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[73.69.118.222]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id t2sm1811634qkt.95.2019.11.21.10.48.07 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 21 Nov 2019 10:48:08 -0800 (PST) From: Pavel Tatashin To: pasha.tatashin@soleen.com, jmorris@namei.org, sashal@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, steve.capper@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com, james.morse@arm.com, vladimir.murzin@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, tglx@linutronix.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, allison@lohutok.net, info@metux.net, alexios.zavras@intel.com, sstabellini@kernel.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, jgross@suse.com, stefan@agner.ch, yamada.masahiro@socionext.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux@armlinux.org.uk Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 13:48:03 -0500 Message-Id: <20191121184805.414758-2-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.0 In-Reply-To: <20191121184805.414758-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> References: <20191121184805.414758-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 22 Nov 2019 05:17:22 +0000 Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/3] arm/arm64/xen: use C inlines for privcmd_call X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" privcmd_call requires to enable access to userspace for the duration of the hypercall. Currently, this is done via assembly macros. Change it to C inlines instead. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin --- arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 2 +- arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c | 2 +- arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S | 15 ++------------- arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S | 19 ++----------------- include/xen/arm/hypercall.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h index 99929122dad7..8e9262a0f016 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ THUMB( orr \reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT ) .macro uaccess_disable, tmp, isb=1 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN /* - * Whenever we re-enter userspace, the domains should always be + * Whenever we re-enter kernel, the domains should always be * set appropriately. */ mov \tmp, #DACR_UACCESS_DISABLE diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h index 98c6b91be4a8..79d4efa3eb62 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -16,6 +16,23 @@ #include +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN +static __always_inline void uaccess_enable(void) +{ + unsigned long val = DACR_UACCESS_ENABLE; + + asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c3, c0, 0" : : "r" (val)); + isb(); +} + +static __always_inline void uaccess_disable(void) +{ + unsigned long val = DACR_UACCESS_ENABLE; + + asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c3, c0, 0" : : "r" (val)); + isb(); +} + /* * These two functions allow hooking accesses to userspace to increase * system integrity by ensuring that the kernel can not inadvertantly @@ -24,7 +41,6 @@ */ static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void) { -#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN unsigned int old_domain = get_domain(); /* Set the current domain access to permit user accesses */ @@ -32,18 +48,22 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void) domain_val(DOMAIN_USER, DOMAIN_CLIENT)); return old_domain; -#else - return 0; -#endif } static __always_inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags) { -#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN /* Restore the user access mask */ set_domain(flags); -#endif } +#else +static __always_inline void uaccess_enable(void) {} +static __always_inline void uaccess_disable(void) {} +static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void) +{ + return 0; +} +static __always_inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN */ /* * These two are intentionally not defined anywhere - if the kernel diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c index dd6804a64f1a..e87280c6d25d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c +++ b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c @@ -440,4 +440,4 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_platform_op_raw); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_multicall); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_vm_assist); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_dm_op); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(privcmd_call); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_privcmd_call); diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S index b11bba542fac..2f5be0dc6195 100644 --- a/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S +++ b/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S @@ -94,29 +94,18 @@ HYPERCALL2(multicall); HYPERCALL2(vm_assist); HYPERCALL3(dm_op); -ENTRY(privcmd_call) +ENTRY(arch_privcmd_call) stmdb sp!, {r4} mov r12, r0 mov r0, r1 mov r1, r2 mov r2, r3 ldr r3, [sp, #8] - /* - * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. We need to allow the - * kernel to access the userspace memory before issuing the hypercall. - */ - uaccess_enable r4 /* r4 is loaded now as we use it as scratch register before */ ldr r4, [sp, #4] __HVC(XEN_IMM) - /* - * Disable userspace access from kernel. This is fine to do it - * unconditionally as no set_fs(KERNEL_DS) is called before. - */ - uaccess_disable r4 - ldm sp!, {r4} ret lr -ENDPROC(privcmd_call); +ENDPROC(arch_privcmd_call); diff --git a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S index c5f05c4a4d00..921611778d2a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S +++ b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ #include #include -#include #include @@ -86,27 +85,13 @@ HYPERCALL2(multicall); HYPERCALL2(vm_assist); HYPERCALL3(dm_op); -ENTRY(privcmd_call) +ENTRY(arch_privcmd_call) mov x16, x0 mov x0, x1 mov x1, x2 mov x2, x3 mov x3, x4 mov x4, x5 - /* - * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to - * enable access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1 - * translations to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT - * instructions are not affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only - * need the explicit uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN emulation - * is enabled (it implies that hardware UAO and PAN disabled). - */ - uaccess_ttbr0_enable x6, x7, x8 hvc XEN_IMM - - /* - * Disable userspace access from kernel once the hyp call completed. - */ - uaccess_ttbr0_disable x6, x7 ret -ENDPROC(privcmd_call); +ENDPROC(arch_privcmd_call); diff --git a/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h b/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h index b40485e54d80..cfb704fd78c8 100644 --- a/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h +++ b/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h @@ -34,16 +34,33 @@ #define _ASM_ARM_XEN_HYPERCALL_H #include +#include #include #include #include struct xen_dm_op_buf; +long arch_privcmd_call(unsigned int call, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, + unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5); -long privcmd_call(unsigned call, unsigned long a1, - unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, - unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5); +static inline long privcmd_call(unsigned int call, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, + unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5) +{ + long rv; + + /* + * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. We need to allow the + * kernel to access the userspace memory before issuing the hypercall. + */ + uaccess_enable(); + rv = arch_privcmd_call(call, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); + uaccess_disable(); + + return rv; +} int HYPERVISOR_xen_version(int cmd, void *arg); int HYPERVISOR_console_io(int cmd, int count, char *str); int HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op(unsigned int cmd, void *uop, unsigned int count);