From patchwork Sat Nov 13 09:55:47 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Topi Miettinen X-Patchwork-Id: 12617633 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F1CAC433F5 for ; Sat, 13 Nov 2021 09:56:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77D0160F22 for ; Sat, 13 Nov 2021 09:56:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235040AbhKMJ6v (ORCPT ); Sat, 13 Nov 2021 04:58:51 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45446 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234300AbhKMJ6v (ORCPT ); Sat, 13 Nov 2021 04:58:51 -0500 Received: from mail-lf1-x12a.google.com (mail-lf1-x12a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::12a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 05759C061766 for ; Sat, 13 Nov 2021 01:55:59 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-lf1-x12a.google.com with SMTP id f18so28717832lfv.6 for ; Sat, 13 Nov 2021 01:55:58 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=DOsvAXNhTgu+u6beFDdYff0QAQA05XBY7npsJk8klf8=; b=dYKA27owxYqlL+XBdzRW1ea4Qs01swhYGWCpn0FeeRCJC/LToitIKyoAJ5PjHdvDsD xOHeJoDt5O7h/1TI9rc0bh8OlFcfgDy+8I+mpvCeGH3aEHmnIUa5XjQMnK6NhvAeYD6Z dvRrR6UBo5YOrwuoRSQW9Z8KFXr5VvYgFRYycQULiEbH8mKMUMbE3Adjc4lhUCxYwUGe vszCYsiSBU+afjcPtK0XHM3sIngkuWCk2Kt+WuIOxZxY/niE20v23WrKOjQGkh/cDD15 ZbzoAXFbTAaQmv8d+tvxxFNG7y93FsrUeBqR3Kho1JbwREJhU8fy2gG0K54QKFs7wopF eSNw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=DOsvAXNhTgu+u6beFDdYff0QAQA05XBY7npsJk8klf8=; b=y1VS43gUWzqJd7cF53tKUw/6Vs/oHCH2JXaNZf4zL09V1BpjMUeRZKW2+AfpIxtIYV sYK3ZX3zKI3XTMzYRj5Zg9Ouso2CnoY+oi8uatUkrFWeE+mQrEUQNxfuFlG5Or56AUbp X+1p9cSS1giR/xk4xR8IzfmE5DskUYAR7kUUIoeehP46Duc1nJjZdlnsf5LNC6NndXTx pwpypt3MQdxpN9xOtR9uG9GIBGn7EALzFjuRb5Qlv5aObFiCHZfgrhLASTgocPbtyO1+ OIOEOHQuVe2XCZLe049vYU8gU4liASI3bdcLtzRpQGjGFRaPt7dyhArSInyKIhI0Io4v HNAg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530ydVBFN7xswWdzEfpz570MuH6S+8nnXMZIjzaCiwa772OU/GaE BbG5xwHfGmWgoDwxS0TQh8SobJ0db8A= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzwFhoE46Xqx71hUVjXtsqUnO2jiDPJCIrent0tGUb4xWksYl8dFCGUWXXl8TMPLon7I8R1mQ== X-Received: by 2002:ac2:442e:: with SMTP id w14mr20307959lfl.577.1636797357011; Sat, 13 Nov 2021 01:55:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (81-197-199-108.elisa-laajakaista.fi. [81.197.199.108]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j5sm220436lfe.219.2021.11.13.01.55.55 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 13 Nov 2021 01:55:56 -0800 (PST) From: Topi Miettinen To: selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Topi Miettinen Subject: [PATCH v2] selinux-notebook: New chapter: Hardening SELinux Date: Sat, 13 Nov 2021 11:55:47 +0200 Message-Id: <20211113095547.19406-1-toiwoton@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Describe some easy and more difficult methods to harden SELinux policies. Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen --- v2: - Updated with comments from Daniel Burgener - Fixed issues with PDF generation --- src/hardening.md | 154 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/implementing_seaware_apps.md | 2 +- src/reference_policy.md | 2 +- src/section_list.txt | 1 + src/toc.md | 1 + 5 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/hardening.md diff --git a/src/hardening.md b/src/hardening.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..031e7c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/hardening.md @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +# Hardening SELinux + +- [Tuning Booleans](#tuning-booleans) +- [Disabling Modules](#disabling-modules) +- [Users and Roles](#users-and-roles) +- [Network Controls](#network-controls) +- [Custom Policy Modules](#custom-policy-modules) +- [Fine Grained Network Controls](#fine-grained-network-controls) +- [Fully Custom Policy](#fully-custom-policy) + +The Reference Policy sets a good basis for learning how to operate a +system with SELinux. The policy allows system administrators and users +to continue using working methods that they learned