diff mbox series

[07/10] x86/shadow: the guess_wrmap() hook is needed for HVM only

Message ID 1e221192-7899-b60d-0280-b77ab5877772@suse.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show
Series x86: mm (mainly shadow) adjustments | expand

Commit Message

Jan Beulich April 17, 2020, 2:28 p.m. UTC
sh_remove_write_access() bails early for !external guests, and hence its
building and thus the need for the hook can be suppressed altogether in
!HVM configs.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Comments

Tim Deegan April 18, 2020, 9:03 a.m. UTC | #1
At 16:28 +0200 on 17 Apr (1587140897), Jan Beulich wrote:
> sh_remove_write_access() bails early for !external guests, and hence its
> building and thus the need for the hook can be suppressed altogether in
> !HVM configs.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

> @@ -366,6 +367,14 @@ int sh_validate_guest_entry(struct vcpu
>  extern int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
>                                    unsigned int level,
>                                    unsigned long fault_addr);
> +#else
> +static inline int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
> +                                         unsigned int level,
> +                                         unsigned long fault_addr)
> +{

Can we have an ASSERT(!shadow_mode_refcounts(d)) here, please,
matching the check that would have made it a noop before?

Cheers,

Tim.
Jan Beulich April 20, 2020, 1:06 p.m. UTC | #2
On 18.04.2020 11:03, Tim Deegan wrote:
> At 16:28 +0200 on 17 Apr (1587140897), Jan Beulich wrote:
>> sh_remove_write_access() bails early for !external guests, and hence its
>> building and thus the need for the hook can be suppressed altogether in
>> !HVM configs.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> 
>> @@ -366,6 +367,14 @@ int sh_validate_guest_entry(struct vcpu
>>  extern int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
>>                                    unsigned int level,
>>                                    unsigned long fault_addr);
>> +#else
>> +static inline int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
>> +                                         unsigned int level,
>> +                                         unsigned long fault_addr)
>> +{
> 
> Can we have an ASSERT(!shadow_mode_refcounts(d)) here, please,
> matching the check that would have made it a noop before?

I've added one, but I find this quite odd in a !HVM build, where

#define PG_refcounts   0

and

#define paging_mode_refcounts(_d) (!!((_d)->arch.paging.mode & PG_refcounts))

Perhaps you're wanting this mainly for documentation purposes?

Jan
Tim Deegan April 21, 2020, 5:31 a.m. UTC | #3
At 15:06 +0200 on 20 Apr (1587395210), Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 18.04.2020 11:03, Tim Deegan wrote:
> > At 16:28 +0200 on 17 Apr (1587140897), Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> sh_remove_write_access() bails early for !external guests, and hence its
> >> building and thus the need for the hook can be suppressed altogether in
> >> !HVM configs.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> > 
> >> @@ -366,6 +367,14 @@ int sh_validate_guest_entry(struct vcpu
> >>  extern int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
> >>                                    unsigned int level,
> >>                                    unsigned long fault_addr);
> >> +#else
> >> +static inline int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
> >> +                                         unsigned int level,
> >> +                                         unsigned long fault_addr)
> >> +{
> > 
> > Can we have an ASSERT(!shadow_mode_refcounts(d)) here, please,
> > matching the check that would have made it a noop before?
> 
> I've added one, but I find this quite odd in a !HVM build, where
> 
> #define PG_refcounts   0
> 
> and
> 
> #define paging_mode_refcounts(_d) (!!((_d)->arch.paging.mode & PG_refcounts))
> 
> Perhaps you're wanting this mainly for documentation purposes?


Yeah, that and future-proofing.  If !HVM builds ever start using
paging_mode_refcounts then this assertion will forcibly remind us that
we need changes here.  I'm glad that it compiles away to nothing in
the meantime.

Cheers,

Tim.
diff mbox series

Patch

--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -1769,6 +1769,7 @@  static inline void trace_shadow_wrmap_bf
     }
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
 /**************************************************************************/
 /* Remove all writeable mappings of a guest frame from the shadow tables
  * Returns non-zero if we need to flush TLBs.
@@ -2000,6 +2001,7 @@  int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain
     /* We killed at least one writeable mapping, so must flush TLBs. */
     return 1;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_HVM */
 
 #if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC)
 static int sh_remove_write_access_from_sl1p(struct domain *d, mfn_t gmfn,
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -4203,7 +4203,7 @@  int sh_rm_write_access_from_sl1p(struct
 }
 #endif /* OOS */
 
-#if SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_WRITABLE_HEURISTIC
+#if defined(CONFIG_HVM) && (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_WRITABLE_HEURISTIC)
 static int sh_guess_wrmap(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr, mfn_t gmfn)
 /* Look up this vaddr in the current shadow and see if it's a writeable
  * mapping of this gmfn.  If so, remove it.  Returns 1 if it worked. */
@@ -4875,10 +4875,10 @@  const struct paging_mode sh_paging_mode
 #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
     .shadow.make_monitor_table     = sh_make_monitor_table,
     .shadow.destroy_monitor_table  = sh_destroy_monitor_table,
-#endif
 #if SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_WRITABLE_HEURISTIC
     .shadow.guess_wrmap            = sh_guess_wrmap,
 #endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_HVM */
     .shadow.pagetable_dying        = sh_pagetable_dying,
     .shadow.trace_emul_write_val   = trace_emulate_write_val,
     .shadow.shadow_levels          = SHADOW_PAGING_LEVELS,
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/private.h
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@  void sh_install_xen_entries_in_l4(struct
 /* Update the shadows in response to a pagetable write from Xen */
 int sh_validate_guest_entry(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmfn, void *entry, u32 size);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
 /* Remove all writeable mappings of a guest frame from the shadows.
  * Returns non-zero if we need to flush TLBs.
  * level and fault_addr desribe how we found this to be a pagetable;
@@ -366,6 +367,14 @@  int sh_validate_guest_entry(struct vcpu
 extern int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
                                   unsigned int level,
                                   unsigned long fault_addr);
+#else
+static inline int sh_remove_write_access(struct domain *d, mfn_t readonly_mfn,
+                                         unsigned int level,
+                                         unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
 
 /* Functions that atomically write PT/P2M entries and update state */
 int shadow_write_p2m_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn,
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@  struct shadow_paging_mode {
 #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
     mfn_t         (*make_monitor_table    )(struct vcpu *v);
     void          (*destroy_monitor_table )(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t mmfn);
-#endif
     int           (*guess_wrmap           )(struct vcpu *v, 
                                             unsigned long vaddr, mfn_t gmfn);
+#endif
     void          (*pagetable_dying       )(paddr_t gpa);
     void          (*trace_emul_write_val  )(const void *ptr, unsigned long vaddr,
                                             const void *src, unsigned int bytes);