From patchwork Fri Feb 14 03:26:34 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Daniel Colascione X-Patchwork-Id: 11381609 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1CF5018B8 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 03:27:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F12B8217F4 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 03:27:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="m8Bsd5O0" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728562AbgBND1F (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Feb 2020 22:27:05 -0500 Received: from mail-pl1-f201.google.com ([209.85.214.201]:38406 "EHLO mail-pl1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728648AbgBND1C (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Feb 2020 22:27:02 -0500 Received: by mail-pl1-f201.google.com with SMTP id t17so4402383ply.5 for ; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 19:27:02 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=fKf7Qy7FXarC79v0tJzZ3+R2Ba3CQFsER7P1EGsqsHY=; b=m8Bsd5O0fYTKXemGllMkb7FkRhDEMVPj/GtwwVndphe2KtvZwDgPMvOndFJ1Me9mR6 qchUsPUoP5EMZyWtPHuhw/3WRcCKJ9AJpFVvSqDmZYbjLUufy2ZPyY2E1CWK6dvjq+TW 5/FD9kOtqSSGOtpUCyyqsW5UppSVE95es/30cP5meRBUMbYnjjkHCprogKIm8kn7EnNc DUPF38vxu4j3W4ZB28OXlCzWb7otenUgLwLYUb7x9KbAP937VsvwyYvAUPc+BmGY4m0W 6c3h1C3PFYeapH9/kxLyE5PkmDq3X8R+UfxQj585upTsNCWPx7ZVgF57E1OsvjcEU5Sn xSKA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=fKf7Qy7FXarC79v0tJzZ3+R2Ba3CQFsER7P1EGsqsHY=; b=bQDsO+jSlQPBuQG2PFfe+k4Q4MnjDtVeUWFxdxQom762aCJQzru7amrRBqlK4WdZXf uoQosr5gUyGs/oNFNb9p2ZGcGeSNCqpITwEpm9clAT1SjnUJnQS24HLZjMtxOUES1O22 XnFzttpZtpe11BZKUBD3Kry6VIQJk4PzupIGua6idjFWKl37nrJEIz5X5RL1HoviVQEz Ks4MidBDU+WH/Le9eWukVoxDPbRmXRYFcsLdAx5mTR2iOSNqhnaFCBSO3L7Cz8pAtuBa ZVeAZV8ISrprrGeZRJgzVXhQrQQ0YtxUR+0M6R/BomqKcLi7PBpeDPybydQD8kWZjFKv yVtQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWdUf7aloo/X/Zb9vqNcgSSE9CLZ7vd3E8NZNTSEvWCWCZCApkR YabvPuGlQOtcvkC8DmwyVeWwKSzsJ2U= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqz2fnuE3DjoH2Z9nK9q0f7PKQ3B4Sm4/6hfEOXXSIs9x+fZJnAlRyTJsD2KVimPXLIKVGevufbrNME= X-Received: by 2002:a63:f0a:: with SMTP id e10mr1105943pgl.402.1581650821043; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 19:27:01 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2020 19:26:34 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20200214032635.75434-1-dancol@google.com> Message-Id: <20200214032635.75434-3-dancol@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com> <20200214032635.75434-1-dancol@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes From: Daniel Colascione To: timmurray@google.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paul@paul-moore.com, nnk@google.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, lokeshgidra@google.com Cc: Daniel Colascione Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in the previous patch to give SELinux the ability to control anonymous-inode files that are created using the new _secure() anon_inodes functions. A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used for the name-based transition is the name associated with the anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or "[perf_event]". Example: type uffd_t; type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : file uffd_t "[userfaultfd]"; allow sysadm_t uffd_t:file { create }; (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd support this new interface. The example above is just for exposition.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1659b59fb5d7..6de0892620b3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2915,6 +2915,62 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; } +static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, + const struct file_operations *fops, + const struct inode *context_inode) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + int rc; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + if (unlikely(!selinux_state.initialized)) + return 0; + + isec = selinux_inode(inode); + + /* + * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has + * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise + * untouched. + */ + + if (context_inode) { + struct inode_security_struct *context_isec = + selinux_inode(context_inode); + if (IS_ERR(context_isec)) + return PTR_ERR(context_isec); + isec->sid = context_isec->sid; + } else { + rc = security_transition_sid( + &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + SECCLASS_FILE, name, &isec->sid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + + /* + * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're + * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode. + */ + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; + ad.u.inode = inode; + + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, + isec->sid, + isec->sclass, + FILE__CREATE, + &ad); +} + static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); @@ -6923,6 +6979,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),