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b=o6eaGIYaRBzqMURQipCCq1FWuqmy8xx4McVRNSbC2kteHiDmB/Dm+BvL7b3HtxIzPo7zPY9X9HzFXtC0a/5DuMmocvY+gDShjrpl+txgw6oKGHKYr2NB99KASmynFSyca4GfLszs+PF1I/RotbpV6Hpa1eExcb9tmpmJwHLvXumNlCn5kqQx6ag/12vfdKDIqS1UvVkzpdDcgTOm0+Yw5MBIQg2WE0wwzjalPC7u5zssQg/BvzzgN9bdzHB+nlnW22o6YfFtydSAb0tLy3J2Fju4OL0zHM0yCvc6oLYfA0maAQ1pal2AZprh46TmlRsKWdVEHN3X8DwKB5XM8uTWig== From: Volodymyr Babchuk To: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" CC: Stewart Hildebrand , Oleksandr Andrushchenko , =?iso-8859-1?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=E9?= Subject: [PATCH v9 08/16] vpci/header: handle p2m range sets per BAR Thread-Topic: [PATCH v9 08/16] vpci/header: handle p2m range sets per BAR Thread-Index: AQHZ2s9Ln5ZnmFXk3EWGqNE8Hf9gXg== Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2023 23:19:44 +0000 Message-ID: <20230829231912.4091958-9-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com> References: <20230829231912.4091958-1-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com> In-Reply-To: <20230829231912.4091958-1-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0 x-ms-publictraffictype: Email x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: VI1PR03MB3710:EE_|AM7PR03MB6371:EE_ x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: c1561186-e07b-4bac-dade-08dba8e66ecf x-ld-processed: b41b72d0-4e9f-4c26-8a69-f949f367c91d,ExtAddr x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1 x-ms-exchange-antispam-relay: 0 x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0; 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As the range sets are now created when a PCI device is added and destroyed when it is removed so make them named and accounted. Note that rangesets were chosen here despite there being only up to 3 separate ranges in each set (typically just 1). But rangeset per BAR was chosen for the ease of implementation and existing code re-usability. This is in preparation of making non-identity mappings in p2m for the MMIOs. Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko --- Since v9: - removed d->vpci.map_pending in favor of checking v->vpci.pdev != NULL - printk -> gprintk - renamed bar variable to fix shadowing - fixed bug with iterating on remote device's BARs - relaxed lock in vpci_process_pending - removed stale comment Since v6: - update according to the new locking scheme - remove odd fail label in modify_bars Since v5: - fix comments - move rangeset allocation to init_bars and only allocate for MAPPABLE BARs - check for overlap with the already setup BAR ranges Since v4: - use named range sets for BARs (Jan) - changes required by the new locking scheme - updated commit message (Jan) Since v3: - re-work vpci_cancel_pending accordingly to the per-BAR handling - s/num_mem_ranges/map_pending and s/uint8_t/bool - ASSERT(bar->mem) in modify_bars - create and destroy the rangesets on add/remove --- xen/drivers/vpci/header.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c | 6 + xen/include/xen/vpci.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c index e96d7b2b37..3cc6a96849 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/header.c @@ -161,63 +161,101 @@ static void modify_decoding(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint16_t cmd, bool vpci_process_pending(struct vcpu *v) { - if ( v->vpci.mem ) + struct pci_dev *pdev = v->vpci.pdev; + struct map_data data = { + .d = v->domain, + .map = v->vpci.cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY, + }; + struct vpci_header *header = NULL; + unsigned int i; + + if ( !pdev ) + return false; + + read_lock(&v->domain->pci_lock); + header = &pdev->vpci->header; + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(header->bars); i++ ) { - struct map_data data = { - .d = v->domain, - .map = v->vpci.cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY, - }; - int rc = rangeset_consume_ranges(v->vpci.mem, map_range, &data); + struct vpci_bar *bar = &header->bars[i]; + int