Message ID | 1479145685-4899-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Not Applicable |
Headers | show |
> -----Original Message----- > From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of Stephen > Smalley > Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM > To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug > > The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit A B:C *; > rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. > > Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > --- > libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index 004a029..d7adbf8 > 100644 > --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c > +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c > @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * state, > static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, > cond_av_list_t ** cond, > - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) > + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, > + char *alloced) > { > avtab_ptr_t node; > avtab_datum_t avdatum; > @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * > handle, > nl->next = *cond; > *cond = nl; > } > + if (alloced) > + *alloced = 1; > + } else { > + if (alloced) > + *alloced = 0; > } > > return node; > @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > handle, > return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; > } > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, > NULL); > if (!node) > return -1; > if (enabled) { > @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > handle, > class_perm_node_t *cur; > uint32_t spec = 0; > unsigned int i; > + char alloced; > > if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { > spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; > @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > handle, > avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; > avkey.specified = spec; > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > extended_perms); > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > + extended_perms, &alloced); > if (!node) > return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; > if (enabled) { > @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > handle, > */ > avdatump->data &= cur->data; > } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { > - if (avdatump->data) > + if (!alloced) > avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; > else > avdatump->data = ~cur->data; This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way the logic is Just &=. > -- > 2.7.4 > > _______________________________________________ > Selinux mailing list > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov.
> -----Original Message----- > From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of Roberts, > William C > Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:44 AM > To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of > > Stephen Smalley > > Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM > > To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > > Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug > > > > The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit > > A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. > > > > Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> > > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > > --- > > libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index > > 004a029..d7adbf8 > > 100644 > > --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c > > +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c > > @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * > > state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > > avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, > > cond_av_list_t ** cond, > > - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) > > + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, > > + char *alloced) > > { > > avtab_ptr_t node; > > avtab_datum_t avdatum; > > @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t > > find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > > nl->next = *cond; > > *cond = nl; > > } > > + if (alloced) > > + *alloced = 1; > > + } else { > > + if (alloced) > > + *alloced = 0; > > } > > > > return node; > > @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > > handle, > > return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; > > } > > > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); > > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, > > NULL); > > if (!node) > > return -1; > > if (enabled) { > > @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > > handle, > > class_perm_node_t *cur; > > uint32_t spec = 0; > > unsigned int i; > > + char alloced; > > > > if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { > > spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; > > @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > > handle, > > avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; > > avkey.specified = spec; > > > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > > extended_perms); > > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > > + extended_perms, &alloced); > > if (!node) > > return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; > > if (enabled) { > > @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > > handle, > > */ > > avdatump->data &= cur->data; > > } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { > > - if (avdatump->data) > > + if (!alloced) > > avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; > > else > > avdatump->data = ~cur->data; > > This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why > wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? I misstated that a bit, but the !avdump->data was the else case. I am really saying why didn't this work before? In my mind, we don't care if its allocated we care if it's set or not. > > Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way the logic is > Just &=. > > > -- > > 2.7.4 > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Selinux mailing list > > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > > _______________________________________________ > Selinux mailing list > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov.
