| Message ID | 20171017135833.4292-1-richard_c_haines@btinternet.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control > over SCTP. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> > --- > include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 + > net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++ > net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++- > net/sctp/socket.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644 > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { > reconf_enable:1; > > __u8 strreset_enable; > + > + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by > + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by > + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they > + * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone() > + * will then plug these into the new socket. > + */ > + > + u32 secid; > + u32 peer_secid; > }; > > /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t; > #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120 > #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121 > #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122 > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123 > > /* PR-SCTP policies */ > #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000 > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr)); > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, > + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP, > + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, > + af->sockaddr_len)) > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > + > /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address > * request and does not have the local resources to add this > * new address to the association, it MUST return an Error > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr)); > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, > + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY, > + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, > + af->sockaddr_len)) > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > + > peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr); > if (!peer) > return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; > int len; > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep, > + chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT)) > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); > + > /* 6.10 Bundling > * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or > * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks. > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > } > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); > - > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); > > /* > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, > struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; > struct sctp_packet *packet; > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep, > + chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK)) > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); > + Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ?
On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote: > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control > > over SCTP. > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> > > --- > > include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++ > > include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 + > > net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++ > > net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++- > > net/sctp/socket.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644 > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { > > reconf_enable:1; > > > > __u8 strreset_enable; > > + > > + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by > > + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by > > + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they > > + * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone() > > + * will then plug these into the new socket. > > + */ > > + > > + u32 secid; > > + u32 peer_secid; > > }; > > > > /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t; > > #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120 > > #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121 > > #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122 > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123 > > > > /* PR-SCTP policies */ > > #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000 > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644 > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > > memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr)); > > > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, > > + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP, > > + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, > > + af->sockaddr_len)) > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > > + > > /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address > > * request and does not have the local resources to add this > > * new address to the association, it MUST return an Error > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > > memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr)); > > > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, > > + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY, > > + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, > > + af->sockaddr_len)) > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > > + > > peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr); > > if (!peer) > > return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644 > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > > sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; > > int len; > > > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep, > > + chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT)) > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); > > + > > /* 6.10 Bundling > > * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or > > * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks. > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > > } > > > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); > > - > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); > > > > /* > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, > > struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; > > struct sctp_packet *packet; > > > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep, > > + chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK)) > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); > > + > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ? I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new association, they should be in all the locations where that happens Neil > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >
