@@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ uint64_t x86_cpu_get_supported_feature_word(FeatureWord w,
#define MSR_ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO (1U << 6)
#define MSR_ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR (1U << 7)
#define MSR_ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (1U << 8)
+#define MSR_ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR (1U << 17)
#define MSR_CORE_CAP_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT (1U << 5)
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
"ssb-no", "mds-no", "pschange-mc-no", "tsx-ctrl",
"taa-no", NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, "fb-clear", NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
As reported by the Intel's doc: "FB_CLEAR: The processor will overwrite fill buffer values as part of MD_CLEAR operations with the VERW instruction. On these processors, L1D_FLUSH does not overwrite fill buffer values." If this cpu feature is present in host, allow QEMU to choose whether to show it to the guest too. One disadvantage of not exposing it is that the guest will report a non existing vulnerability in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data because the mitigation is present only when the cpu has (FLUSH_L1D and MD_CLEAR) or FB_CLEAR features enabled. Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com> --- target/i386/cpu.h | 1 + target/i386/cpu.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)