On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 9:48 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing > a dontaudit A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; > rule. > > Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> This looks like it fixes my problem. Thanks! Tested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > --- > libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c > index 004a029..d7adbf8 100644 > --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c > +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c > @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * state, > static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, > cond_av_list_t ** cond, > - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) > + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, > + char *alloced) > { > avtab_ptr_t node; > avtab_datum_t avdatum; > @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > nl->next = *cond; > *cond = nl; > } > + if (alloced) > + *alloced = 1; > + } else { > + if (alloced) > + *alloced = 0; > } > > return node; > @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; > } > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, NULL); > if (!node) > return -1; > if (enabled) { > @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > class_perm_node_t *cur; > uint32_t spec = 0; > unsigned int i; > + char alloced; > > if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { > spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; > @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; > avkey.specified = spec; > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, extended_perms); > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > + extended_perms, &alloced); > if (!node) > return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; > if (enabled) { > @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > */ > avdatump->data &= cur->data; > } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { > - if (avdatump->data) > + if (!alloced) > avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; > else > avdatump->data = ~cur->data; > -- > 2.7.4 >
On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 9:48 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing > a dontaudit A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; > rule. > > Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > --- > libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c > index 004a029..d7adbf8 100644 > --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c > +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c > @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * state, > static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, > cond_av_list_t ** cond, > - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) > + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, > + char *alloced) > { > avtab_ptr_t node; For robustness, it would be safer to ensure that alloced was always assigned to. This variable may end up unassigned on certain error conditions. It's not a bug today, since the caller always performs a check on the return value prior to using this variable, but it could be a use of an unassigned variable in a future version of this code. Also, "bool" would be a better type for alloced, rather than using a "char".... > avtab_datum_t avdatum; > @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > nl->next = *cond; > *cond = nl; > } > + if (alloced) > + *alloced = 1; > + } else { > + if (alloced) > + *alloced = 0; > } > > return node; > @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; > } > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, NULL); > if (!node) > return -1; > if (enabled) { > @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > class_perm_node_t *cur; > uint32_t spec = 0; > unsigned int i; > + char alloced; > > if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { > spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; > @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; > avkey.specified = spec; > > - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, extended_perms); > + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > + extended_perms, &alloced); > if (!node) > return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; > if (enabled) { > @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, > */ > avdatump->data &= cur->data; > } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { > - if (avdatump->data) > + if (!alloced) > avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; > else > avdatump->data = ~cur->data; > -- > 2.7.4 >
On 11/14/2016 02:41 PM, Roberts, William C wrote: > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of Roberts, >> William C >> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:44 AM >> To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >> Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug >> >> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of >>> Stephen Smalley >>> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM >>> To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >>> Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug >>> >>> The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit >>> A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. >>> >>> Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> >>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >>> --- >>> libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- >>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index >>> 004a029..d7adbf8 >>> 100644 >>> --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c >>> +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c >>> @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * >>> state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >>> avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, >>> cond_av_list_t ** cond, >>> - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) >>> + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, >>> + char *alloced) >>> { >>> avtab_ptr_t node; >>> avtab_datum_t avdatum; >>> @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t >>> find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >>> nl->next = *cond; >>> *cond = nl; >>> } >>> + if (alloced) >>> + *alloced = 1; >>> + } else { >>> + if (alloced) >>> + *alloced = 0; >>> } >>> >>> return node; >>> @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>> handle, >>> return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; >>> } >>> >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, >>> NULL); >>> if (!node) >>> return -1; >>> if (enabled) { >>> @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>> handle, >>> class_perm_node_t *cur; >>> uint32_t spec = 0; >>> unsigned int i; >>> + char alloced; >>> >>> if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { >>> spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; >>> @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>> handle, >>> avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; >>> avkey.specified = spec; >>> >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, >>> extended_perms); >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, >>> + extended_perms, &alloced); >>> if (!node) >>> return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; >>> if (enabled) { >>> @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>> handle, >>> */ >>> avdatump->data &= cur->data; >>> } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { >>> - if (avdatump->data) >>> + if (!alloced) >>> avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; >>> else >>> avdatump->data = ~cur->data; >> >> This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why >> wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? > > I misstated that a bit, but the !avdump->data was the else case. I am really > saying why didn't this work before? In my mind, we don't care if its allocated > we care if it's set or not. The old logic wrongly assumed that !avdatump->data would only be true if this was the first dontaudit rule for the (source type, target type, target class) and the node had just been allocated by find_avtab_node() with a zero avdatump->data value. However, if you have a dontaudit A B:C *; rule, then the set complement of it will be 0, so we can have !avdatump->data be true in that case too. Thus, if we end up processing: dontaudit A B:C *; dontaudit A B:C { p1 p2 ... }; we'll end up clobbering avdatump->data with ~{ p1 p2 ... }. The marlin policy contains: dontaudit su self:capability *; dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module; and self rules are expanded (the kernel has no notion of self), so we end up with: dontaudit su self:capability *; dontaudit su self:capability sys_module; We have never encountered this situation before because there are no dontaudit A B:C *; rules in refpolicy; that's a corner case that only shows up in Android's su policy, and only because it is a permissive domain with no explicit allow rules (other than those picked up via macros that set up attributes or transitions). The fix was to replace the avdatump->data test with an explicit indication that the node was freshly allocated i.e. this is the first such rule. I agree that it could be clearer, but I was going for the simplest, least invasive fix for now, both due to limited time and to ease back-porting. >> >> Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way the logic is >> Just &=.