before becoming +familiar with SELinux, because of its "targeted" model and reasonable +defaults. + +However, it's possible to tighten the policy considerably. The +Reference Policy gives several options for hardening but for maximum +control over the policy, it's possible to write custom modules or even +replace the Reference Policy entirely. + +The hardening suggestions are listed in the rough order of difficulty. + +## Tuning Booleans + +The Reference Policy uses booleans to control optional aspects of the +policy. Changing the booleans is very easy way to tune the SELinux +policy. The booleans can be also changed temporarily, without +committing them yet to the on-disk policy, so changes are +automatically reverted on next boot. + +For example, recent Firefox browsers can work with policy boolean +`mozilla_execstack` set to `off`. This can reduce the surface to +vulnerabilities which could use an executable stack. The boolean can +be changed using ***setsebool**(8)*: + +``` +# Check current status: +getsebool mozilla_execstack +mozilla_execstack --> on + +# Change temporarily: +setsebool mozilla_execstack=off + +# Write to persistent policy on disk: +setsebool -P mozilla_execstack=off + +``` + +## Disabling Modules + +By default, the Reference Policy enables most policy modules to +support any system. But when the system is known well by the +administrator, it's possible to remove modules which aren't used. + +As an example, if Firefox isn't installed, the module `mozilla` can be +removed from the policy. The hardening effect comes from reducing the +allow rules, some of which may apply to paths which aren't actively +monitored because the corresponding application isn't installed. + +Care should be taken to never remove modules which actually are used, +since this may weaken the policy instead, because the removed module +could have contained an application more strictly than what the policy +allows without the module. Removing critical modules can also result +in system breakage. + +## Users and Roles + +In the "targeted" model, both unprivileged users and the system +administrator (`root`) are unconfined and the TE rules are very +relaxed. However, it's possible to change the SELinux user for these +accounts to more confined variants. + +For the unprivileged users, the confined user in the Reference Policy +is `user_u` with corresponding role `user_r`. There's also `staff_u` +and `staff_r` to allow transitioning to system administrative roles by +logging in as `staff_u:staff_r` and escalating to `staff_u:sysadm_r` +or another role for administrative tasks with ***newrole**(1)*. + +For the system administrator there are several options: `root` SELinux +user, which is mostly unconfined and `sysadm_u`, which is more +confined. The role for both is `sysadm_r`. + +It's also possible to divide the powers of the system administrator to +several roles, `sysadm_r`, `auditadm_r`, `logadm_r`, `dbadm_r` and +`secadm_r`. This can be useful when an organization wants to ensure +that even the system administrators can be held accountable for their +actions. The roles can be also useful for management of labor, for +example having dedicated persons for managing databases or SELinux +policies. + +It should be noted that since this isn't the default way of operating +SELinux, the Reference Policy may need to supplemented and the +administrators, even users, may need to be more aware of SELinux in +order to be able to operate the system. + +## Network Controls + +With network controls of SELinux, it's possible to enhance firewall +rules with knowledge of SELinux types. Traditional firewall rules only +affect the whole system by allowing certain ports and protocols but +blocking others. With `nftables` and `iptables` it's also possible to +make this more fine grained: certain users can access network but +others may not. By using also SELinux controls it's possible to fine +tune this to application level: `mozilla_t` can connect to the +Internet but some other applications