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[73.69.118.222]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f97sm17384185qtb.18.2020.01.02.13.14.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 02 Jan 2020 13:14:03 -0800 (PST) From: Pavel Tatashin To: pasha.tatashin@soleen.com, jmorris@namei.org, sashal@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, steve.capper@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, maz@kernel.org, james.morse@arm.com, vladimir.murzin@arm.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, tglx@linutronix.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, allison@lohutok.net, info@metux.net, alexios.zavras@intel.com, sstabellini@kernel.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, jgross@suse.com, stefan@agner.ch, yamada.masahiro@socionext.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux@armlinux.org.uk, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, julien@xen.org Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 16:13:53 -0500 Message-Id: <20200102211357.8042-3-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200102211357.8042-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> References: <20200102211357.8042-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 2/6] arm/arm64/xen: use C inlines for privcmd_call X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" privcmd_call requires to enable access to userspace for the duration of the hypercall. Currently, this is done via assembly macros. Change it to C inlines instead. Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini Reviewed-by: Julien Grall --- arch/arm/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c | 2 +- arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S | 19 ++----------------- include/xen/arm/hypercall.h | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h index c6882bba5284..cac5bd9ef519 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -2,4 +2,10 @@ #define _ASM_ARM_XEN_HYPERCALL_H #include +static inline long privcmd_call(unsigned int call, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, + unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5) +{ + return arch_privcmd_call(call, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); +} #endif /* _ASM_ARM_XEN_HYPERCALL_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c index dd6804a64f1a..e87280c6d25d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c +++ b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c @@ -440,4 +440,4 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_platform_op_raw); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_multicall); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_vm_assist); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(HYPERVISOR_dm_op); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(privcmd_call); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_privcmd_call); diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S index b11bba542fac..277078c7da49 100644 --- a/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S +++ b/arch/arm/xen/hypercall.S @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ HYPERCALL2(multicall); HYPERCALL2(vm_assist); HYPERCALL3(dm_op); -ENTRY(privcmd_call) +ENTRY(arch_privcmd_call) stmdb sp!, {r4} mov r12, r0 mov r0, r1 @@ -119,4 +119,4 @@ ENTRY(privcmd_call) ldm sp!, {r4} ret lr -ENDPROC(privcmd_call); +ENDPROC(arch_privcmd_call); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h index c3198f9ccd2e..1a74fb28607f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -1,5 +1,29 @@ #ifndef _ASM_ARM64_XEN_HYPERCALL_H #define _ASM_ARM64_XEN_HYPERCALL_H #include +#include +static inline long privcmd_call(unsigned int call, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, + unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5) +{ + long rv; + + /* + * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to + * enable access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1 + * translations to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT + * instructions are not affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only + * need the explicit uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN emulation + * is enabled (it implies that hardware UAO and PAN disabled). + */ + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + rv = arch_privcmd_call(call, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); + /* + * Disable userspace access from kernel once the hyp call completed. + */ + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + return rv; +} #endif /* _ASM_ARM64_XEN_HYPERCALL_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S index c5f05c4a4d00..921611778d2a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S +++ b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ #include #include -#include #include @@ -86,27 +85,13 @@ HYPERCALL2(multicall); HYPERCALL2(vm_assist); HYPERCALL3(dm_op); -ENTRY(privcmd_call) +ENTRY(arch_privcmd_call) mov x16, x0 mov x0, x1 mov x1, x2 mov x2, x3 mov x3, x4 mov x4, x5 - /* - * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to - * enable access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1 - * translations to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT - * instructions are not affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only - * need the explicit uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN emulation - * is enabled (it implies that hardware UAO and PAN disabled). - */ - uaccess_ttbr0_enable x6, x7, x8 hvc XEN_IMM - - /* - * Disable userspace access from kernel once the hyp call completed. - */ - uaccess_ttbr0_disable x6, x7 ret -ENDPROC(privcmd_call); +ENDPROC(arch_privcmd_call); diff --git a/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h b/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h index babcc08af965..624c8ad7e42a 100644 --- a/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h +++ b/include/xen/arm/hypercall.h @@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ struct xen_dm_op_buf; -long privcmd_call(unsigned call, unsigned long a1, - unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, - unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5); +long arch_privcmd_call(unsigned int call, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, + unsigned long a4, unsigned long a5); int HYPERVISOR_xen_version(int cmd, void *arg); int HYPERVISOR_console_io(int cmd, int count, char *str); int HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op(unsigned int cmd, void *uop, unsigned int count);