rc; + + if ( rangeset_is_empty(bar->mem) ) + continue; + + rc = rangeset_consume_ranges(bar->mem, map_range, &data); if ( rc == -ERESTART ) + { + read_unlock(&v->domain->pci_lock); return true; + } - write_lock(&v->domain->pci_lock); - spin_lock(&v->vpci.pdev->vpci->lock); - /* Disable memory decoding unconditionally on failure. */ - modify_decoding(v->vpci.pdev, - rc ? v->vpci.cmd & ~PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY : v->vpci.cmd, - !rc && v->vpci.rom_only); - spin_unlock(&v->vpci.pdev->vpci->lock); - - rangeset_destroy(v->vpci.mem); - v->vpci.mem = NULL; if ( rc ) - /* - * FIXME: in case of failure remove the device from the domain. - * Note that there might still be leftover mappings. While this is - * safe for Dom0, for DomUs the domain will likely need to be - * killed in order to avoid leaking stale p2m mappings on - * failure. - */ - vpci_deassign_device(v->vpci.pdev); - write_unlock(&v->domain->pci_lock); + { + spin_lock(&pdev->vpci->lock); + /* Disable memory decoding unconditionally on failure. */ + modify_decoding(pdev, v->vpci.cmd & ~PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY, + false); + spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock); + + v->vpci.pdev = NULL; + + read_unlock(&v->domain->pci_lock); + + if ( is_hardware_domain(v->domain) ) + { + write_lock(&v->domain->pci_lock); + vpci_deassign_device(v->vpci.pdev); + write_unlock(&v->domain->pci_lock); + } + else + { + domain_crash(v->domain); + } + return false; + } } + read_unlock(&v->domain->pci_lock); + + v->vpci.pdev = NULL; + + spin_lock(&pdev->vpci->lock); + modify_decoding(pdev, v->vpci.cmd, v->vpci.rom_only); + spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock); return false; } static int __init apply_map(struct domain *d, const struct pci_dev *pdev, - struct rangeset *mem, uint16_t cmd) + uint16_t cmd) { struct map_data data = { .d = d, .map = true }; - int rc; + struct vpci_header *header = &pdev->vpci->header; + int rc = 0; + unsigned int i; ASSERT(rw_is_locked(&d->pci_lock)); - while ( (rc = rangeset_consume_ranges(mem, map_range, &data)) == -ERESTART ) + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(header->bars); i++ ) { - /* - * It's safe to drop and reacquire the lock in this context - * without risking pdev disappearing because devices cannot be - * removed until the initial domain has been started. - */ - read_unlock(&d->pci_lock); - process_pending_softirqs(); - read_lock(&d->pci_lock); - } + struct vpci_bar *bar = &header->bars[i]; - rangeset_destroy(mem); + if ( rangeset_is_empty(bar->mem) ) + continue; + + while ( (rc = rangeset_consume_ranges(bar->mem, map_range, + &data)) == -ERESTART ) + { + /* + * It's safe to drop and reacquire the lock in this context + * without risking pdev disappearing because devices cannot be + * removed until the initial domain has been started. + */ + write_unlock(&d->pci_lock); + process_pending_softirqs(); + write_lock(&d->pci_lock); + } + } if ( !rc ) modify_decoding(pdev, cmd, false); @@ -225,10 +263,12 @@ static int __init apply_map(struct domain *d, const struct pci_dev *pdev, } static void defer_map(struct domain *d, struct pci_dev *pdev, - struct rangeset *mem, uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) + uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) { struct vcpu *curr = current; + ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&pdev->domain->pci_lock)); + /* * FIXME: when deferring the {un}map the state of the device should not * be trusted. For example the enable bit is toggled after the device @@ -236,7 +276,6 @@ static void defer_map(struct domain *d, struct pci_dev *pdev, * started for the same device if the domain is not well-behaved. */ curr->vpci.pdev = pdev; - curr->vpci.mem = mem; curr->vpci.cmd = cmd; curr->vpci.rom_only = rom_only; /* @@ -250,33 +289,33 @@ static void defer_map(struct domain *d, struct pci_dev *pdev, static int modify_bars(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) { struct