *datamsg; bool wait_connect = false; struct sctp_chunk *chunk; + union sctp_addr *daddr; long timeo; int err; @@ -1869,6 +1876,15 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_set_owner_w(chunk); chunk->transport = transport; } + /* Fail if transport was deleted after lookup in sctp_sendmsg() */ + daddr = sctp_sendmsg_get_daddr(sk, msg, NULL); + if (daddr) { + sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, daddr, &aux_transport); + if (!aux_transport || aux_transport != transport) { + sctp_datamsg_free(datamsg); + goto err; + } + } err = sctp_primitive_SEND(net, asoc, datamsg); if (err) {
sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in all the message chunks to be sent. There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have been set up and before the message is sent. This causes the access to the transport data in sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association outqueue is flushed, to do a use-after-free read. This patch addresses this scenario by checking if the transport still exists right after the chunks to be sent are set up to use it and before proceeding to sending them. If the transport was freed since it was found, the send is aborted. The reason to add the check here is that once the transport is assigned to the chunks, deleting that transport is safe, since it will also set chunk->transport to NULL in the affected chunks. This scenario is correctly handled already, see Fixes below. The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1] and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]). Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport.txt [1] Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__repro.c [2] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: df132eff4638 ("sctp: clear the transport of some out_chunk_list chunks in sctp_assoc_rm_peer") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn@igalia.com> --- net/sctp/socket.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) --- base-commit: 38fec10eb60d687e30c8c6b5420d86e8149f7557 change-id: 20250402-kasan_slab-use-after-free_read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport-46c9c30bcb7d