On 11/14/2016 06:58 PM, Nick Kralevich wrote: > On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 9:48 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing >> a dontaudit A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; >> rule. >> >> Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> >> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> --- >> libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- >> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c >> index 004a029..d7adbf8 100644 >> --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c >> +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c >> @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * state, >> static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >> avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, >> cond_av_list_t ** cond, >> - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) >> + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, >> + char *alloced) >> { >> avtab_ptr_t node; > > For robustness, it would be safer to ensure that alloced was always > assigned to. This variable may end up unassigned on certain error > conditions. It's not a bug today, since the caller always performs a > check on the return value prior to using this variable, but it could > be a use of an unassigned variable in a future version of this code. > > Also, "bool" would be a better type for alloced, rather than using a "char".... Originally did that but it broke - requires a separate patch to rename the field named "bool" in include/sepol/policydb/conditional.h and all users. There was no bool type in C when we first wrote the security server code (for Flask).
For bit setting in constant time, one could always clear the bit(s) and or in what you want. I think that logic might be applicable here. I could take a stab at looking at it today, if no one has anything better by tomorrow well just merge yours as is. Does that sound reasonable? On Nov 15, 2016 06:18, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > On 11/14/2016 02:41 PM, Roberts, William C wrote: > > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of > Roberts, > >> William C > >> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:44 AM > >> To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > >> Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug > >> > >> > >> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of > >>> Stephen Smalley > >>> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM > >>> To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > >>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > >>> Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug > >>> > >>> The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit > >>> A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. > >>> > >>> Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> > >>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > >>> --- > >>> libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- > >>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > >>> > >>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index > >>> 004a029..d7adbf8 > >>> 100644 > >>> --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c > >>> +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c > >>> @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * > >>> state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > >>> avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, > >>> cond_av_list_t ** cond, > >>> - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) > >>> + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, > >>> + char *alloced) > >>> { > >>> avtab_ptr_t node; > >>> avtab_datum_t avdatum; > >>> @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t > >>> find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > >>> nl->next = *cond; > >>> *cond = nl; > >>> } > >>> + if (alloced) > >>> + *alloced = 1; > >>> + } else { > >>> + if (alloced) > >>> + *alloced = 0; > >>> } > >>> > >>> return node; > >>> @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >>> handle, > >>> return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; > >>> } > >>> > >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); > >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, > >>> NULL); > >>> if (!node) > >>> return -1; > >>> if (enabled) { > >>> @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >>> handle, > >>> class_perm_node_t *cur; > >>> uint32_t spec = 0; > >>> unsigned int i; > >>> + char alloced; > >>> > >>> if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { > >>> spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; > >>> @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >>> handle, > >>> avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; > >>> avkey.specified = spec; > >>> > >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > >>> extended_perms); > >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > >>> + extended_perms, &alloced); > >>> if (!node) > >>> return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; > >>> if (enabled) { > >>> @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >>> handle, > >>> */ > >>> avdatump->data &= cur->data; > >>> } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { > >>> - if (avdatump->data) > >>> + if (!alloced) > >>> avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; > >>> else > >>> avdatump->data = ~cur->data; > >> > >> This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why > >> wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? > > > > I misstated that a bit, but the !avdump->data was the else case. I am > really > > saying why didn't this work before? In my mind, we don't care if its > allocated > > we care if it's set or not. > > The old logic wrongly assumed that !avdatump->data would only be true if > this was the first dontaudit rule for the (source type, target type, > target class) and the node had just been allocated by find_avtab_node() > with a zero avdatump->data value. > However, if you have a dontaudit A B:C *; rule, then the set complement > of it will be 0, so we can have !avdatump->data be true in that case > too. Thus, if we end up processing: > dontaudit A B:C *; > dontaudit A B:C { p1 p2 ... }; > we'll end up clobbering avdatump->data with ~{ p1 p2 ... }. > > The marlin policy contains: > dontaudit su self:capability *; > dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module; > and self rules are expanded (the kernel has no notion of self), so we > end up with: > dontaudit su self:capability *; > dontaudit su self:capability sys_module; > > We have never encountered this situation before because there are no > dontaudit A B:C *; rules in refpolicy; that's a corner case that only > shows up in Android's su policy, and only because it is a permissive > domain with no explicit allow rules (other than those picked up via > macros that set up attributes or transitions). > > The fix was to replace the avdatump->data test with an explicit > indication that the node was freshly allocated i.e. this is the first > such rule. I agree that it could be clearer, but I was going for the > simplest, least invasive fix for now, both due to limited time and to > ease back-porting. > > >> > >> Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way > the logic is > >> Just &=. > > _______________________________________________ > Selinux mailing list > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > To get help, send an email containing "help" to > Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. >
