| Message ID | 2157e10d63619d43151fe8b8ca913b44c54aba6e.1592176600.git.gorbak25@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | hw/xen_pt: Don't grant opregion permissions | expand |
Hi Grzegorz, On 6/15/20 1:21 AM, Grzegorz Uriasz wrote: > With the upstreaming of linux based stubdomains to xen, qemu can't > assume it runs inside dom0 - permission assignment must be moved to > libxl running in dom0. This xen patch: > https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2020-06/msg00973.html > implements granting the required permissions to the stubdomain running > qemu. This patch removes granting opregion permissions in qemu - this > should be fine as when qemu is running inside dom0 the memory mapping will > be successfully created without first explicitly granting the permission. > > Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Uriasz <gorbak25@gmail.com> > --- > hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c | 13 ------------- > 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c > index 7d46e9c209..303674365b 100644 > --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c > +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c > @@ -283,19 +283,6 @@ void igd_write_opregion(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, uint32_t val) > igd_guest_opregion = (unsigned long)(val & ~XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_MASK) > | (igd_host_opregion & XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_MASK); > > - ret = xc_domain_iomem_permission(xen_xc, xen_domid, > - (unsigned long)(igd_host_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT), > - XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_PAGES, > - XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_ENABLE_ACCESSED); > - > - if (ret) { > - XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "[%d]:Can't enable to access IGD host opregion:" > - " 0x%lx.\n", ret, > - (unsigned long)(igd_host_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT)), > - igd_guest_opregion = 0; > - return; > - } Shouldn't this be somehow versioned? I.e. if the libxl does not have the change then keep the current code? > - > ret = xc_domain_memory_mapping(xen_xc, xen_domid, > (unsigned long)(igd_guest_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT), > (unsigned long)(igd_host_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT), >
On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 11:21:09PM +0000, Grzegorz Uriasz wrote: > With the upstreaming of linux based stubdomains to xen, qemu can't > assume it runs inside dom0 - permission assignment must be moved to > libxl running in dom0. This xen patch: > https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2020-06/msg00973.html > implements granting the required permissions to the stubdomain running > qemu. This patch removes granting opregion permissions in qemu - this > should be fine as when qemu is running inside dom0 the memory mapping will > be successfully created without first explicitly granting the permission. In order to avoid breaking certain libxl - QEMU combinations, could you make the check below non-fatal? So that the current code can be kept for dom0 while not throwing an error when used inside of a stub domain? Thanks, Roger.
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c index 7d46e9c209..303674365b 100644 --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c @@ -283,19 +283,6 @@ void igd_write_opregion(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, uint32_t val) igd_guest_opregion = (unsigned long)(val & ~XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_MASK) | (igd_host_opregion & XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_MASK); - ret = xc_domain_iomem_permission(xen_xc, xen_domid, - (unsigned long)(igd_host_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT), - XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_PAGES, - XEN_PCI_INTEL_OPREGION_ENABLE_ACCESSED); - - if (ret) { - XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "[%d]:Can't enable to access IGD host opregion:" - " 0x%lx.\n", ret, - (unsigned long)(igd_host_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT)), - igd_guest_opregion = 0; - return; - } - ret = xc_domain_memory_mapping(xen_xc, xen_domid, (unsigned long)(igd_guest_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT), (unsigned long)(igd_host_opregion >> XC_PAGE_SHIFT),
With the upstreaming of linux based stubdomains to xen, qemu can't assume it runs inside dom0 - permission assignment must be moved to libxl running in dom0. This xen patch: https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2020-06/msg00973.html implements granting the required permissions to the stubdomain running qemu. This patch removes granting opregion permissions in qemu - this should be fine as when qemu is running inside dom0 the memory mapping will be successfully created without first explicitly granting the permission. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Uriasz <gorbak25@gmail.com> --- hw/xen/xen_pt_graphics.c | 13 ------------- 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)