Message ID | 20200819195935.1720168-1-dburgener@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
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Headers | show
Return-Path: <SRS0=v2nJ=B5=vger.kernel.org=selinux-owner@kernel.org> Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0F6EF913 for <patchwork-selinux@patchwork.kernel.org>; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 19:59:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E69FF207DE for <patchwork-selinux@patchwork.kernel.org>; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 19:59:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="ek8H9M4a" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726585AbgHST7m (ORCPT <rfc822;patchwork-selinux@patchwork.kernel.org>); Wed, 19 Aug 2020 15:59:42 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:39324 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726435AbgHST7m (ORCPT <rfc822;selinux@vger.kernel.org>); Wed, 19 Aug 2020 15:59:42 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-172-233-15.hsd1.md.comcast.net [73.172.233.15]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C5D8620B4908; Wed, 19 Aug 2020 12:59:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com C5D8620B4908 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1597867181; bh=J2L+Z0jTl2KqUCnQVGdnqWFslScIDnVerECXRgcn3+o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=ek8H9M4ataWyd0ga7FdtVy/XTjX452X0XsRq3rL3HewlsL3klIOr77U3JAZtLcp17 z5ixAqnyDdipUZukOW4jcfYivYjRoGW1mFyEi4IFaUVtfw5jBMvtqkKg/NNjdC1/hk QjpdGFxRU4F8l1EavXEdPOo6akaSb8fhGV6bG4FQ= From: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com> To: selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Subject: [PATCH v3 0/4] Update SELinuxfs out of tree and then swapover Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2020 15:59:31 -0400 Message-Id: <20200819195935.1720168-1-dburgener@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.4 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: <selinux.vger.kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org |
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Update SELinuxfs out of tree and then swapover
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v2: Clean up commit messages to accurately reflect current scope of changes v3: Remove all policy_capabilities directory manipulation. Switch from vfs_rename() to d_exchange() for directory exchanging. Use appropriate comment style. Reuse inodes for temporary directories. In the current implementation, on policy load /sys/fs/selinux is updated by deleting the previous contents of /sys/fs/selinux/{class,booleans} and then recreating them. This means that there is a period of time when the contents of these directories do not exist which can cause race conditions as userspace relies on them for information about the policy. In addition, it means that error recovery in the event of failure is challenging. This patch series follows the design outlined by Al Viro in a previous e-mail to the list[1]. This approach is to first create the new directory structures out of tree, then to perform the swapover, and finally to delete the old directories. Not handled in this series is error recovery in the event of failure. Error recovery in the selinuxfs recreation is unhandled in the current code, so this series will not cause any regression in this regard. Handling directory recreation in this manner is a prerequisite to make proper error handling possible. In order to demonstrate the race condition that this series fixes, you can use the following commands: while true; do cat /sys/fs/selinux/class/service/perms/status >/dev/null; done & while true; do load_policy; done; In the existing code, this will display errors fairly often as the class lookup fails. (In normal operation from systemd, this would result in a permission check which would be allowed or denied based on policy settings around unknown object classes.) After applying this patch series you should expect to no longer see such error messages. This series is relative to https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11705743/, Stephen Smalley's series to split policy loading into a prep and commit. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20181002155810.GP32577@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/ Daniel Burgener (4): selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)