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Tue, 05 Jan 2021 19:41:32 -0800 (PST) From: Claire Chang To: robh+dt@kernel.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, joro@8bytes.org, will@kernel.org, frowand.list@gmail.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, jgross@suse.com, sstabellini@kernel.org, hch@lst.de, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com Cc: grant.likely@arm.com, xypron.glpk@gmx.de, treding@nvidia.com, mingo@kernel.org, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, peterz@infradead.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, saravanak@google.com, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, rdunlap@infradead.org, dan.j.williams@intel.com, bgolaszewski@baylibre.com, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, tfiga@chromium.org, drinkcat@chromium.org, Claire Chang Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 0/6] Restricted DMA Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 11:41:18 +0800 Message-Id: <20210106034124.30560-1-tientzu@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog MIME-Version: 1.0 This series implements mitigations for lack of DMA access control on systems without an IOMMU, which could result in the DMA accessing the system memory at unexpected times and/or unexpected addresses, possibly leading to data leakage or corruption. For example, we plan to use the PCI-e bus for Wi-Fi and that PCI-e bus is not behind an IOMMU. As PCI-e, by design, gives the device full access to system memory, a vulnerability in the Wi-Fi firmware could easily escalate to a full system exploit (remote wifi exploits: [1a], [1b] that shows a full chain of exploits; [2], [3]). To mitigate the security concerns, we introduce restricted DMA. Restricted DMA utilizes the existing swiotlb to bounce streaming DMA in and out of a specially allocated region and does memory allocation from the same region. The feature on its own provides a basic level of protection against the DMA overwriting buffer contents at unexpected times. However, to protect against general data leakage and system memory corruption, the system needs to provide a way to restrict the DMA to a predefined memory region (this is usually done at firmware level, e.g. in ATF on some ARM platforms). [1a] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html [1b] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_11.html [2] https://blade.tencent.com/en/advisories/qualpwn/ [3] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vulnerabilities-found-in-highly-popular-firmware-for-wifi-chips/ Claire Chang (6): swiotlb: Add io_tlb_mem struct swiotlb: Add restricted DMA pool swiotlb: Use restricted DMA pool if available swiotlb: Add restricted DMA alloc/free support. dt-bindings: of: Add restricted DMA pool of: Add plumbing for restricted DMA pool .../reserved-memory/reserved-memory.txt | 24 + arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c | 4 +- drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 12 +- drivers/of/address.c | 21 + drivers/of/device.c | 4 + drivers/of/of_private.h | 5 + drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c | 4 +- include/linux/device.h | 4 + include/linux/swiotlb.h | 61 +- kernel/dma/Kconfig | 1 + kernel/dma/direct.c | 20 +- kernel/dma/direct.h | 10 +- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 576 +++++++++++------- 13 files changed, 514 insertions(+), 232 deletions(-)