Perhaps merge Stephen's change now, and address any changes in a followup? I'd like to get it merged into the selinux tree so I can merge the changes into the Android tree. -- Nick On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 9:10 AM, William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com> wrote: > For bit setting in constant time, one could always clear the bit(s) and or > in what you want. I think that logic might be applicable here. I could take > a stab at looking at it today, if no one has anything better by tomorrow > well just merge yours as is. Does that sound reasonable? > > > On Nov 15, 2016 06:18, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> >> On 11/14/2016 02:41 PM, Roberts, William C wrote: >> > >> > >> >> -----Original Message----- >> >> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of >> >> Roberts, >> >> William C >> >> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:44 AM >> >> To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >> >> Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler >> >> bug >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >> >>> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of >> >>> Stephen Smalley >> >>> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM >> >>> To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >> >>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> >>> Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug >> >>> >> >>> The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit >> >>> A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. >> >>> >> >>> Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> >> >>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> >>> --- >> >>> libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- >> >>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> >>> >> >>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index >> >>> 004a029..d7adbf8 >> >>> 100644 >> >>> --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c >> >>> +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c >> >>> @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * >> >>> state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >> >>> avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, >> >>> cond_av_list_t ** cond, >> >>> - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) >> >>> + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, >> >>> + char *alloced) >> >>> { >> >>> avtab_ptr_t node; >> >>> avtab_datum_t avdatum; >> >>> @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t >> >>> find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >> >>> nl->next = *cond; >> >>> *cond = nl; >> >>> } >> >>> + if (alloced) >> >>> + *alloced = 1; >> >>> + } else { >> >>> + if (alloced) >> >>> + *alloced = 0; >> >>> } >> >>> >> >>> return node; >> >>> @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >> >>> handle, >> >>> return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; >> >>> } >> >>> >> >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); >> >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, >> >>> NULL); >> >>> if (!node) >> >>> return -1; >> >>> if (enabled) { >> >>> @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >> >>> handle, >> >>> class_perm_node_t *cur; >> >>> uint32_t spec = 0; >> >>> unsigned int i; >> >>> + char alloced; >> >>> >> >>> if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { >> >>> spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; >> >>> @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >> >>> handle, >> >>> avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; >> >>> avkey.specified = spec; >> >>> >> >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, >> >>> extended_perms); >> >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, >> >>> + extended_perms, &alloced); >> >>> if (!node) >> >>> return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; >> >>> if (enabled) { >> >>> @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >> >>> handle, >> >>> */ >> >>> avdatump->data &= cur->data; >> >>> } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { >> >>> - if (avdatump->data) >> >>> + if (!alloced) >> >>> avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; >> >>> else >> >>> avdatump->data = ~cur->data; >> >> >> >> This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why >> >> wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? >> > >> > I misstated that a bit, but the !avdump->data was the else case. I am >> > really >> > saying why didn't this work before? In my mind, we don't care if its >> > allocated >> > we care if it's set or not. >> >> The old logic wrongly assumed that !avdatump->data would only be true if >> this was the first dontaudit rule for the (source type, target type, >> target class) and the node had just been allocated by find_avtab_node() >> with a zero avdatump->data value. >> However, if you have a dontaudit A B:C *; rule, then the set complement >> of it will be 0, so we can have !avdatump->data be true in that case >> too. Thus, if we end up processing: >> dontaudit A B:C *; >> dontaudit A B:C { p1 p2 ... }; >> we'll end up clobbering avdatump->data with ~{ p1 p2 ... }. >> >> The marlin policy contains: >> dontaudit su self:capability *; >> dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module; >> and self rules are expanded (the kernel has no notion of self), so we >> end up with: >> dontaudit su self:capability *; >> dontaudit su self:capability sys_module; >> >> We have never encountered this situation before because there are no >> dontaudit A B:C *; rules in refpolicy; that's a corner case that only >> shows up in Android's su policy, and only because it is a permissive >> domain with no explicit allow rules (other than those picked up via >> macros that set up attributes or transitions). >> >> The fix was to replace the avdatump->data test with an explicit >> indication that the node was freshly allocated i.e. this is the first >> such rule. I agree that it could be clearer, but I was going for the >> simplest, least invasive fix for now, both due to limited time and to >> ease back-porting. >> >> >> >> >> Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way >> >> the logic is >> >> Just &=. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Selinux mailing list >> Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >> To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. >> To get help, send an email containing "help" to >> Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > > > _______________________________________________ > Selinux mailing list > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > To get help, send an email containing "help" to > Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov.
