From patchwork Thu Nov 12 01:53:58 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lokesh Gidra X-Patchwork-Id: 11899037 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FFF8139F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 05:40:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9E6C21D91 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 05:40:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="Mz0/RepG" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729467AbgKLFiR (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 00:38:17 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55230 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728178AbgKLByn (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Nov 2020 20:54:43 -0500 Received: from mail-yb1-xb4a.google.com (mail-yb1-xb4a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b4a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 51BBBC0401C0 for ; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 17:54:15 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-yb1-xb4a.google.com with SMTP id i184so4263048ybg.7 for ; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 17:54:15 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject :from:to:cc; bh=EKdfgxKmgqyWOrEoFelO0xo4xUprR4kVgmmY5QtMneA=; b=Mz0/RepGCaX9VPHW6LKYUdkGuWwDxdRh602UW+erQ9khnSph5lnBFq+8u9tT4GDxaS ckxAoj4jIZb/X+96/D7EN4p3mRLqrhrRnE3AxR4nd3qOi6FK1e/Z6XUKmdBv0V52oHoi fnRSEC7tE+8O3CSNKd8dbNMYYBVswtN2GpJKmuRoeXfgAY2LAq6yldLOmIxmMhutphYm j4fhBnd140Pi1Ckyo33E5c9jKyWfJ37HDd6ORnuKewANEJvZfovjkYwOABiS+IlQOpEn QIjD4OMXTdg/iDGYGT+UyppMyuf4rtDyeeBOjhzp9egpqH7d6TWO6igQsuhW95l5hcfa uSuw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=EKdfgxKmgqyWOrEoFelO0xo4xUprR4kVgmmY5QtMneA=; b=PP4Z6q1UPNFTd2HWE9vHqwiw9ZIUN7qY/vzO+IZbxohplW1Nt8M8b26WvkMowJw/RK g5+nokfGAXNhsF8rS7//xtzbrQVcgXn0S7Bw/gvHlvVG051pQkbaW8lld0Gv+bXfIncj JdNp51EhD1Rlj2KLcH/VT9JCypUGcm2O7Ot6DjHwgkejrGFxN/MWu+qEzJgPUn5ArorV aXQ0sOOU9CQ5QhNjIMZkEozJS4LhyvEN/XursnS86EyMP9FaTpvmV6Hzyvf5oOq5nwC/ soi7ciDv/mnYQy5WZvLJVpp5nxd+EpzPcOWMZNQo8i2zhqicOWtkDimpoqJZP7leb/7P C/7Q== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532cAF0dJuXnsAVyEvZVAMh/qr6Dd392p8odwdkSvoyfslK/+8tX 9q8SYmqCSt574mG6oDf+GUvhCg+RAL2PJs+rZw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzFSv/Xdn7GGdy2MUG7BhSbdefjZ9hVJ+MOvRURjTp6rSFxYr2XLTCAi7JOZcqE2J6h4zH58KP3k6BneY9sdA== Sender: "lokeshgidra via sendgmr" X-Received: from lg.mtv.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:211:202:f693:9fff:fef4:29dd]) (user=lokeshgidra job=sendgmr) by 2002:a25:bc42:: with SMTP id d2mr6737406ybk.461.1605146054397; Wed, 11 Nov 2020 17:54:14 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 17:53:58 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20201112015359.1103333-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> Message-Id: <20201112015359.1103333-4-lokeshgidra@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20201112015359.1103333-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2.299.gdc1121823c-goog Subject: [PATCH v13 3/4] selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes From: Lokesh Gidra To: Andrea Arcangeli , Alexander Viro , James Morris , Stephen Smalley , Casey Schaufler , Eric Biggers , Paul Moore Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Eric Paris , Lokesh Gidra , Daniel Colascione , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , KP Singh , David Howells , Anders Roxell , Sami Tolvanen , Matthew Garrett , Aaron Goidel , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , YueHaibing , Christian Brauner , Alexei Starovoitov , Alexey Budankov , Adrian Reber , Aleksa Sarai , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, Andrew Morton , hch@infradead.org, Daniel Colascione Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org From: Daniel Colascione This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control anonymous-inode files that are created using the new anon_inode_getfd_secure() function. A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used for the name-based transition is the name associated with the anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or "[perf_event]". Example: type uffd_t; type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]"; allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create }; (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd support this new interface. The example above is just for exposition.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6b1826fc3658..d092aa512868 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2927,6 +2927,61 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; } +static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, + const struct inode *context_inode) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + int rc; + + if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))) + return 0; + + isec = selinux_inode(inode); + + /* + * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has + * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise + * untouched. + */ + + if (context_inode) { + struct inode_security_struct *context_isec = + selinux_inode(context_inode); + if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) + return -EACCES; + + isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass; + isec->sid = context_isec->sid; + } else { + isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; + rc = security_transition_sid( + &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + + /* + * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're + * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode. + */ + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; + ad.u.inode = inode; + + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, + isec->sid, + isec->sclass, + ANON_INODE__CREATE, + &ad); +} + static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); @@ -6992,6 +7047,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 40cebde62856..ba2e01a6955c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { {"open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write"} }, { "lockdown", { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } }, + { "anon_inode", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { NULL } };