On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 07:16 -0400, Neil Horman wrote: > On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines > > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access > > > control > > > over SCTP. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> > > > --- > > > include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++ > > > include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 + > > > net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++ > > > net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++- > > > net/sctp/socket.c | 61 > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644 > > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { > > > reconf_enable:1; > > > > > > __u8 strreset_enable; > > > + > > > + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are > > > set by > > > + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used > > > by > > > + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as > > > they > > > + * cause a new socket to be generated. > > > security_sctp_sk_clone() > > > + * will then plug these into the new socket. > > > + */ > > > + > > > + u32 secid; > > > + u32 peer_secid; > > > }; > > > > > > /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644 > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t; > > > #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120 > > > #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121 > > > #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122 > > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123 > > > > > > /* PR-SCTP policies */ > > > #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000 > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644 > > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 > > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > > > memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, > > > sizeof(addr)); > > > > > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, > > > + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP, > > > + (struct sockaddr > > > *)&addr, > > > + af->sockaddr_len)) > > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > > > + > > > /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD > > > IP address > > > * request and does not have the local resources > > > to add this > > > * new address to the association, it MUST return > > > an Error > > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 > > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > > > memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), > > > sizeof(addr)); > > > > > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, > > > + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRI > > > MARY, > > > + (struct sockaddr > > > *)&addr, > > > + af->sockaddr_len)) > > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > > > + > > > peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr); > > > if (!peer) > > > return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644 > > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > > > sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; > > > int len; > > > > > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint > > > *)ep, > > > + chunk->skb, > > > SCTP_CID_INIT)) > > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, > > > commands); > > > + > > > /* 6.10 Bundling > > > * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or > > > * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks. > > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > > > } > > > > > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, > > > SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); > > > - > > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, > > > SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); > > > > > > /* > > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, > > > struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; > > > struct sctp_packet *packet; > > > > > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint > > > *)ep, > > > + chunk->skb, > > > SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK)) > > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, > > > commands); > > > + > > > > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in > > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ? > > I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new > association, > they should be in all the locations where that happens > Neil Thanks for the comments. I've just added the hook as requested for my next update, however I have not managed to trigger these areas using the lksctp-tools tests. Can you suggest any suitable tools for testing these scenarios. Thanks Richard > > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux- > > sctp" in > > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > > > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" > in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 8:04 PM, Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: > On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 07:16 -0400, Neil Horman wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote: >> > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines >> > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: >> > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access >> > > control >> > > over SCTP. >> > > >> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> >> > > --- >> > > include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++ >> > > include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 + >> > > net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++ >> > > net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++- >> > > net/sctp/socket.c | 61 >> > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> > > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> > > >> > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h >> > > b/include/net/sctp/structs.h >> > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644 >> > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h >> > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h >> > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { >> > > reconf_enable:1; >> > > >> > > __u8 strreset_enable; >> > > + >> > > + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are >> > > set by >> > > + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used >> > > by >> > > + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as >> > > they >> > > + * cause a new socket to be generated. >> > > security_sctp_sk_clone() >> > > + * will then plug these into the new socket. >> > > + */ >> > > + >> > > + u32 secid; >> > > + u32 peer_secid; >> > > }; >> > > >> > > /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ >> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h >> > > b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h >> > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644 >> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h >> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h >> > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t; >> > > #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120 >> > > #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121 >> > > #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122 >> > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123 >> > > >> > > /* PR-SCTP policies */ >> > > #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000 >> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c >> > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644 >> > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c >> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c >> > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 >> > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, >> > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) >> > > memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, >> > > sizeof(addr)); >> > > >> > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, >> > > + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP, >> > > + (struct sockaddr >> > > *)&addr, >> > > + af->sockaddr_len)) >> > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; >> > > + >> > > /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD >> > > IP address >> > > * request and does not have the local resources >> > > to add this >> > > * new address to the association, it MUST return >> > > an Error >> > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 >> > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, >> > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) >> > > memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), >> > > sizeof(addr)); >> > > >> > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, >> > > + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRI >> > > MARY, >> > > + (struct sockaddr >> > > *)&addr, >> > > + af->sockaddr_len)) >> > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; >> > > + >> > > peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr); >> > > if (!peer) >> > > return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; >> > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c >> > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644 >> > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c >> > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c >> > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t >> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, >> > > sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; >> > > int len; >> > > >> > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ >> > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint >> > > *)ep, >> > > + chunk->skb, >> > > SCTP_CID_INIT)) >> > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, >> > > commands); >> > > + >> > > /* 6.10 Bundling >> > > * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or >> > > * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks. >> > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t >> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, >> > > } >> > > >> > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, >> > > SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); >> > > - >> > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, >> > > SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); >> > > >> > > /* >> > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t >> > > sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, >> > > struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; >> > > struct sctp_packet *packet; >> > > >> > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ >> > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint >> > > *)ep, >> > > + chunk->skb, >> > > SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK)) >> > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, >> > > commands); >> > > + >> > >> > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be in >> > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ? >> >> I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new >> association, >> they should be in all the locations where that happens >> Neil > > Thanks for the comments. I've just added the hook as requested for my > next update, however I have not managed to trigger these areas using > the lksctp-tools tests. Can you suggest any suitable tools for testing > these scenarios. It's all a matter of timing: sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit(): Case A: Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP (CLOSED) (CLOSED) INIT -----------------> <----------------- INIT-ACK COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> <----------------- COOKIE-ACK Communication Up ----------> INIT -----------------> (Different INIT-TAG) <----------------- INIT-ACK COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> <----------------- COOKIE-ACK DATA -----------------> <----------------- SACK sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit(): Case B: Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP (CLOSED) (CLOSED) <----- Associate <----------------- INIT INIT -----------------> <----------------- INIT-ACK COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> <----------------- COOKIE-ACK Communication Up ----------> sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(): Case D: Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP (CLOSED) (CLOSED) <----- Associate INIT -----------------> <----------------- INIT-ACK COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> <----------------- COOKIE-ACK Communication Up ----------> COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> <----------------- COOKIE-ACK I think scapy could help with 4-shake stuff: # iptables -A OUTPUT -p sctp -d 192.0.0.2 --chunk-type only abort -o eth1 -j DROP and something like: def start_assoc(self, target, local): target_host, target_port = target local_host, local_port = local # init snd self._tsn = 2017 self._cnt = 15 SCTP_HEADER = (IP(dst=target_host, flags="DF") / SCTP(sport=local_port, dport=target_port, tag=0)) INIT = (SCTP_HEADER / SCTPChunkInit(init_tag=1, a_rwnd=106496, n_out_streams=self._cnt, n_in_streams=self._cnt, init_tsn=self._tsn, params=[SCTPParamSupport(types=[64])])) INIT_ACK = sr1(INIT, timeout=3, verbose=0) if INIT_ACK == None or not INIT_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkInitAck): return False # cookie echo snd SCTP_HEADER[SCTP].tag = INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkInitAck].init_tag COOKIE_ECHO = (SCTP_HEADER / SCTPChunkCookieEcho(cookie=INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkParamStateCookie].cookie)) COOKIE_ACK = sr1(COOKIE_ECHO, timeout=3, verbose=0) if COOKIE_ACK == None or not COOKIE_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkCookieAck): return False
On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 21:14 +0800, Xin Long wrote: > On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 8:04 PM, Richard Haines > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: > > On Fri, 2017-10-20 at 07:16 -0400, Neil Horman wrote: > > > On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:05:09PM +0800, Xin Long wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 9:58 PM, Richard Haines > > > > <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> wrote: > > > > > Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise > > > > > access > > > > > control > > > > > over SCTP. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.co > > > > > m> > > > > > --- > > > > > include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++ > > > > > include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 + > > > > > net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++ > > > > > net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++- > > > > > net/sctp/socket.c | 61 > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > > > > 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > > > b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > > > index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644 > > > > > --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > > > +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h > > > > > @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { > > > > > reconf_enable:1; > > > > > > > > > > __u8 strreset_enable; > > > > > + > > > > > + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These > > > > > are > > > > > set by > > > > > + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be > > > > > used > > > > > by > > > > > + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections > > > > > as > > > > > they > > > > > + * cause a new socket to be generated. > > > > > security_sctp_sk_clone() > > > > > + * will then plug these into the new socket. > > > > > + */ > > > > > + > > > > > + u32 secid; > > > > > + u32 peer_secid; > > > > > }; > > > > > > > > > > /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ > > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > > > b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > > > index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644 > > > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h > > > > > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t; > > > > > #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120 > > > > > #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121 > > > > > #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122 > > > > > +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123 > > > > > > > > > > /* PR-SCTP policies */ > > > > > #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000 > > > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > > > b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > > > index 6110447..ca4705b 100644 > > > > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c > > > > > @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 > > > > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > > > > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > > > > > memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, > > > > > sizeof(addr)); > > > > > > > > > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep- > > > > > >base.sk, > > > > > + SCTP_PARAM_ADD > > > > > _IP, > > > > > + (struct > > > > > sockaddr > > > > > *)&addr, > > > > > + af- > > > > > >sockaddr_len)) > > > > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > > > > > + > > > > > /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an > > > > > ADD > > > > > IP address > > > > > * request and does not have the local > > > > > resources > > > > > to add this > > > > > * new address to the association, it MUST > > > > > return > > > > > an Error > > > > > @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 > > > > > sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, > > > > > if (af->is_any(&addr)) > > > > > memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), > > > > > sizeof(addr)); > > > > > > > > > > + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep- > > > > > >base.sk, > > > > > + SCTP_PARAM_SET > > > > > _PRI > > > > > MARY, > > > > > + (struct > > > > > sockaddr > > > > > *)&addr, > > > > > + af- > > > > > >sockaddr_len)) > > > > > + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; > > > > > + > > > > > peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr); > > > > > if (!peer) > > > > > return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; > > > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > > > b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > > > index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644 > > > > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > > > > @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t > > > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > > > > > sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; > > > > > int len; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > > > > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint > > > > > *)ep, > > > > > + chunk->skb, > > > > > SCTP_CID_INIT)) > > > > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, > > > > > arg, > > > > > commands); > > > > > + > > > > > /* 6.10 Bundling > > > > > * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or > > > > > * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks. > > > > > @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t > > > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, > > > > > SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); > > > > > - > > > > > sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, > > > > > SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); > > > > > > > > > > /* > > > > > @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t > > > > > sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, > > > > > struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; > > > > > struct sctp_packet *packet; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ > > > > > + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint > > > > > *)ep, > > > > > + chunk->skb, > > > > > SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK)) > > > > > + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, > > > > > arg, > > > > > commands); > > > > > + > > > > > > > > Just thinking security_sctp_assoc_request hook should also be > > > > in > > > > sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() ? > > > > > > I agree, i think if this hook is gating on the creation of a new > > > association, > > > they should be in all the locations where that happens > > > Neil > > > > Thanks for the comments. I've just added the hook as requested for > > my > > next update, however I have not managed to trigger these areas > > using > > the lksctp-tools tests. Can you suggest any suitable tools for > > testing > > these scenarios. > > It's all a matter of timing: > > sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit(): > Case A: > > Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP > (CLOSED) (CLOSED) > > INIT -----------------> > > <----------------- INIT-ACK > > COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> > > <----------------- COOKIE-ACK > Communication Up ----------> > INIT -----------------> > (Different INIT-TAG) > <----------------- INIT-ACK > > COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> > > <----------------- COOKIE-ACK > > DATA -----------------> > > <----------------- SACK > > > sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit(): > Case B: > > Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP > (CLOSED) (CLOSED) > > <-- > --- Associate > <----------------- INIT > > INIT -----------------> > > <----------------- INIT-ACK > > COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> > > <----------------- COOKIE-ACK > Communication Up ----------> > > > sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(): > Case D: > > Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP > (CLOSED) (CLOSED) > > <-- > --- Associate > INIT -----------------> > > <----------------- INIT-ACK > > COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> > > <----------------- COOKIE-ACK > Communication Up ----------> > COOKIE-ECHO -----------------> > > <----------------- COOKIE-ACK > > I think scapy could help with 4-shake stuff: > # iptables -A OUTPUT -p sctp -d 192.0.0.2 --chunk-type only abort -o > eth1 -j DROP > and > something like: > def start_assoc(self, target, local): > target_host, target_port = target > local_host, local_port = local > > # init snd > self._tsn = 2017 > self._cnt = 15 > > SCTP_HEADER = (IP(dst=target_host, flags="DF") / > SCTP(sport=local_port, dport=target_port, tag=0)) > INIT = (SCTP_HEADER / SCTPChunkInit(init_tag=1, > a_rwnd=106496, n_out_streams=self._cnt, n_in_streams=self._cnt, > init_tsn=self._tsn, > > params=[SCTPParamSupport(types=[64])])) > INIT_ACK = sr1(INIT, timeout=3, verbose=0) > if INIT_ACK == None or not > INIT_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkInitAck): > return False > > # cookie echo snd > SCTP_HEADER[SCTP].tag = > INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkInitAck].init_tag > COOKIE_ECHO = (SCTP_HEADER / > SCTPChunkCookieEcho(cookie=INIT_ACK[SCTPChunkParamStateCookie].cookie > )) > COOKIE_ACK = sr1(COOKIE_ECHO, timeout=3, verbose=0) > if COOKIE_ACK == None or not > COOKIE_ACK.haslayer(SCTPChunkCookieAck): > return False That looks a bit complicated for me so I found some SCTP Conformance Test Tools at: https://github.com/nplab I added the required hooks as suggested above and then built and ran "ETSI-SCTP-Conformance-Testsuite" and "sctp-tests" with the following specific tests for the above scenarios according to RFC2960 sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4: sctp-dm-o-4-8 sctp-as-o-1-9-1 sctp-as-o-1-9-2 sctp-dm-o-4-2-1 They all passed except when running: "sctp-tests" runsctptest sctp-as-o-1-9-2 - TIMEOUT This is because the SUT needs to reply with a new IP address that required a modified test server (I just used a simple sctp server), however the ETSI-SCTP-Conformance-Testsuite did pass as I guess that provided the required IP address. Are these tests okay ?? Does anyone on the list use these conformance tools ??? > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux- > security-module" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h index 7767577..6e72e3e 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h @@ -1270,6 +1270,16 @@ struct sctp_endpoint { reconf_enable:1; __u8 strreset_enable; + + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they + * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone() + * will then plug these into the new socket. + */ + + u32 secid; + u32 peer_secid; }; /* Recover the outter endpoint structure. */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h index 