From patchwork Tue Feb 5 11:06:37 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10797333 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31954186D for ; Tue, 5 Feb 2019 11:06:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22D0C2AC37 for ; Tue, 5 Feb 2019 11:06:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 173022B403; Tue, 5 Feb 2019 11:06:55 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4A852AC37 for ; Tue, 5 Feb 2019 11:06:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727337AbfBELGy (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Feb 2019 06:06:54 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f67.google.com ([209.85.128.67]:38556 "EHLO mail-wm1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728020AbfBELGx (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Feb 2019 06:06:53 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f67.google.com with SMTP id m22so3159554wml.3 for ; Tue, 05 Feb 2019 03:06:51 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3/UgfA2b1LMjP8l3IHGLgf3GGlVLs/lH9BS+aBvDM2I=; b=HT4cjD/hsm2o3hbrufJtuhtRKc5n7FGch34YsD7+OJ5uD1bzuRD70BQcUgQFoaI8lF WzP1EjYemOMm3nElPqQu+Grt3pMbukRtfwrig3SA4znVelM2o3rq8pv6joAPP8hnPFww CGPPact4RVnNeBe+VQ+A/IsEdBTNP+W8KL6RdWuZb8gdGwwpw79ogC92Rc+rx4flYZfW Mtr2GhCToTrw4gyX9YHJE4Ar32dMCRW2EJ7ZYQAqQEAnBGz1Of3CvGrT0/G2VE6Egd9C WIW9ryswrLDnR3SX484p9/J/26K0nPukEfvqHwZj8jrnywTq2+dnbFOEBMfmOLIpmrPT 8k8g== X-Gm-Message-State: AHQUAua44S48r1PTa76PzmSbe3M44mGrTzzfHSdCcbNqZWzABowGDMWe 5Op58Mi63jlVDqvO2o9oVj4ItwNViBQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3IY6xruLh9iK67l00gygLYpeYDFM92ZbgXYOFgp4iHRp6OAiiXLZ3IHgyfyB1lbVxiclA/BSaw== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:1902:: with SMTP id 2mr3388784wmz.150.1549364810864; Tue, 05 Feb 2019 03:06:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id x186sm26067070wmg.41.2019.02.05.03.06.49 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Tue, 05 Feb 2019 03:06:49 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v5 4/5] selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 12:06:37 +0100 Message-Id: <20190205110638.30782-5-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190205110638.30782-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190205110638.30782-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the actual inodes later by other hooks. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 758a99d1086e..e013cc02de50 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3354,6 +3354,66 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +/* kernfs node operations */ + +int selinux_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, + const struct iattr *dir_iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, + const struct iattr *iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *secattr) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; + int rc; + char *context; + + rc = simple_xattr_get(dir_secattr, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, NULL, 0); + if (rc == -ENODATA) + return 0; + else if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + clen = (u32)rc; + context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = simple_xattr_get(dir_secattr, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen); + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(context); + return rc; + } + + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, + GFP_KERNEL); + kfree(context); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (tsec->create_sid) { + newsid = tsec->create_sid; + } else { + u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(iattr->ia_mode); + + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + parent_sid, secclass, qstr, + &newsid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + &context, &clen); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = simple_xattr_set(secattr, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen, + XATTR_CREATE); + kfree(context); + return rc; +} + + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -6800,6 +6860,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),