| Message ID | a6bca963dca72d5ffeb811a254a4f6415ac7ff74.1652433977.git.pabeni@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Commit | 4d42d54a7d6aa6d29221d3fd4f2ae9503e94f011 |
| Delegated to: | Netdev Maintainers |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [net] net/sched: act_pedit: sanitize shift argument before usage | expand |
Hello: This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>: On Fri, 13 May 2022 11:27:06 +0200 you wrote: > syzbot was able to trigger an Out-of-Bound on the pedit action: > > UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/act_pedit.c:238:43 > shift exponent 1400735974 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' > CPU: 0 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor151 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-syzkaller-00165-g810c2f0a3f86 #0 > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] > dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 > ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x50 lib/ubsan.c:151 > __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x187 lib/ubsan.c:322 > tcf_pedit_init.cold+0x1a/0x1f net/sched/act_pedit.c:238 > tcf_action_init_1+0x414/0x690 net/sched/act_api.c:1367 > tcf_action_init+0x530/0x8d0 net/sched/act_api.c:1432 > tcf_action_add+0xf9/0x480 net/sched/act_api.c:1956 > tc_ctl_action+0x346/0x470 net/sched/act_api.c:2015 > rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5993 > netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502 > netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] > netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 > netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] > sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 > ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e2/0x800 net/socket.c:2413 > ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 > __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2496 > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > RIP: 0033:0x7fe36e9e1b59 > Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > RSP: 002b:00007ffef796fe88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe36e9e1b59 > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000300 RDI: 0000000000000003 > RBP: 00007fe36e9a5d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe36e9a5d90 > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 > </TASK> > > [...] Here is the summary with links: - [net] net/sched: act_pedit: sanitize shift argument before usage https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/4d42d54a7d6a You are awesome, thank you!
diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c index 0eaaf1f45de1..211c757bfc3c 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c +++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c @@ -232,6 +232,10 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, for (i = 0; i < p->tcfp_nkeys; ++i) { u32 cur = p->tcfp_keys[i].off; + /* sanitize the shift value for any later use */ + p->tcfp_keys[i].shift = min_t(size_t, BITS_PER_TYPE(int) - 1, + p->tcfp_keys[i].shift); + /* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual * value with uchar max. */
syzbot was able to trigger an Out-of-Bound on the pedit action: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/act_pedit.c:238:43 shift exponent 1400735974 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' CPU: 0 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor151 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-syzkaller-00165-g810c2f0a3f86 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x50 lib/ubsan.c:151 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x187 lib/ubsan.c:322 tcf_pedit_init.cold+0x1a/0x1f net/sched/act_pedit.c:238 tcf_action_init_1+0x414/0x690 net/sched/act_api.c:1367 tcf_action_init+0x530/0x8d0 net/sched/act_api.c:1432 tcf_action_add+0xf9/0x480 net/sched/act_api.c:1956 tc_ctl_action+0x346/0x470 net/sched/act_api.c:2015 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5993 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e2/0x800 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2496 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fe36e9e1b59 Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffef796fe88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe36e9e1b59 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fe36e9a5d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe36e9a5d90 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The 'shift' field is not validated, and any value above 31 will trigger out-of-bounds. The issue predates the git history, but syzbot was able to trigger it only after the commit mentioned in the fixes tag, and this change only applies on top of such commit. Address the issue bounding the 'shift' value to the maximum allowed by the relevant operator. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+8ed8fc4c57e9dcf23ca6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 8b796475fd78 ("net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is writable") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> --- net/sched/act_pedit.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)