6217ff8..c04812f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sctp.h @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ typedef __s32 sctp_assoc_t; #define SCTP_RESET_ASSOC 120 #define SCTP_ADD_STREAMS 121 #define SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS 122 +#define SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT 123 /* PR-SCTP policies */ #define SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE 0x0000 diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 6110447..ca4705b 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -3059,6 +3059,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, if (af->is_any(&addr)) memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr)); + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP, + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + af->sockaddr_len)) + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; + /* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address * request and does not have the local resources to add this * new address to the association, it MUST return an Error @@ -3125,6 +3131,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, if (af->is_any(&addr)) memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr)); + if (security_sctp_bind_connect(asoc->ep->base.sk, + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY, + (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + af->sockaddr_len)) + return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; + peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr); if (!peer) return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED; diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index b2a74c3..4ba5805 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -314,6 +314,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, sctp_unrecognized_param_t *unk_param; int len; + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep, + chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* 6.10 Bundling * An endpoint MUST NOT bundle INIT, INIT ACK or * SHUTDOWN COMPLETE with any other chunks. @@ -446,7 +451,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, } sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); - sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl)); /* @@ -507,6 +511,11 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; struct sctp_packet *packet; + /* Update socket peer label if first association. */ + if (security_sctp_assoc_request((struct sctp_endpoint *)ep, + chunk->skb, SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -899,6 +908,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net, */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_COUNTER_RESET, SCTP_NULL()); + /* Set peer label for connection. */ + security_inet_conn_established(ep->base.sk, chunk->skb); + /* RFC 2960 5.1 Normal Establishment of an Association * * E) Upon reception of the COOKIE ACK, endpoint "A" will move diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 70355a0..e948163 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -1014,6 +1014,12 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk, /* Do the work. */ switch (op) { case SCTP_BINDX_ADD_ADDR: + /* Allow security module to validate bindx addresses. */ + err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD, + (struct sockaddr *)kaddrs, + addrs_size); + if (err) + goto out; err = sctp_bindx_add(sk, kaddrs, addrcnt); if (err) goto out; @@ -1223,6 +1229,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, if (assoc_id) *assoc_id = asoc->assoc_id; + err = sctp_wait_for_connect(asoc, &timeo); /* Note: the asoc may be freed after the return of * sctp_wait_for_connect. @@ -1336,9 +1343,17 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk, if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) { err = -EFAULT; } else { + /* Allow security module to validate connectx addresses. */ + err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX, + (struct sockaddr *)kaddrs, + addrs_size); + if (err) + goto out_free; + err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id); } +out_free: kfree(kaddrs); return err; @@ -1604,6 +1619,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len) struct sctp_transport *transport, *chunk_tp; struct sctp_chunk *chunk; union sctp_addr to; + struct sctp_af *af; struct sockaddr *msg_name = NULL; struct sctp_sndrcvinfo default_sinfo; struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo; @@ -1833,6 +1849,24 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len) } scope = sctp_scope(&to); + + /* Label connection socket for first association 1-to-many + * style for client sequence socket()->sendmsg(). This + * needs to be done before sctp_assoc_add_peer() as that will + * set up the initial packet that needs to account for any + * security ip options (CIPSO/CALIPSO) added to the packet. + */ + af = sctp_get_af_specific(to.sa.sa_family); + if (!af) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } + err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT, + (struct sockaddr *)&to, + af->sockaddr_len); + if (err < 0) + goto out_unlock; + new_asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, sk, scope, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_asoc) { err = -ENOMEM; @@ -2865,6 +2899,8 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, { struct sctp_prim prim; struct sctp_transport *trans; + struct sctp_af *af; + int err; if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_prim)) return -EINVAL; @@ -2872,6 +2908,17 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, if (copy_from_user(&prim, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_prim))) return -EFAULT; + /* Allow security module to validate address but need address len. */ + af = sctp_get_af_specific(prim.ssp_addr.ss_family); + if (!af) + return -EINVAL; + + err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr *)&prim.ssp_addr, + af->sockaddr_len); + if (err) + return err; + trans = sctp_addr_id2transport(sk, &prim.ssp_addr, prim.ssp_assoc_id); if (!trans) return -EINVAL; @@ -3192,6 +3239,13 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_peer_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optva if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, (union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr)) return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; + /* Allow security module to validate address. */ + err = security_sctp_bind_connect(sk, SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr *)&prim.sspp_addr, + af->sockaddr_len); + if (err) + return err; + /* Create an ASCONF chunk with SET_PRIMARY parameter */ chunk = sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(asoc, (union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr); @@ -8024,6 +8078,8 @@ void sctp_copy_sock(struct sock *newsk, struct sock *sk, { struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); struct inet_sock *newinet; + struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk); + struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep; newsk->sk_type = sk->sk_type; newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = sk->sk_bound_dev_if; @@ -8066,7 +8122,10 @@ void sctp_copy_sock(struct sock *newsk, struct sock *sk, if (newsk->sk_flags & SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP) net_enable_timestamp(); - security_sk_clone(sk, newsk); + /* Set newsk security attributes from orginal sk and connection + * security attribute from ep. + */ + security_sctp_sk_clone(ep, sk, newsk); } static inline void sctp_copy_descendant(struct sock *sk_to,
Add security hooks to allow security modules to exercise access control over SCTP. Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> --- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 10 ++++++++ include/uapi/linux/sctp.h | 1 + net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++ net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++- net/sctp/socket.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)