diff mbox series

[5.15,412/530] x86/entry: Work around Clang __bdos() bug

Message ID 20221024113103.742966550@linuxfoundation.org (mailing list archive)
State Accepted
Commit 3e1730842f142add55dc658929221521a9ea62b6
Headers show
Series None | expand

Commit Message

Greg Kroah-Hartman Oct. 24, 2022, 11:32 a.m. UTC 
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 3e1730842f142add55dc658929221521a9ea62b6 ]

Clang produces a false positive when building with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
and CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y when operating on an array with a dynamic
offset. Work around this by using a direct assignment of an empty
instance. Avoids this warning:

../include/linux/fortify-string.h:309:4: warning: call to __write_overflow_field declared with 'warn
ing' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Wat
tribute-warning]
                        __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
                        ^

which was isolated to the memset() call in xen_load_idt().

Note that this looks very much like another bug that was worked around:
https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1592

Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/41527d69-e8ab-3f86-ff37-6b298c01d5bc@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 133ef31639df..561aad13412f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -759,6 +759,7 @@  static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
 {
 	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
 	static struct trap_info traps[257];
+	static const struct trap_info zero = { };
 	unsigned out;
 
 	trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc);
@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@  static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
 	memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc));
 
 	out = xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps, false);
-	memset(&traps[out], 0, sizeof(traps[0]));
+	traps[out] = zero;
 
 	xen_mc_flush();
 	if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps))