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d="scan'208";a="126012812" From: Andrew Cooper To: Xen-devel CC: Andrew Cooper , Jan Beulich , Jan Beulich , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= , Wei Liu , Alejandro Vallejo , "Stefano Stabellini" , Xenia Ragiadakou Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/ucode: Move vendor specifics back out of early_microcode_init() Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 21:55:38 +0100 Message-ID: <20231026205539.3261811-2-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20231026205539.3261811-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> References: <20231026205539.3261811-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 I know it was me who dropped microcode_init_{intel,amd}() in c/s dd5f07997f29 ("x86/ucode: Rationalise startup and family/model checks"), but times have moved on. We've gained new conditional support, and a wish to compile-time specialise Xen to single platform. (Re)introduce ucode_probe_{amd,intel}() and move the recent vendor specific additions back out. Encode the conditional support state in the NULL-ness of hooks as it's already done on other paths. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Roger Pau Monné CC: Wei Liu CC: Alejandro Vallejo CC: Stefano Stabellini CC: Xenia Ragiadakou v2: * Undo unintentinal operand inversion in early_microcode_init() --- xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c | 10 +++++++++- xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/core.c | 16 +++++----------- xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 12 ++++++++++-- xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/private.h | 16 ++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c index 75fc84e445ce..17e68697d5bf 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/amd.c @@ -434,9 +434,17 @@ static struct microcode_patch *cf_check cpu_request_microcode( return patch; } -const struct microcode_ops __initconst_cf_clobber amd_ucode_ops = { +static const struct microcode_ops __initconst_cf_clobber amd_ucode_ops = { .cpu_request_microcode = cpu_request_microcode, .collect_cpu_info = collect_cpu_info, .apply_microcode = apply_microcode, .compare_patch = compare_patch, }; + +void __init ucode_probe_amd(struct microcode_ops *ops) +{ + if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x10 ) + return; + + *ops = amd_ucode_ops; +} diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/core.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/core.c index 65ebeb50deea..3fd1f516e042 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -847,25 +847,19 @@ int __init early_microcode_init(unsigned long *module_map, { const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data; int rc = 0; - bool can_load = false; switch ( c->x86_vendor ) { case X86_VENDOR_AMD: - if ( c->x86 >= 0x10 ) - { - ucode_ops = amd_ucode_ops; - can_load = true; - } + ucode_probe_amd(&ucode_ops); break; case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: - ucode_ops = intel_ucode_ops; - can_load = intel_can_load_microcode(); + ucode_probe_intel(&ucode_ops); break; } - if ( !ucode_ops.apply_microcode ) + if ( !ucode_ops.collect_cpu_info ) { printk(XENLOG_INFO "Microcode loading not available\n"); return -ENODEV; @@ -882,10 +876,10 @@ int __init early_microcode_init(unsigned long *module_map, * * Take the hint in either case and ignore the microcode interface. */ - if ( this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev == ~0 || !can_load ) + if ( !ucode_ops.apply_microcode || this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev == ~0 ) { printk(XENLOG_INFO "Microcode loading disabled due to: %s\n", - can_load ? "rev = ~0" : "HW toggle"); + ucode_ops.apply_microcode ? "rev = ~0" : "HW toggle"); ucode_ops.apply_microcode = NULL; return -ENODEV; } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/intel.c index 060c529a6e5d..96f34b336b21 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static struct microcode_patch *cf_check cpu_request_microcode( return patch; } -bool __init intel_can_load_microcode(void) +static bool __init can_load_microcode(void) { uint64_t mcu_ctrl; @@ -398,9 +398,17 @@ bool __init intel_can_load_microcode(void) return !(mcu_ctrl & MCU_CONTROL_DIS_MCU_LOAD); } -const struct microcode_ops __initconst_cf_clobber intel_ucode_ops = { +static const struct microcode_ops __initconst_cf_clobber intel_ucode_ops = { .cpu_request_microcode = cpu_request_microcode, .collect_cpu_info = collect_cpu_info, .apply_microcode = apply_microcode, .compare_patch = compare_patch, }; + +void __init ucode_probe_intel(struct microcode_ops *ops) +{ + *ops = intel_ucode_ops; + + if ( !can_load_microcode() ) + ops->apply_microcode = NULL; +} diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/private.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/private.h index d80787205a5e..b58611e908aa 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/private.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/microcode/private.h @@ -60,13 +60,17 @@ struct microcode_ops { const struct microcode_patch *new, const struct microcode_patch *old); }; -/** - * Checks whether we can perform microcode updates on this Intel system +/* + * Microcode loading falls into one of 3 states. + * - No support at all + * - Read-only (locked by firmware, or we're virtualised) + * - Loading available * - * @return True iff the microcode update facilities are enabled + * These are encoded by (not) filling in ops->collect_cpu_info (i.e. no + * support available) and (not) ops->apply_microcode (i.e. read only). + * Otherwise, all hooks must be filled in. */ -bool intel_can_load_microcode(void); - -extern const struct microcode_ops amd_ucode_ops, intel_ucode_ops; +void ucode_probe_amd(struct microcode_ops *ops); +void ucode_probe_intel(struct microcode_ops *ops); #endif /* ASM_X86_MICROCODE_PRIVATE_H */