@@ -580,9 +580,10 @@ static bool __init check_smt_enabled(void)
}
/* Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. */
-static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
+static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
{
unsigned int ucode_rev = this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev;
+ bool safe = false;
if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) )
return true;
@@ -620,29 +621,31 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
case 0x3f: /* Haswell EX/EP */
case 0x45: /* Haswell D */
case 0x46: /* Haswell H */
- return true;
+ safe = true;
+ break;
/*
* Broadwell processors are retpoline-safe after specific microcode
* versions.
*/
case 0x3d: /* Broadwell */
- return ucode_rev >= 0x2a;
+ safe = ucode_rev >= 0x2a; break;
case 0x47: /* Broadwell H */
- return ucode_rev >= 0x1d;
+ safe = ucode_rev >= 0x1d; break;
case 0x4f: /* Broadwell EP/EX */
- return ucode_rev >= 0xb000021;
+ safe = ucode_rev >= 0xb000021; break;
case 0x56: /* Broadwell D */
switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_mask )
{
- case 2: return ucode_rev >= 0x15;
- case 3: return ucode_rev >= 0x7000012;
- case 4: return ucode_rev >= 0xf000011;
- case 5: return ucode_rev >= 0xe000009;
+ case 2: safe = ucode_rev >= 0x15; break;
+ case 3: safe = ucode_rev >= 0x7000012; break;
+ case 4: safe = ucode_rev >= 0xf000011; break;
+ case 5: safe = ucode_rev >= 0xe000009; break;
default:
printk("Unrecognised CPU stepping %#x - assuming not reptpoline safe\n",
boot_cpu_data.x86_mask);
- return false;
+ safe = false;
+ break;
}
break;
@@ -656,7 +659,8 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
case 0x67: /* Cannonlake? */
case 0x8e: /* Kabylake M */
case 0x9e: /* Kabylake D */
- return false;
+ safe = false;
+ break;
/*
* Atom processors before Goldmont Plus/Gemini Lake are retpoline-safe.
@@ -675,13 +679,17 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
case 0x5c: /* Goldmont */
case 0x5f: /* Denverton */
case 0x85: /* Knights Mill */
- return true;
+ safe = true;
+ break;
default:
printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming not reptpoline safe\n",
boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
- return false;
+ safe = false;
+ break;
}
+
+ return safe;
}
/*
@@ -1114,7 +1122,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
{
enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
bool has_spec_ctrl, ibrs = false, hw_smt_enabled;
- bool cpu_has_bug_taa;
+ bool cpu_has_bug_taa, retpoline_safe;
hw_smt_enabled = check_smt_enabled();
@@ -1140,6 +1148,9 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
thunk = THUNK_JMP;
}
+ /* Determine if retpoline is safe on this CPU. */
+ retpoline_safe = retpoline_calculations();
+
/*
* Has the user specified any custom BTI mitigations? If so, follow their
* instructions exactly and disable all heuristics.
@@ -1161,7 +1172,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
* On all hardware, we'd like to use retpoline in preference to
* IBRS, but only if it is safe on this hardware.
*/
- if ( retpoline_safe() )
+ if ( retpoline_safe )
thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE;
else if ( has_spec_ctrl )
ibrs = true;
This is prep work, split out to simply the diff on the following change. * Rename to retpoline_calculations(), and call unconditionally. It is shortly going to synthesise missing enumerations required for guest safety. * For the model check switch statement, store the result in a variable and break rather than returning directly. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org> v2: * Extend the 'safe' variable to the entire switch statement. --- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)