From patchwork Mon Jun 6 16:43:33 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kashyap Chamarthy X-Patchwork-Id: 12870701 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB242C43334 for ; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 16:44:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1]:58860 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nyFqa-0005lA-Sc for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Mon, 06 Jun 2022 12:44:56 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:56036) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nyFpT-0004I2-Sg for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 06 Jun 2022 12:43:47 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]:39511) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1nyFpR-0005QF-0U for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 06 Jun 2022 12:43:47 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1654533824; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=85M/mbOsY++SxxXsdeEOIBSPTH7Onr6poaaAkyUsycQ=; b=Z1G1y/Tj+gIkWgGGES9I23obbCfCEbkncv0h0SjMtrVAIiBdv1vUhLliY/GknhiCiVJcag 0EWaagR8JDpuEvmmD9rBocMC466cx7QABZhrj9NNYQqmnypHHb6gVUi/6iUzUJW0KJUOqL bWAhrW8s3fcgQDaLBJ+mMrAHbBnlU2g= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast-mx02.redhat.com [66.187.233.88]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-438-QY4RCy-EN7Ggnu6pWjGRRw-1; Mon, 06 Jun 2022 12:43:42 -0400 X-MC-Unique: QY4RCy-EN7Ggnu6pWjGRRw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.8]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 576DF811E75; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 16:43:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pinwheel.redhat.com (unknown [10.39.192.81]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4926DC27E8F; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 16:43:40 +0000 (UTC) From: Kashyap Chamarthy To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com, peter.maydell@linaro.org, eblake@redhat.com, Kashyap Chamarthy Subject: [PATCH v3 1/4] docs: rSTify "security-process" page; move it to QEMU Git Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 18:43:33 +0200 Message-Id: <20220606164336.245740-2-kchamart@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20220606164336.245740-1-kchamart@redhat.com> References: <20220606164336.245740-1-kchamart@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.85 on 10.11.54.8 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.133.124; envelope-from=kchamart@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -11 X-Spam_score: -1.2 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.2 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.082, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, PP_MIME_FAKE_ASCII_TEXT=0.999, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" This is based on Paolo's suggestion[1] that the 'security-process'[2] page being a candidate for docs/devel. Converted from Markdown to rST using: $> pandoc -f markdown -t rst security-process.md \ -o security-process.rst It's a 1-1 conversion (I double-checked to the best I could). I've also checked that the hyperlinks work correctly post-conversion. [1] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2021-11/msg04002.html [2] https://www.qemu.org/contribute/security-process Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell --- docs/devel/index.rst | 1 + docs/devel/security-process.rst | 190 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 191 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/devel/security-process.rst diff --git a/docs/devel/index.rst b/docs/devel/index.rst index afd937535e..424eff9294 100644 --- a/docs/devel/index.rst +++ b/docs/devel/index.rst @@ -48,3 +48,4 @@ modifying QEMU's source code. trivial-patches submitting-a-patch submitting-a-pull-request + security-process diff --git a/docs/devel/security-process.rst b/docs/devel/security-process.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..965d11f588 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/devel/security-process.rst @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +.. _security-process: + +Security Process +================ + +Please report any suspected security issue in QEMU to the security +mailing list at: + +- ` `__ + +To report an issue via `GPG `__ encrypted email, +please send it to the Red Hat Product Security team at: + +- ` `__ + +**Note:** after the triage, encrypted issue details shall be sent to the +upstream ‘qemu-security’ mailing list for archival purposes. + +How to report an issue +---------------------- + +- Please include as many details as possible in the issue report. Ex: + + - QEMU version, upstream commit/tag + - Host & Guest architecture x86/Arm/PPC, 32/64 bit etc. + - Affected code area/snippets + - Stack traces, crash details + - Malicious inputs/reproducer steps etc. + - Any configurations/settings required to trigger the issue. + +- Please share the QEMU command line used to invoke a guest VM. + +- Please specify whom to acknowledge for reporting this issue. + +How we respond +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- Process of handling security issues comprises following steps: + + 0) **Acknowledge:** + + - A non-automated response email is sent to the reporter(s) to + acknowledge the reception of the report. (*60 day’s counter starts + here*) + + 1) **Triage:** + + - Examine the issue details and confirm whether the issue is genuine + - Validate if it can be misused for malicious purposes + - Determine its worst case impact and severity + [Low/Moderate/Important/Critical] + + 2) **Response:** + + - Negotiate