can't. SELinux packet controls +can be also used to combine Deep Packet Inspection with SELinux TE +rules. + +## Custom Policy Modules + +Further hardening can be achieved by replacing policy modules from the +Reference Policy with custom modules. Typically the modules in the +Reference Policy are written to allow all possible modes of operation +for an application or its users, since the writers of the policy don't +know the specifics of each installation. Thus the SELinux rules may be +more relaxed than what could be optimal for a specific case. When the +exact environment and usage patterns are known, it's possible to write +replacement policy modules to remove excess rules and hence reduce +attack surface. + +As a minimum, it should be ensured that all continuously running +services and main user applications have a dedicated policy module or +rules, instead of running in for example `init_t`, `initrc_t` or +`unconfined_t` types which may offer low level of protection. + +## Fine Grained Network Controls + +In an internal network of an organization, where all entities can +agree on the same SELinux policy, using IPSec, CIPSO and CALIPSO may +allow further policy controls. In addition to SELinux domain of the +source application, even the SELinux domain (or at least MCS/MLS +category/sensitivity) of the target server can be used in TE rules. + +## Fully Custom Policy + +It's also possible to write custom SELinux policies for an entire +system with non-trivial effort. + +The rules can also be analyzed with various SELinux tools, such as +`apol`, `sedta`, `sepolicy` and many more. With the tools it may be +possible to find hardening opportunities or errors in the policy. + +The downside of making the SELinux rules as tight as possible is that +when the applications (or hardware components or network +configuration) are updated, there's a possibility that the rules may +also need updating because of the changes. Less generic rules are also +less generally useful for different configurations, so the rules may +need tuning for each installation. + + + +--- +**[[ PREV ]](reference_policy.md)** **[[ TOP ]](#)** **[[ NEXT ]](implementing_seaware_apps.md)** diff --git a/src/implementing_seaware_apps.md b/src/implementing_seaware_apps.md index 74833f8..2351421 100644 --- a/src/implementing_seaware_apps.md +++ b/src/implementing_seaware_apps.md @@ -297,4 +297,4 @@ applied to their objects as defined by policy. --- -**[[ PREV ]](reference_policy.md)** **[[ TOP ]](#)** **[[ NEXT ]](embedded_systems.md)** +**[[ PREV ]](hardening.md)** **[[ TOP ]](#)** **[[ NEXT ]](embedded_systems.md)** diff --git a/src/reference_policy.md b/src/reference_policy.md index 45e4145..ebb516f 100644 --- a/src/reference_policy.md +++ b/src/reference_policy.md @@ -3060,4 +3060,4 @@ section. --- -**[[ PREV ]](modular_policy_statements.md)** **[[ TOP ]](#)** **[[ NEXT ]](implementing_seaware_apps.md)** +**[[ PREV ]](modular_policy_statements.md)** **[[ TOP ]](#)** **[[ NEXT ]](hardening.md)** diff --git a/src/section_list.txt b/src/section_list.txt index dcca883..b67f65e 100644 --- a/src/section_list.txt +++ b/src/section_list.txt @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ infiniband_statements.md xen_statements.md modular_policy_statements.md reference_policy.md +hardening.md implementing_seaware_apps.md embedded_systems.md seandroid.md diff --git a/src/toc.md b/src/toc.md index f5778bd..20a87f0 100644 --- a/src/toc.md +++ b/src/toc.md @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ - [XEN Statements](xen_statements.md#xen-statements) - [Modular Policy Support Statements](modular_policy_statements.md#modular-policy-support-statements) - [The Reference Policy](reference_policy.md#the-reference-policy) +- [Hardening SELinux](hardening.md#hardening-selinux) - [Implementing SELinux-aware Applications](implementing_seaware_apps.md#implementing-selinux-aware-applications) - [Embedded Systems](embedded_systems.md#embedded-systems) - [SE for Android](seandroid.md#security-enhancements-for-android)