| Message ID | 20200719094420.1515976-1-dominick.grift@defensec.nl (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [SELinux-notebook,v6] objects.md: some clarifications | expand |
On Sun, Jul 19, 2020 at 5:45 AM Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> wrote: > > Elaborate on labeling. Touch on the significance of the default statement, on various av permissions related to labeling using the libselinux API, and on how the kernel and unlabeled initial security identifiers are used to address labeling challenges in special cases such as initialization and failover respectively. > > Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> > --- > diff --git a/src/objects.md b/src/objects.md > index 58664ef..d27f881 100644 > --- a/src/objects.md > +++ b/src/objects.md > + policy's approval of course) using the **libselinux** API > + functions. The `process setfscreate` access vector can be used to process setfscreate is a permission. An access vector is a set of permissions. The access vector definitions in the policy specify the set of permissions associated with each class. > @@ -269,6 +275,23 @@ and manage their transition: > > `type_transition`, `role_transition` and `range_transition` > > +SELinux-aware applications can enforce a new label (with the policy's I don't think you originated this language but technically it should be "can assign a new label" or "specify a particular label" or similar, not "enforce a new label". > +The `kernel` **initial security identifier** is used to associate > +specified a label with subjects that were left unlabeled due to > +system initialization, for example kernel threads. The kernel SID is used for kernel objects, including kernel threads (both those that are created during initialization but also kernel threads created later), kernel-private sockets, synthetic objects representing kernel resources (e.g. the "system" class), etc. It is true that processes created prior to initial policy load will also be in the kernel SID until/unless there is a policy loaded and either a policy-defined transition or an explicit setcon or setexeccon+execve, but that's just the typical default inheritance from creating task behavior for processes. > + > +The `unlabeled` **initial security identifier** is used > +to associate a specified label with subjects that had their label > +invalidated due to policy changes at runtime. It is also assigned as the initial state for various objects e.g. inodes, superblocks, etc until they reach a point where a more specific label can be determined e.g. from an xattr or from policy. The context associated with the unlabeled SID is used as the fallback context for both subjects and objects when their label is invalidated by a policy reload (their SID is unchanged but the SID is transparently remapped to the unlabeled context).
diff --git a/src/objects.md b/src/objects.md index 58664ef..d27f881 100644 --- a/src/objects.md +++ b/src/objects.md @@ -110,14 +110,20 @@ objects is managed by the system and generally unseen by the users (until labeling goes wrong !!). As processes and objects are created and destroyed, they either: -1. Inherit their labels from the parent process or object. +1. Inherit their labels from the parent process or object. The policy + default user, type, role and range statements can be used to + change the behavior as discussed in the [**Default Rules**](default_rules.md#default-object-rules) + section. 2. The policy type, role and range transition statements allow a different label to be assigned as discussed in the [**Domain and Object Transitions**](domain_object_transitions.md#domain-and-object-transitions) section. 3. SELinux-aware applications can enforce a new label (with the - policies approval of course) using the **libselinux** API - functions. + policy's approval of course) using the **libselinux** API + functions. The `process setfscreate` access vector can be used to + allow subjects to create files with a new label programmatically + using the ***setfscreatecon**(3)* function, overriding default + rules and transition statements. 4. An object manager (OM) can enforce a default label that can either be built into the OM or obtained via a configuration file (such as those used by @@ -269,6 +275,23 @@ and manage their transition: `type_transition`, `role_transition` and `range_transition` +SELinux-aware applications can enforce a new label (with the policy's +approval of course) using the **libselinux** API functions. The +`process setexec`, `process setkeycreate` and `process setsockcreate` +access vectors can be used to allow subjects to label processes, +kernel keyrings, and sockets programmatically using the +***setexec**(3)*, ***setkeycreatecon**(3)* and +***setsockcreatecon**(3)* functions respectively, overriding +transition statements. + +The `kernel` **initial security identifier** is used to associate +specified a label with subjects that were left unlabeled due to +system initialization, for example kernel threads. + +The `unlabeled` **initial security identifier** is used +to associate a specified label with subjects that had their label +invalidated due to policy changes at runtime. + ### Object Reuse As GNU / Linux runs it creates instances of objects and manages the
Elaborate on labeling. Touch on the significance of the default statement, on various av permissions related to labeling using the libselinux API, and on how the kernel and unlabeled initial security identifiers are used to address labeling challenges in special cases such as initialization and failover respectively. Signed-off-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl> --- v2: fixes patch description v3: adding patch description, s/policies/policy's/, split unlabeled and kernel descriptions for clarity v4: fixes another typo in description and emphasize system initialization a bit v5: emphasize kernel threads with kernel isid description v6: forgot to mention defaultuser, can only associate one label with isids src/objects.md | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)