embargo timeline (if required, depending on severity) + - Request a `CVE `__ and open an + upstream `bug `__ + - Create an upstream fix patch annotated with + + - CVE-ID + - Link to an upstream bugzilla + - Reported-by, Tested-by etc. tags + + - Once the patch is merged, close the upstream bug with a link to + the commit + + - Fixed in: + +- Above security lists are operated by select analysts, maintainers + and/or representatives from downstream communities. + +- List members follow a **responsible disclosure** policy. Any + non-public information you share about security issues, is kept + confidential within members of the QEMU security team and a minimal + supporting staff in their affiliated companies. Such information will + not be disclosed to third party organisations/individuals without + prior permission from the reporter(s). + +- We aim to process security issues within maximum of **60 days**. That + is not to say that issues will remain private for 60 days, nope. + After the triaging step above + + - If severity of the issue is sufficiently low, an upstream public + bug will be created immediately. + - If severity of the issue requires co-ordinated disclosure at a + future date, then the embargo process below is followed, and + upstream bug will be opened at the end of the embargo period. + + This will allow upstream contributors to create, test and track fix + patch(es). + +Publication embargo +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- If a security issue is reported that is not already public and its + severity requires coordinated disclosure, then an embargo date will + be set and communicated to the reporter(s). + +- Embargo periods will be negotiated by mutual agreement between + reporter(s), members of the security list and other relevant parties + to the problem. The preferred embargo period is upto `2 + weeks `__. + However, longer embargoes may be negotiated if the severity of the + issue requires it. + +- Members of the security list agree not to publicly disclose any + details of an embargoed security issue until its embargo date + expires. + +CVE allocation +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Each security issue is assigned a `CVE `__ +number. The CVE number is allocated by one of the vendor security +engineers on the security list. + +When to contact the QEMU Security List +-------------------------------------- + +You should contact the Security List if: \* You think there may be a +security vulnerability in QEMU. \* You are unsure about how a known +vulnerability affects QEMU. \* You can contact us in English. We are +unable to respond in other languages. + +When *not* to contact the QEMU Security List +-------------------------------------------- + +- You need assistance in a language other than English. +- You require technical assistance (for example, “how do I configure + QEMU?”). +- You need help upgrading QEMU due to security alerts. +- Your issue is not security related. + +How impact and severity of a bug is decided +------------------------------------------- + +**Security criterion:** -> +https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/security.html + +All security issues in QEMU are not equal. Based on the parts of the +QEMU sources wherein the bug is found, its impact and severity could +vary. + +In particular, QEMU is used in many different scenarios; some of them +assume that the guest is trusted, some of them don’t. General +considerations to triage QEMU issues and decide whether a configuration +is security sensitive include: + +- Is there any feasible way for a malicious party to exploit this flaw + and cause real damage? (e.g. from a guest or via downloadable images) +- Does the flaw require access to the management interface? Would the + management interface be accessible in the scenario where the flaw + could cause real damage? +- Is QEMU used in conjunction with a hypervisor (as opposed to TCG + binary translation)? +- Is QEMU used to offer virtualised production services, as opposed to + usage as a development platform? + +Whenever some or all of these questions have negative answers, what +appears to be a major security flaw might be considered of low severity +because it could only be exercised in use cases where QEMU and +everything interacting with it is trusted. + +For example, consider upstream commit `9201bb9 “sdhci.c: Limit the +maximum block +size” `__, an of +out of bounds (OOB) memory access (ie. buffer overflow) issue that was +found and fixed in the SD Host Controller emulation (hw/sd/sdhci.c). + +On the surface, this bug appears to be a genuine security flaw, with +potentially severe implications. But digging further down, there are +only two ways to use SD Host Controller emulation, one is via +‘sdhci-pci’ interface and the other is via ‘generic-sdhci’ interface. + +Of these two, the ‘sdhci-pci’ interface had actually been disabled by +default in the upstream QEMU releases (commit `1910913 “sdhci: Make +device”sdhci-pci" unavailable with +-device" `__ at +the time the flaw was reported; therefore, guests could not possibly use +‘sdhci-pci’ for any purpose. + +The ‘generic-sdhci’ interface, instead, had only one user in ‘Xilinx +Zynq Baseboard emulation’ (hw/arm/xilinx_zynq.c). Xilinx Zynq is a +programmable systems on chip (SoC) device. While QEMU does emulate this +device, in practice it is used to facilitate cross-platform +developmental efforts, i.e. QEMU is used to write programs for the SoC +device. In such developer environments, it is generally assumed that the +guest is trusted. + +And thus, this buffer overflow turned out to be a security non-issue.