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b=mFNZm90s75AAP+RPh1NlQ7a5VcL64OhwoOzNMmVUjyFIuHY1NtAvsAPEYBefAz9nlcy10WZMKGo4CPBuBqWy5e9FfP5BEnQJ+88HnE8PcPBqRUMkmH1HO2Ij7UJAR7uLLDM+8bLm7vtnEevgMjc0JLUAPGazXvH+NQxObfzV3tWp4kT/YtO5yZnsXIhc0RWPPKyKJSe51c9KdfK1ywTIiPjdPhKfSgEKlxUwi9gYremadqqIek5Onh8DoYZ4wAykE8TOEcPdKMvcwSXuk1Bc5c3xKlKgOujReng+mM6CEFeAgdFWkASHk+ifuOb99/yuZNqYXfohdhQRpOFo6JiWEQ== From: Volodymyr Babchuk To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" CC: Oleksandr Andrushchenko , Jan Beulich , Andrew Cooper , =?iso-8859-1?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=E9?= , Wei Liu , George Dunlap , Julien Grall , Stefano Stabellini , Volodymyr Babchuk Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] vpci: use pcidevs locking to protect MMIO handlers Thread-Topic: [PATCH v2 3/4] vpci: use pcidevs locking to protect MMIO handlers Thread-Index: AQHYmuuJA1lWCBgnj0iqi/IOtvD1PA== Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 21:15:42 +0000 Message-ID: <20220718211521.664729-4-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com> References: <20220718211521.664729-1-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com> In-Reply-To: <20220718211521.664729-1-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 x-ms-publictraffictype: Email x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 34069ad9-9f6e-407a-ac59-08da6902ac53 x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: VI1PR03MB6288:EE_ x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1 x-ms-exchange-antispam-relay: 0 x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0; 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This is not a problem as of now as these are only used by Dom0. But, towards vPCI is used also for guests, we need to properly protect pdev and pdev->vpci from being removed while still in use. For that use pcidevs_read_{un}lock helpers. This patch adds ASSERTs in the code to check that the rwlock is taken and in appropriate mode. Some of such checks require changes to the initialization of local variables which may be accessed before the ASSERT checks the locking. For example see init_bars and mask_write. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk --- Since v1: - move pcidevs_read_{lock|unlock} into patch 1 --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 24 ++++++++++++++--- xen/drivers/vpci/header.c | 24 +++++++++++++++-- xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c | 21 ++++++++++----- xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 16 +++++++++--- xen/include/xen/pci.h | 1 + xen/include/xen/vpci.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c index c1ede676d0..3f250f81a4 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c @@ -891,10 +891,16 @@ void vpci_msix_arch_init_entry(struct vpci_msix_entry *entry) entry->arch.pirq = INVALID_PIRQ; } -int vpci_msix_arch_print(const struct vpci_msix *msix) +int vpci_msix_arch_print(const struct domain *d, const struct vpci_msix *msix) { unsigned int i; + /* + * FIXME: this is not immediately correct, as the lock can be grabbed + * by a different CPU. But this is better then nothing. + */ + ASSERT(pcidevs_read_locked()); + for ( i = 0; i < msix->max_entries; i++ ) { const struct vpci_msix_entry *entry = &msix->entries[i]; @@ -911,11 +917,23 @@ int vpci_msix_arch_print(const struct vpci_msix *msix) if ( i && !(i % 64) ) { struct pci_dev *pdev = msix->pdev; + pci_sbdf_t sbdf = pdev->sbdf; spin_unlock(&msix->pdev->vpci->lock); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); + + /* NB: we still hold rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock); here. */ process_pending_softirqs(); - /* NB: we assume that pdev cannot go away for an alive domain. */ - if ( !pdev->vpci || !spin_trylock(&pdev->vpci->lock) ) + + if ( !pcidevs_read_trylock() ) + return -EBUSY; + pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn); + /* + * FIXME: we may find a re-allocated pdev's copy here. + * Even occupying the same address as before. Do our best. + */ + if ( !pdev || (pdev != msix->pdev) || !pdev->vpci || + !spin_trylock(&pdev->vpci->lock) ) return -EBUSY; if ( pdev->vpci->msix != msix ) { diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c index a1c928a0d2..e0461b1139 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c @@ -142,16 +142,19 @@ bool vpci_process_pending(struct vcpu *v) if ( rc == -ERESTART ) return true; + pcidevs_read_lock(); spin_lock(&v->vpci.pdev->vpci->lock); /* Disable memory decoding unconditionally on failure. */ modify_decoding(v->vpci.pdev, rc ? v->vpci.cmd & ~PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY : v->vpci.cmd, !rc && v->vpci.rom_only); spin_unlock(&v->vpci.pdev->vpci->lock); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); rangeset_destroy(v->vpci.mem); v->vpci.mem = NULL; if ( rc ) + { /* * FIXME: in case of failure remove the device from the domain. * Note that there might still be leftover mappings. While this is @@ -159,7 +162,10 @@ bool vpci_process_pending(struct vcpu *v) * killed in order to avoid leaking stale p2m mappings on * failure. */ + pcidevs_write_lock(); vpci_remove_device(v->vpci.pdev); + pcidevs_write_unlock(); + } } return false; @@ -172,7 +178,16 @@ static int __init apply_map(struct domain *d, const struct pci_dev *pdev, int rc; while ( (rc = rangeset_consume_ranges(mem, map_range, &data)) == -ERESTART ) + { + /* + * It's safe to drop and re-acquire the lock in this context + * without risking pdev disappearing because devices cannot be + * removed until the initial domain has been started. + */ + pcidevs_write_unlock(); process_pending_softirqs(); + pcidevs_write_lock(); + } rangeset_destroy(mem); if ( !rc ) modify_decoding(pdev, cmd, false); @@ -450,10 +465,15 @@ static int cf_check init_bars(struct pci_dev *pdev) uint16_t cmd; uint64_t addr, size; unsigned int i, num_bars, rom_reg; - struct vpci_header *header = &pdev->vpci->header; - struct vpci_bar *bars = header->bars; + struct vpci_header *header; + struct vpci_bar *bars; int rc; + ASSERT(pcidevs_write_locked()); + + header = &pdev->vpci->header; + bars = header->bars; + switch ( pci_conf_read8(pdev->sbdf, PCI_HEADER_TYPE) & 0x7f ) { case PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL: diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c index 8f2b59e61a..d864f740cf 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c @@ -184,12 +184,17 @@ static void cf_check mask_write( static int cf_check init_msi(struct pci_dev *pdev) { - uint8_t slot = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn); - unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->seg, pdev->bus, slot, func, - PCI_CAP_ID_MSI); + uint8_t slot, func; + unsigned int pos; uint16_t control; int ret; + ASSERT(pcidevs_write_locked()); + + slot = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn); + func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn); + pos = pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->seg, pdev->bus, slot, func, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI); + if ( !pos ) return 0; @@ -277,6 +282,9 @@ void vpci_dump_msi(void) printk("vPCI MSI/MSI-X d%d\n", d->domain_id); + if ( !pcidevs_read_trylock() ) + continue; + for_each_pdev ( d, pdev ) { const struct vpci_msi *msi; @@ -310,7 +318,7 @@ void vpci_dump_msi(void) printk(" entries: %u maskall: %d enabled: %d\n", msix->max_entries, msix->masked, msix->enabled); - rc = vpci_msix_arch_print(msix); + rc = vpci_msix_arch_print(d, msix); if ( rc ) { /* @@ -318,12 +326,13 @@ void vpci_dump_msi(void) * holding the lock. */ printk("unable to print all MSI-X entries: %d\n", rc); - process_pending_softirqs(); - continue; + goto pdev_done; } } spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock); + pdev_done: + pcidevs_read_unlock(); process_pending_softirqs(); } } diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c index bea0cc7aed..35cc9280f4 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c @@ -144,9 +144,13 @@ static struct vpci_msix *msix_find(const struct domain *d, unsigned long addr) list_for_each_entry ( msix, &d->arch.hvm.msix_tables, next ) { - const struct vpci_bar *bars = msix->pdev->vpci->header.bars; + const struct vpci_bar *bars; unsigned int i; + if ( !msix->pdev->vpci ) + continue; + + bars = msix->pdev->vpci->header.bars; for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msix->tables); i++ ) if ( bars[msix->tables[i] & PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK].enabled && VMSIX_ADDR_IN_RANGE(addr, msix->pdev->vpci, i) ) @@ -158,7 +162,13 @@ static struct vpci_msix *msix_find(const struct domain *d, unsigned long addr) static int cf_check msix_accept(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr) { - return !!msix_find(v->domain, addr); + int rc; + + pcidevs_read_lock(); + rc = !!msix_find(v->domain, addr); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); + + return rc; } static bool access_allowed(const struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned long addr, @@ -218,17 +228,26 @@ static int cf_check msix_read( struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, unsigned int len, unsigned long *data) { const struct domain *d = v->domain; - struct vpci_msix *msix = msix_find(d, addr); + struct vpci_msix *msix; const struct vpci_msix_entry *entry; unsigned int offset; *data = ~0ul; + pcidevs_read_lock(); + + msix = msix_find(d, addr); if ( !msix ) + { + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_RETRY; + } if ( !access_allowed(msix->pdev, addr, len) ) + { + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_OKAY; + } if ( VMSIX_ADDR_IN_RANGE(addr, msix->pdev->vpci, VPCI_MSIX_PBA) ) { @@ -299,6 +318,7 @@ static int cf_check msix_read( break; } spin_unlock(&msix->pdev->vpci->lock); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_OKAY; } @@ -307,15 +327,24 @@ static int cf_check msix_write( struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, unsigned int len, unsigned long data) { const struct domain *d = v->domain; - struct vpci_msix *msix = msix_find(d, addr); + struct vpci_msix *msix; struct vpci_msix_entry *entry; unsigned int offset; + pcidevs_read_lock(); + + msix = msix_find(d, addr); if ( !msix ) + { + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_RETRY; + } if ( !access_allowed(msix->pdev, addr, len) ) + { + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_OKAY; + } if ( VMSIX_ADDR_IN_RANGE(addr, msix->pdev->vpci, VPCI_MSIX_PBA) ) { @@ -351,6 +380,7 @@ static int cf_check msix_write( break; } + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_OKAY; } @@ -428,6 +458,7 @@ static int cf_check msix_write( break; } spin_unlock(&msix->pdev->vpci->lock); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return X86EMUL_OKAY; } @@ -440,9 +471,13 @@ static const struct hvm_mmio_ops vpci_msix_table_ops = { int vpci_make_msix_hole(const struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct domain *d = pdev->domain; + struct domain *d; unsigned int i; + ASSERT(pcidevs_read_locked()); + + d = pdev->domain; + if ( !pdev->vpci->msix ) return 0; @@ -487,13 +522,19 @@ int vpci_make_msix_hole(const struct pci_dev *pdev) static int cf_check init_msix(struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct domain *d = pdev->domain; - uint8_t slot = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn); + struct domain *d; + uint8_t slot, func; unsigned int msix_offset, i, max_entries; uint16_t control; struct vpci_msix *msix; int rc; + ASSERT(pcidevs_write_locked()); + + d = pdev->domain; + slot = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn); + func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn); + msix_offset = pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->seg, pdev->bus, slot, func, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX); if ( !msix_offset ) diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c index c7a40a2f41..1559763479 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c @@ -37,7 +37,9 @@ extern vpci_register_init_t *const __end_vpci_array[]; void vpci_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) { - if ( !has_vpci(pdev->domain) ) + ASSERT(pcidevs_write_locked()); + + if ( !has_vpci(pdev->domain) || !pdev->vpci ) return; spin_lock(&pdev->vpci->lock); @@ -332,10 +334,14 @@ uint32_t vpci_read(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size) return data; } + pcidevs_read_lock(); /* Find the PCI dev matching the address. */ pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn); - if ( !pdev ) + if ( !pdev || (pdev && !pdev->vpci) ) + { + pcidevs_read_unlock(); return vpci_read_hw(sbdf, reg, size); + } spin_lock(&pdev->vpci->lock); @@ -381,6 +387,7 @@ uint32_t vpci_read(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size) ASSERT(data_offset < size); } spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); if ( data_offset < size ) { @@ -443,9 +450,11 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size, * Find the PCI dev matching the address. * Passthrough everything that's not trapped. */ + pcidevs_read_lock(); pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, sbdf.seg, sbdf.bus, sbdf.devfn); - if ( !pdev ) + if ( !pdev || (pdev && !pdev->vpci) ) { + pcidevs_read_unlock(); vpci_write_hw(sbdf, reg, size, data); return; } @@ -486,6 +495,7 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size, ASSERT(data_offset < size); } spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock); + pcidevs_read_unlock(); if ( data_offset < size ) /* Tailing gap, write the remaining. */ diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h index 052b2ddf9f..c974ebdc94 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ void pcidevs_unlock(void); bool __must_check pcidevs_locked(void); void pcidevs_read_lock(void); +int pcidevs_read_trylock(void); void pcidevs_read_unlock(void); bool __must_check pcidevs_read_locked(void); diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h index 67c9a0c631..7ab39839ff 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int __must_check vpci_msix_arch_enable_entry(struct vpci_msix_entry *entry, int __must_check vpci_msix_arch_disable_entry(struct vpci_msix_entry *entry, const struct pci_dev *pdev); void vpci_msix_arch_init_entry(struct vpci_msix_entry *entry); -int vpci_msix_arch_print(const struct vpci_msix *msix); +int vpci_msix_arch_print(const struct domain *d, const struct vpci_msix *msix); /* * Helper functions to fetch MSIX related data. They are used by both the