@@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
unsigned long id;
unsigned char id_as_uchar;
unsigned char type;
- unsigned char identifier[10], *challenge = NULL;
- unsigned char *challenge_binhex = NULL;
+ unsigned char identifier[10], *initiatorchg = NULL;
+ unsigned char *initiatorchg_binhex = NULL;
unsigned char *digest = NULL;
unsigned char *response = NULL;
unsigned char *client_digest = NULL;
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;
struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
- int auth_ret = -1, ret, challenge_len;
+ int auth_ret = -1, ret, initiatorchg_len;
digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!digest) {
@@ -256,15 +256,15 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
memset(chap_n, 0, MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE);
memset(chap_r, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
- challenge = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!challenge) {
+ initiatorchg = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!initiatorchg) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n");
goto out;
}
- challenge_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!challenge_binhex) {
- pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge_binhex buffer\n");
+ initiatorchg_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!initiatorchg_binhex) {
+ pr_err("Unable to allocate initiatorchg_binhex buffer\n");
goto out;
}
/*
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
* Get CHAP_C.
*/
if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_C", CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN,
- challenge, &type) < 0) {
+ initiatorchg, &type) < 0) {
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -408,28 +408,28 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
goto out;
}
- challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2);
- if (!challenge_len) {
+ initiatorchg_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(initiatorchg), 2);
+ if (!initiatorchg_len) {
pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
goto out;
}
- if (challenge_len > 1024) {
+ if (initiatorchg_len > 1024) {
pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
goto out;
}
- if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) {
+ if (hex2bin(initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg, initiatorchg_len) < 0) {
pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n");
goto out;
}
- pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);
+ pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", initiatorchg);
/*
* During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
* initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
* the target.
*/
- if (challenge_len == chap->challenge_len &&
- !memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge,
- challenge_len)) {
+ if (initiatorchg_len == chap->challenge_len &&
+ !memcmp(initiatorchg_binhex, chap->challenge,
+ initiatorchg_len)) {
pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
" login attempt\n");
goto out;
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
/*
* Convert received challenge to binary hex.
*/
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, challenge_binhex, challenge_len,
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg_len,
digest);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for ma challenge\n");
@@ -487,8 +487,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
kzfree(desc);
if (tfm)
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- kfree(challenge);
- kfree(challenge_binhex);
+ kfree(initiatorchg);
+ kfree(initiatorchg_binhex);
kfree(digest);
kfree(response);
kfree(server_digest);
This patch renames some variables in chap_server_compute_hash() to make it harder to confuse the initiator's challenge with the target's challenge when the mutual chap authentication is used. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 40 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)