vpci_header *header = &pdev->vpci->header; - struct rangeset *mem = rangeset_new(NULL, NULL, 0); struct pci_dev *tmp, *dev = NULL; const struct domain *d; const struct vpci_msix *msix = pdev->vpci->msix; - unsigned int i; + unsigned int i, j; int rc; ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&pdev->domain->pci_lock)); - if ( !mem ) - return -ENOMEM; - /* - * Create a rangeset that represents the current device BARs memory region - * and compare it against all the currently active BAR memory regions. If - * an overlap is found, subtract it from the region to be mapped/unmapped. + * Create a rangeset per BAR that represents the current device memory + * region and compare it against all the currently active BAR memory + * regions. If an overlap is found, subtract it from the region to be + * mapped/unmapped. * - * First fill the rangeset with all the BARs of this device or with the ROM + * First fill the rangesets with the BAR of this device or with the ROM * BAR only, depending on whether the guest is toggling the memory decode * bit of the command register, or the enable bit of the ROM BAR register. */ for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(header->bars); i++ ) { - const struct vpci_bar *bar = &header->bars[i]; + struct vpci_bar *bar = &header->bars[i]; unsigned long start = PFN_DOWN(bar->addr); unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(bar->addr + bar->size - 1); + if ( !bar->mem ) + continue; + if ( !MAPPABLE_BAR(bar) || (rom_only ? bar->type != VPCI_BAR_ROM : (bar->type == VPCI_BAR_ROM && !header->rom_enabled)) || @@ -292,14 +331,31 @@ static int modify_bars(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) continue; } - rc = rangeset_add_range(mem, start, end); + rc = rangeset_add_range(bar->mem, start, end); if ( rc ) { printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "Failed to add [%lx, %lx]: %d\n", start, end, rc); - rangeset_destroy(mem); return rc; } + + /* Check for overlap with the already setup BAR ranges. */ + for ( j = 0; j < i; j++ ) + { + struct vpci_bar *prev_bar = &header->bars[j]; + + if ( rangeset_is_empty(prev_bar->mem) ) + continue; + + rc = rangeset_remove_range(prev_bar->mem, start, end); + if ( rc ) + { + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, + "%pp: failed to remove overlapping range [%lx, %lx]: %d\n", + &pdev->sbdf, start, end, rc); + return rc; + } + } } /* Remove any MSIX regions if present. */ @@ -309,14 +365,21 @@ static int modify_bars(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(vmsix_table_addr(pdev->vpci, i) + vmsix_table_size(pdev->vpci, i) - 1); - rc = rangeset_remove_range(mem, start, end); - if ( rc ) + for ( j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(header->bars); j++ ) { - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING - "Failed to remove MSIX table [%lx, %lx]: %d\n", - start, end, rc); - rangeset_destroy(mem); - return rc; + const struct vpci_bar *bar = &header->bars[j]; + + if ( rangeset_is_empty(bar->mem) ) + continue; + + rc = rangeset_remove_range(bar->mem, start, end); + if ( rc ) + { + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, + "%pp: failed to remove MSIX table [%lx, %lx]: %d\n", + &pdev->sbdf, start, end, rc); + return rc; + } } } @@ -356,27 +419,34 @@ static int modify_bars(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tmp->vpci->header.bars); i++ ) { - const struct vpci_bar *bar = &tmp->vpci->header.bars[i]; - unsigned long start = PFN_DOWN(bar->addr); - unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(bar->addr + bar->size - 1); - - if ( !bar->enabled || - !rangeset_overlaps_range(mem, start, end) || - /* - * If only the ROM enable bit is toggled check against - * other BARs in the same device for overlaps, but not - * against the same ROM BAR. - */ - (rom_only && tmp == pdev && bar->type == VPCI_BAR_ROM) ) + const struct vpci_bar *remote_bar = &tmp->vpci->header.bars[i]; + unsigned long start = PFN_DOWN(remote_bar->addr); + unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(remote_bar->addr + + remote_bar->size - 1); + + if ( !remote_bar->enabled ) continue; - rc = rangeset_remove_range(mem, start, end); - if ( rc ) + for ( j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(header->bars); j++) { - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "Failed to remove [%lx, %lx]: %d\n", - start, end, rc); - rangeset_destroy(mem); - return rc; + const struct vpci_bar *bar = &header->bars[j]; + if ( !rangeset_overlaps_range(bar->mem, start, end) || + /* + * If only the ROM enable bit is toggled check against + * other BARs in the same device for overlaps, but not + * against the same ROM BAR. + */ + (rom_only && tmp == pdev && bar->type == VPCI_BAR_ROM) ) + continue; + + rc = rangeset_remove_range(bar->mem, start, end); + if ( rc ) + { + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, + "%pp: failed to remove [%lx, %lx]: %d\n", + &pdev->sbdf, start, end, rc); + return rc; + } } } } @@ -400,10 +470,10 @@ static int modify_bars(const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint16_t cmd, bool rom_only) * will always be to establish mappings and process all the BARs. */ ASSERT((cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY) && !rom_only); - return apply_map(pdev->domain, pdev, mem, cmd); + return apply_map(pdev->domain, pdev, cmd); } - defer_map(dev->domain, dev, mem, cmd, rom_only); + defer_map(dev->domain, dev, cmd, rom_only); return 0; } @@ -595,6 +665,20 @@ static void cf_check rom_write( rom->addr = val & PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_MASK; } +static int bar_add_rangeset(const struct pci_dev *pdev, struct vpci_bar *bar, + unsigned int i) +{ + char str[32]; + + snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%pp:BAR%d", &pdev->sbdf, i); + + bar->mem = rangeset_new(pdev->domain, str, RANGESETF_no_print); + if ( !bar->mem ) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} + static int cf_check init_bars(struct pci_dev *pdev) { uint16_t cmd; @@ -675,6 +759,10 @@ static int cf_check init_bars(struct pci_dev *pdev) else bars[i].type = VPCI_BAR_MEM32; + rc = bar_add_rangeset(pdev, &bars[i], i); + if ( rc ) + return rc; + rc = pci_size_mem_bar(pdev->sbdf, reg, &addr, &size, (i == num_bars - 1) ? PCI_BAR_LAST : 0); if ( rc < 0 ) @@ -725,6 +813,12 @@ static int cf_check init_bars(struct pci_dev *pdev) rom_reg, 4, rom); if ( rc ) rom->type = VPCI_BAR_EMPTY; + else + { + rc = bar_add_rangeset(pdev, rom, i); + if ( rc ) + return rc; + } } } else diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c index 135d390218..412685f41d 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c +++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/vpci.c @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ extern vpci_register_init_t *const __end_vpci_array[]; void vpci_deassign_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) { + unsigned int i; + ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&pdev->domain->pci_lock)); if ( !has_vpci(pdev->domain) || !pdev->vpci ) @@ -63,6 +65,10 @@ void vpci_deassign_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) if ( pdev->vpci->msix->table[i] ) iounmap(pdev->vpci->msix->table[i]); } + + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pdev->vpci->header.bars); i++ ) + rangeset_destroy(pdev->vpci->header.bars[i].mem); + xfree(pdev->vpci->msix); xfree(pdev->vpci->msi); xfree(pdev->vpci); diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h index 89f1e27f4f..d77a6f9506 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/vpci.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/vpci.h @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ struct vpci { /* Guest address. */ uint64_t guest_addr; uint64_t size; + struct rangeset *mem; enum { VPCI_BAR_EMPTY, VPCI_BAR_IO, @@ -156,7 +157,6 @@ struct vpci { struct vpci_vcpu { /* Per-vcpu structure to store state while {un}mapping of PCI BARs. */ - struct rangeset *mem; struct pci_dev *pdev; uint16_t cmd; bool rom_only : 1;