On Nov 15, 2016 09:30, "Nick Kralevich" <nnk@google.com> wrote: > > Perhaps merge Stephen's change now, and address any changes in a > followup? I'd like to get it merged into the selinux tree so I can > merge the changes into the Android tree. That's fine with me too. > > -- Nick > > On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 9:10 AM, William Roberts > <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com> wrote: > > For bit setting in constant time, one could always clear the bit(s) and or > > in what you want. I think that logic might be applicable here. I could take > > a stab at looking at it today, if no one has anything better by tomorrow > > well just merge yours as is. Does that sound reasonable? > > > > > > On Nov 15, 2016 06:18, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > >> > >> On 11/14/2016 02:41 PM, Roberts, William C wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> >> -----Original Message----- > >> >> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of > >> >> Roberts, > >> >> William C > >> >> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:44 AM > >> >> To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > >> >> Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler > >> >> bug > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >>> -----Original Message----- > >> >>> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of > >> >>> Stephen Smalley > >> >>> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM > >> >>> To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > >> >>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > >> >>> Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug > >> >>> > >> >>> The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit > >> >>> A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. > >> >>> > >> >>> Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> > >> >>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > >> >>> --- > >> >>> libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- > >> >>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > >> >>> > >> >>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index > >> >>> 004a029..d7adbf8 > >> >>> 100644 > >> >>> --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c > >> >>> +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c > >> >>> @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * > >> >>> state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > >> >>> avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, > >> >>> cond_av_list_t ** cond, > >> >>> - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) > >> >>> + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, > >> >>> + char *alloced) > >> >>> { > >> >>> avtab_ptr_t node; > >> >>> avtab_datum_t avdatum; > >> >>> @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t > >> >>> find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, > >> >>> nl->next = *cond; > >> >>> *cond = nl; > >> >>> } > >> >>> + if (alloced) > >> >>> + *alloced = 1; > >> >>> + } else { > >> >>> + if (alloced) > >> >>> + *alloced = 0; > >> >>> } > >> >>> > >> >>> return node; > >> >>> @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >> >>> handle, > >> >>> return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; > >> >>> } > >> >>> > >> >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); > >> >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, > >> >>> NULL); > >> >>> if (!node) > >> >>> return -1; > >> >>> if (enabled) { > >> >>> @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >> >>> handle, > >> >>> class_perm_node_t *cur; > >> >>> uint32_t spec = 0; > >> >>> unsigned int i; > >> >>> + char alloced; > >> >>> > >> >>> if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { > >> >>> spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; > >> >>> @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >> >>> handle, > >> >>> avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; > >> >>> avkey.specified = spec; > >> >>> > >> >>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > >> >>> extended_perms); > >> >>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, > >> >>> + extended_perms, &alloced); > >> >>> if (!node) > >> >>> return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; > >> >>> if (enabled) { > >> >>> @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * > >> >>> handle, > >> >>> */ > >> >>> avdatump->data &= cur->data; > >> >>> } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { > >> >>> - if (avdatump->data) > >> >>> + if (!alloced) > >> >>> avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; > >> >>> else > >> >>> avdatump->data = ~cur->data; > >> >> > >> >> This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why > >> >> wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? > >> > > >> > I misstated that a bit, but the !avdump->data was the else case. I am > >> > really > >> > saying why didn't this work before? In my mind, we don't care if its > >> > allocated > >> > we care if it's set or not. > >> > >> The old logic wrongly assumed that !avdatump->data would only be true if > >> this was the first dontaudit rule for the (source type, target type, > >> target class) and the node had just been allocated by find_avtab_node() > >> with a zero avdatump->data value. > >> However, if you have a dontaudit A B:C *; rule, then the set complement > >> of it will be 0, so we