| Message ID | 20240527133140.218300-2-frolov@swemel.ru (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | hw/net/virtio-net.c: fix crash in iov_copy() | expand |
ping https://patchew.org/QEMU/20240527133140.218300-2-frolov@swemel.ru/ On 27.05.2024 16:31, Dmitry Frolov wrote: > A crash found while fuzzing device virtio-net-socket-check-used. > Assertion "offset == 0" in iov_copy() fails if less than guest_hdr_len bytes > were transmited. > > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Frolov <frolov@swemel.ru> > --- > hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c > index 24e5e7d347..603b80a50a 100644 > --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c > +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c > @@ -2783,6 +2783,12 @@ static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q) > */ > assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len); > if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) { > + if (iov_size(out_sg, out_num) < n->guest_hdr_len) { > + virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net header is invalid"); > + virtqueue_detach_element(q->tx_vq, elem, 0); > + g_free(elem); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), > out_sg, out_num, > 0, n->host_hdr_len);
Дмитрий Фролов <frolov@swemel.ru> writes: > ping > > https://patchew.org/QEMU/20240527133140.218300-2-frolov@swemel.ru/ > > On 27.05.2024 16:31, Dmitry Frolov wrote: >> A crash found while fuzzing device virtio-net-socket-check-used. >> Assertion "offset == 0" in iov_copy() fails if less than guest_hdr_len bytes >> were transmited. >> >> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Frolov <frolov@swemel.ru> >> --- >> hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++ >> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c >> index 24e5e7d347..603b80a50a 100644 >> --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c >> +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c >> @@ -2783,6 +2783,12 @@ static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q) >> */ >> assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len); >> if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) { >> + if (iov_size(out_sg, out_num) < n->guest_hdr_len) { >> + virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net header is invalid"); >> + virtqueue_detach_element(q->tx_vq, elem, 0); >> + g_free(elem); >> + return -EINVAL; >> + } Isn't this basically another case for goto detach? Although the use of goto's here is a bit of a code smell. I wonder if there is any way to better structure this function and take care of the auto-freeing of elements? >> unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), >> out_sg, out_num, >> 0, n->host_hdr_len);
diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c index 24e5e7d347..603b80a50a 100644 --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c @@ -2783,6 +2783,12 @@ static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q) */ assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len); if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) { + if (iov_size(out_sg, out_num) < n->guest_hdr_len) { + virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net header is invalid"); + virtqueue_detach_element(q->tx_vq, elem, 0); + g_free(elem); + return -EINVAL; + } unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), out_sg, out_num, 0, n->host_hdr_len);
A crash found while fuzzing device virtio-net-socket-check-used. Assertion "offset == 0" in iov_copy() fails if less than guest_hdr_len bytes were transmited. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Frolov <frolov@swemel.ru> --- hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)