can have !avdatump->data be true in that case > >> too. Thus, if we end up processing: > >> dontaudit A B:C *; > >> dontaudit A B:C { p1 p2 ... }; > >> we'll end up clobbering avdatump->data with ~{ p1 p2 ... }. > >> > >> The marlin policy contains: > >> dontaudit su self:capability *; > >> dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module; > >> and self rules are expanded (the kernel has no notion of self), so we > >> end up with: > >> dontaudit su self:capability *; > >> dontaudit su self:capability sys_module; > >> > >> We have never encountered this situation before because there are no > >> dontaudit A B:C *; rules in refpolicy; that's a corner case that only > >> shows up in Android's su policy, and only because it is a permissive > >> domain with no explicit allow rules (other than those picked up via > >> macros that set up attributes or transitions). > >> > >> The fix was to replace the avdatump->data test with an explicit > >> indication that the node was freshly allocated i.e. this is the first > >> such rule. I agree that it could be clearer, but I was going for the > >> simplest, least invasive fix for now, both due to limited time and to > >> ease back-porting. > >> > >> >> > >> >> Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way > >> >> the logic is > >> >> Just &=. > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Selinux mailing list > >> Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > >> To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > >> To get help, send an email containing "help" to > >> Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Selinux mailing list > > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > > To get help, send an email containing "help" to > > Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > > > > -- > Nick Kralevich | Android Security | nnk@google.com | 650.214.4037
On 11/15/2016 12:30 PM, Nick Kralevich wrote: > Perhaps merge Stephen's change now, and address any changes in a > followup? I'd like to get it merged into the selinux tree so I can > merge the changes into the Android tree. Yes, it is already merged. > > -- Nick > > On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 9:10 AM, William Roberts > <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com> wrote: >> For bit setting in constant time, one could always clear the bit(s) and or >> in what you want. I think that logic might be applicable here. I could take >> a stab at looking at it today, if no one has anything better by tomorrow >> well just merge yours as is. Does that sound reasonable? >> >> >> On Nov 15, 2016 06:18, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>> >>> On 11/14/2016 02:41 PM, Roberts, William C wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of >>>>> Roberts, >>>>> William C >>>>> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 10:44 AM >>>>> To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >>>>> Subject: RE: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler >>>>> bug >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: Selinux [mailto:selinux-bounces@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of >>>>>> Stephen Smalley >>>>>> Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 9:48 AM >>>>>> To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >>>>>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >>>>>> Subject: [PATCH v2] libsepol: fix checkpolicy dontaudit compiler bug >>>>>> >>>>>> The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit >>>>>> A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. >>>>>> >>>>>> Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >>>>>> --- >>>>>> libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- >>>>>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>>>>> >>>>>> diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index >>>>>> 004a029..d7adbf8 >>>>>> 100644 >>>>>> --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c >>>>>> +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c >>>>>> @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * >>>>>> state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >>>>>> avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, >>>>>> cond_av_list_t ** cond, >>>>>> - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) >>>>>> + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, >>>>>> + char *alloced) >>>>>> { >>>>>> avtab_ptr_t node; >>>>>> avtab_datum_t avdatum; >>>>>> @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t >>>>>> find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, >>>>>> nl->next = *cond; >>>>>> *cond = nl; >>>>>> } >>>>>> + if (alloced) >>>>>> + *alloced = 1; >>>>>> + } else { >>>>>> + if (alloced) >>>>>> + *alloced = 0; >>>>>> } >>>>>> >>>>>> return node; >>>>>> @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>>>>> handle, >>>>>> return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; >>>>>> } >>>>>> >>>>>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); >>>>>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, >>>>>> NULL); >>>>>> if (!node) >>>>>> return -1; >>>>>> if (enabled) { >>>>>> @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>>>>> handle, >>>>>> class_perm_node_t *cur; >>>>>> uint32_t spec = 0; >>>>>> unsigned int i; >>>>>> + char alloced; >>>>>> >>>>>> if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { >>>>>> spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; >>>>>> @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>>>>> handle, >>>>>> avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; >>>>>> avkey.specified = spec; >>>>>> >>>>>> - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, >>>>>> extended_perms); >>>>>> + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, >>>>>> + extended_perms, &alloced); >>>>>> if (!node) >>>>>> return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; >>>>>> if (enabled) { >>>>>> @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * >>>>>> handle, >>>>>> */ >>>>>> avdatump->data &= cur->data; >>>>>> } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { >>>>>> - if (avdatump->data) >>>>>> + if (!alloced) >>>>>> avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; >>>>>> else >>>>>> avdatump->data = ~cur->data; >>>>> >>>>> This seems awkward to me. If the insertion created a new empty node why >>>>> wouldn't !avdump->data be true (note the addition of the not operator)? >>>> >>>> I misstated that a bit, but the !avdump->data was the else case. I am >>>> really >>>> saying why didn't this work before? In my mind, we don't care if its >>>> allocated >>>> we care if it's set or not. >>> >>> The old logic wrongly assumed that !avdatump->data would only be true if >>> this was the first dontaudit rule for the (source type, target type, >>> target class) and the node had just been allocated by find_avtab_node() >>> with a zero avdatump->data value. >>> However, if you have a dontaudit A B:C *; rule, then the set complement >>> of it will be 0, so we can have !avdatump->data be true in that case >>> too. Thus, if we end up processing: >>> dontaudit A B:C *; >>> dontaudit A B:C { p1 p2 ... }; >>> we'll end up clobbering avdatump->data with ~{ p1 p2 ... }. >>> >>> The marlin policy contains: >>> dontaudit su self:capability *; >>> dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module; >>> and self rules are expanded (the kernel has no notion of self), so we >>> end up with: >>> dontaudit su self:capability *; >>> dontaudit su self:capability sys_module; >>> >>> We have never encountered this situation before because there are no >>> dontaudit A B:C *; rules in refpolicy; that's a corner case that only >>> shows up in Android's su policy, and only because it is a permissive >>> domain with no explicit allow rules (other than those picked up via >>> macros that set up attributes or transitions). >>> >>> The fix was to replace the avdatump->data test with an explicit >>> indication that the node was freshly allocated i.e. this is the first >>> such rule. I agree that it could be clearer, but I was going for the >>> simplest, least invasive fix for now, both due to limited time and to >>> ease back-porting. >>> >>>>> >>>>> Or perhaps a mechanism to actual set the data on allocation, this way >>>>> the logic is >>>>> Just &=. >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Selinux mailing list >>> Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >>> To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. >>> To get help, send an email containing "help" to >>> Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Selinux mailing list >> Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov >> To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. >> To get help, send an email containing "help" to >> Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > > >
diff --git a/libsepol/src/expand.c b/libsepol/src/expand.c index 004a029..d7adbf8 100644 --- a/libsepol/src/expand.c +++ b/libsepol/src/expand.c @@ -1604,7 +1604,8 @@ static int expand_range_trans(expand_state_t * state, static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, avtab_t * avtab, avtab_key_t * key, cond_av_list_t ** cond, - av_extended_perms_t *xperms) + av_extended_perms_t *xperms, + char *alloced) { avtab_ptr_t node; avtab_datum_t avdatum; @@ -1658,6 +1659,11 @@ static avtab_ptr_t find_avtab_node(sepol_handle_t * handle, nl->next = *cond; *cond = nl; } + if (alloced) + *alloced = 1; + } else { + if (alloced) + *alloced = 0; } return node; @@ -1750,7 +1756,7 @@ static int expand_terule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, return EXPAND_RULE_CONFLICT; } - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL); + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, NULL, NULL); if (!node) return -1; if (enabled) { @@ -1790,6 +1796,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, class_perm_node_t *cur; uint32_t spec = 0; unsigned int i; + char alloced; if (specified & AVRULE_ALLOWED) { spec = AVTAB_ALLOWED; @@ -1824,7 +1831,8 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, avkey.target_class = cur->tclass; avkey.specified = spec; - node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, extended_perms); + node = find_avtab_node(handle, avtab, &avkey, cond, + extended_perms, &alloced); if (!node) return EXPAND_RULE_ERROR; if (enabled) { @@ -1850,7 +1858,7 @@ static int expand_avrule_helper(sepol_handle_t * handle, */ avdatump->data &= cur->data; } else if (specified & AVRULE_DONTAUDIT) { - if (avdatump->data) + if (!alloced) avdatump->data &= ~cur->data; else avdatump->data = ~cur->data;
The combining logic for dontaudit rules was wrong, causing a dontaudit A B:C *; rule to be clobbered by a dontaudit A B:C p; rule. Reported-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> --- libsepol/src/expand.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)